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Abstract
The International Criminal Court requires a solid foundation on which to build its
future success, investigating the most heinous international crimes and prosecuting
the alleged perpetrators. This thesis examines some remaining challenges to ensure
the long term success of the Court. It begins by requiring the ICC to establish a
culture that adheres to the values of the organization and a legal system capable of
fairly and expeditiously carrying out its mission. This requires an ethical approach
and effective management. It is necessary for the Office of the Prosecutor to
understand the burden of proof requirements at the confirmation of charges stage,
which in turn requires the Pre-Trial Chambers to be consistent in their decisions.
The OTP appear to have accepted the direction from the Pre-Trial Chamber, that its
investigations should be largely completed by the time of the confirmation of charges
hearing. This is, in the author’s view, a mistake and should be challenged again at
an opportune moment. The Office of the Prosecutor, learning from its experience, is
adhering to good governance by creating and publishing its strategic goals. One of
the strategic goals is to have largely completed its investigations by the time of the
confirmation of charges hearing, a reaction to a critical decision by the Pre-trial
Chamber in the Gbagbo case.
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1Chapter 1 – Introduction
1.1 Introduction
This chapter will, following a brief introduction, set out the research question of the
thesis.  It will also explain the justification for the decision to address that particular
research question.
In July 2012 the International Criminal Court (ICC, or Court) celebrated its tenth
anniversary1. Even though, as a new institution, it had the benefit of learning lessons
from the ad hoc tribunals2 also based in The Hague – the International City of Peace
and Justice3 – the first decade of the Court’s existence was difficult and many
hurdles were faced.
The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP, or Office) has clearly identified the first decade
as the ‘start-up phase’,4 perhaps in an effort to distance itself from some public
failures in the early years of its operation, although the OTP has never made such a
claim. For example, during this period, there were occasions when the Lubanga5 trial
looked to be in serious difficulty and the proceedings were stayed on two separate
occasions.6 In other cases, not all of the charges brought by the Prosecution were
accepted by the pre-trial chamber. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
1 The Rome Statute entered into force on 1st July 2002 after it was ratified by 60 states.
2 The ad hoc tribunals are those tribunals established by the UNSC to investigate or prosecute
alleged breaches of international criminal law in specific instances. They include: the
Yugoslavia and Rwandan tribunals as well as the Special Court for Sierra Leone and Special
Tribunal for the Lebanon.
3 See UN Secretary General’s remarks at the 60th anniversary celebration of the International
Court of Justice, The Hague on 12th April 2006, http://www.icj-
cij.org/presscom/index.php?pr=1005&lg=en&pt=1&p1=6&p2=1/ - Last accessed 19/08/2013.
The Municipality of the City of The Hague and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs have
embraced this slogan in order to promote the city and, depending on the audience, is
sometimes expanded to include ‘security’ (i.e. the International City of Peace, Justice and
Security).
4 Strategic Plan June 2012 – 2015, International Criminal Court, Officer of the Prosecutor, 11
October 2013, para. 2, p.5, http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/954beb/.
5 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06.
6 In June 2008 and again in July 2010.
2Situation7 in the case of The Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana,8 the Pre-Trial
Chamber declined to confirm the charges against Mr. Mbarushimana and he was
released from custody in December 2011, in what was an embarrassing defeat for the
Prosecutor.9 Also within the DRC situation, the acquittal of Mathieu Ngudjolo in
December 201210 brought the spotlight upon the Court and reinforced a growing
notion that the OTP was struggling to secure convictions.11
Tellingly, the first Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, publicly at least, did not seem
to accept any criticism for how the OTP conducted its activities during his term of
office. “I received criticism because I was too slow in Sudan, too fast in Libya; too
comprehensive in one case, a very small case in Lubanga. That is the life of the
Prosecutor. I’m not in a popularity contest. I respect my legal mandate; standards
were fully respected”12, he said in an interview at the end of his tenure. It is this
arrogance that tends to lead the author to the conclusion that the OTP, or maybe just
Ocampo himself, was not taking responsibility for his actions. In the same interview
he stressed that “the Court itself is managing the challenges of international criminal
law. We manage well” 13 but “the system around the Court responsible for
7 A ‘situation’ could also be called an investigation, and within each situation it is possible to
have a number of cases. For example, in the DRC situations there are a number of individual
cases, which would usually be tried separately. The ICC also has a third category of affairs
called ‘preliminary examinations’, where evidence is being assessed but no decision has
been taken on whether or not to open an investigation. For more information, see:
https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/situations.aspx?ln=en.
8 The Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10.
9 A positive spin on the Chamber failing to confirm charges in Mbarushimana, is that it is
evidence that the Court is functioning and capable of taking tough and fair decisions. On
23rd April 2010, Pre-Trial Chamber I also declined to confirm the charges in The Prosecutor v
Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, Case No. ICC-02/05-02/09, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges,
http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/cb3614.
10 The Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12, Judgment Pursuant to
Article 74 of the Statute, 18 December 2012, http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/2c2cde/.
11 The Prosecution appealed the verdict on 20 December 2012. On 27 February 2015, the
verdict was upheld by the Appeals Chamber - Judgment on the Prosecutor’s appeal against
the decision of Trial Chamber II entitled “Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute”,
http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/1dce8f/.
12 IPI Global Observatory, 25 January 2012,
http://theglobalobservatory.org/2012/01/interview-with-luis-moreno-ocampo-chief-
prosecutor-of-the-international-criminal-court/ - Last visited  25/02/2015
13 Ibid.
3implementing and enforcing its decisions can still improve”, he said, “as the
international relations challenges are still there”.14
However, a number of significant problems have persisted beyond  the Court’s
‘start-up’ phase and, as late as June 2013 the Pre-Trial Chamber in the Situation in
the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire (CIV),15 in the case of The Prosecutor v. Laurent
Gbagbo,16 failed to confirm the charges against the former Ivorian President17. The
decision was unexpected by the OTP’s trial team and illustrated a profound gap in
the interpretation of the Rome Statute, Rules of Evidence and Procedure and case-
law of the Court between the OTP on the one hand, and this Pre-Trial Chamber on
the other.18 One of the main issues highlighted by this decision is the applicable
evidentiary standard required for the confirmation of charges. Previous decisions by
the Court had given guidance on this very matter. However, in this case, the Pre-
Trial Chamber19 found that the Prosecutor did not present sufficient evidence to meet
the standard of the ‘substantial grounds to believe’ threshold required under Article
61(7) of the Statute.20
Additionally, in December 2013 the Prosecutor made the shocking announcement
that she had requested an adjournment of the commencement of the trial against Mr.
Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta,21 the incumbent President of Kenya, within the Kenya
(KEN) Situation,22 stating that “... [I] come to the conclusion that currently the case
against Mr. Kenyatta does not satisfy the high evidentiary standards required at trial.
I therefore need time to complete efforts to obtain additional evidence, and to
14 Ibid.
15 Situation in the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire, ICC-02/11.
16 The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/15. The Blé
Goudé Gbagbo cases were joined on 11 March 2015. The trial finally began on 28 January
2016.
17 The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, Decision adjourning the
hearing on the confirmation of charges pursuant to article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute, 03
June 2013, http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/2682d8/.
18 This issue is discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
19 Although not unanimously: Presiding Judge, Silvia Fernández wrote a dissenting opinion
- http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/4936d0/.
20 The article says “shall…determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish substantial
grounds to believe that the person committed each of the crimes charged”.
21 The Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11.
22 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09.
4consider whether such evidence will enable my Office to fully meet the evidentiary
threshold required at trial.”23 The case highlights the vulnerability of the OTP when
relying largely on witness testimony to prove its case. According to the International
Bar Association, who launched a report entitled ‘Witnesses before the International
Criminal Court’, in July 2013:
“The ICC has made significant strides in protecting, supporting and managing
witnesses during its first ten years of operation; both the Court and its Member
States are to be commended. However, the Court still encounters serious
witness-related challenges in almost all of its cases.’ Dr. Ellis cited the case of
the prominent Kenyan politician Mr Francis Muthaura, accused of crimes
against humanity, as a prime example, saying, ‘The ICC Prosecutor recently
dropped all charges against Mr Francis Muthaura due to critical and unresolved
problems with key witnesses.’ He added, ‘This single case highlights the
myriad of issues surrounding witness-management and the need for the Court to
evaluate and review its approach to witnesses in order to bolster its international
credibility and ensure fair, efficient and effective trials.”. 24
Later in 2013, in a different case, Bemba,25 the arrest of several members of the
defence team of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo26 indicates that some of the difficulties
faced by the Prosecutor, even while outside her control, have the potential to
seriously damage the reputation of the OTP, and the Court generally.
23 “Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda,
following an application seeking an adjournment of the provisional trial date”, 19/12/2013 -
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-statement-19-12-2013.
24 “ICC’s reliance on live witness testimony at a crossroads states new IBA report”, Mark
Ellis, IBA Executive Director -
http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=4470a96b-c4fa-457f-9854-
ce8f6da005ed - Last visited 12/12/2013.
25 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Bemba was found
guilty, on 21 March 2016, of two counts of crimes against humanity (murder and rape) and
three counts of war crimes (murder, rape, and pillaging). The crimes were committed in
Central African Republic ("CAR") from on or about 26 October 2002 to 15 March 2003 ("2002-
2003 CAR Operation") by a contingent of Mouvement de Libération du Congo ("MLC")
troops. Mr Bemba was a person effectively acting as a military commander with effective
authority and control over the forces that committed the crimes. He was sentenced on 21
June 2016, to 18 years of imprisonment. See: https://www.icc-cpi.int/car/bemba - Last
accessed 29/08/2016.
26 See: “Aimé Kilolo Musamba, Fidèle Babala Wandu, and Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo make
first appearance before ICC”, 27/11/2013, in relation to The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba
Gombo, Aimé Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidèle Babala Wandu and Narcisse
Arido, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13 - https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=966&ln=en.
5Despite the challenges,27 it would be wrong to say that the ICC did not make any
progress in its first decade. Under the stewardship of its first Prosecutor, Luis
Moreno Ocampo, an Argentinian lawyer who earned a reputation as a public
prosecutor during the Argentine ‘junta trials’ in 1985,28 a functioning organisation
was developed and the strategic use of narrow, focused investigations combined with
the deployment of staff on a rotating basis, meant that Situations were opened in
seven countries.29 Furthermore, he Court’s first guilty verdict was delivered on 14th
March 2012 against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, for the war crimes of enlisting and
conscripting of children under the age of 15 years and using them to participate
actively in hostilities.30
It could well be argued that the mere existence of the Court is already a significant
victory against the odds.
“The fact that the Rome Statute passed with such a lopsided victory, despite all
of the objections from different sides regarding the semantics of the document,
was a major victory in itself. Then, the rapidness of the ratification of the treaty,
just four short years after the monumental signing, showed that the need to
establish a world criminal court was present. Since the inception of the court,
fifty seven additional nations have joined the court, with more coming all the
time. The support for the ICC is definitely growing, especially among the
smaller nations of the world, as they view the ICC as a support system to their
27 11 years after the formation of the Court, only cases based in Africa have been opened.
This has led to claims of an anti-African bias and on 11th October 2013 the African Union
held an extraordinary session specifically to address the “[p]rogress Report on the
Implementation of Decision Assembly/AU/Dec. 482 (XXI) of May 2013 on International
Jurisdiction, Justice and ICC”. Pressure is being brought from influential opponents of the
ICC from within the African Union after a number of its leaders were indicted. See:
http://www.au.int/en/content/extraordinary-session-assembly-african-union - Last visited
09/10/2013.
28 The trial of the juntas was the first major trial held for war crimes since the Nuremberg
Trials in Germany after the Second World War. It lasted from April to August 1985 and
resulted in three generals and two admirals being found guilty, two of whom (General
Videla and Admiral Massera), received life sentences.
29 A further Situation was opened by Prosecutor Bensouda, in Mali, in January 2013.
30 By September 2016, the Court had formally closed five cases. Two cases are at the
Reparations stage, one is at the Appeals stage, a further six cases are at Trial stage and four
are at the Pre-Trial stage.  See: https://www.icc-cpi.int/ - Last accessed 29/08/2016.
6own domestic judicial institution.”31
Within the 10 active Situations32, the Office of the Prosecutor has opened 18 cases.
Half of the Situations were referred to the Court by the States themselves.33 A further
two were referred to the ICC by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)34 and
a two more were initiated by the Prosecutor under the proprio motu powers 35
delivered by Article 15 of the Rome Statute.36
The OTP is aware of the challenges that lie ahead and is mindful of its potential for
making an impact on peace and justice in the world’s most war-torn regions and
indeed its obligation to the victims of crimes.37 The OTP strategy recognises that
“jurisprudence is still developing, [the] judges are indicating through their decisions
that they are expecting the OTP to be (more) trial-ready at an earlier stage in the
proceedings and that they are expecting the OTP to submit more and different kinds
of evidence than what the Office considered would suffice in its focused
investigations and prosecutions.”38
1.2 Research Question
The main goal of this thesis is to identify some areas where the Court needs to
establish a solid foundation upon which to grow into an institution, which can most
effectively achieve its mandate. The primary research question therefore is: What are
31 Donovan, Daniel, “International Criminal Court: Successes and Failures, International
Policy Digest”, 23 March 2012, http://intpolicygigest.org/2012/03/23/international-criminal-
court-sucess-and-failures-of-the-past-andgoals-for-the-future/.
32 The Court treats the two referrals from the Central African Republic as separate Situations.
33 Uganda, Mali, Central African Republic (1 and 2) and Democratic Republic of the Congo.
34 Darfur, Sudan and Libya.
35 Kenya, Georgia and Côte d'Ivoire.
36 According to Schabas, by 2010 the Court was “fully operational and that it has been able to
arrest suspects and hold trials is an outstanding accomplishment. Few would have expected this
sixteen years ago when international criminal justice revived … with the creation of the [ICTY]. In
1993 the international Law Commission was working diligently on the preliminary draft of the Rome
Statute, but probably most of its members – indeed, most knowledgeable observers – did not expect
things to move very quickly” – Schabas, William, “The International Criminal Court: A
Commentary on the Rome Statute”, Oxford Commentaries on International Law, Oxford
University Press, p.7.
37 See generally: OTP strategic plan June 2012 -2015 - http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/954beb/.
38 Ibid, p.5.
7some of the key operational challenges remaining to ensure the long term success of
the International Criminal Court?
This can be addressed by looking at three separate areas: cultural, strategic and
procedural/legal. By taking a more holistic approach it is possible to make the Court
more successful generally.  The ICC is not merely a court, it is a complex institution
that needs to be managed strategically and with a large and diverse staff it is
important to both understand and nurture the culture of the institution. It is however,
necessary to implement some limitations to this work and therefore from the very
beginning, it should be stated clearly that there are a great many issues which the
author will not attempt to cover although some of the main criticisms of the Court
and the OTP will be set out in a preliminary chapter, in order to provide the general
context.39
In order to adequately answer the Research Question, the thesis will ask three sub-
questions, the first of which relates to the legal culture of the Court; is the legal
culture of the court hindering its effectiveness? This particular issue has not been
subject to much examination by scholars, although Judith McMorrow40 did excellent
research on the topic as it related to the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).  Lawyers before international tribunals are licenced by
their home bar associations. Their behaviour before an international tribunal could
result in disciplinary hearings against them back home. But expectations of domestic
bar associations differ. For example, “a British-trained defence counsel would not
prepare a witness in advance of trial because it is forbidden in Great Britain. For
U.S.-trained defence counsel, however, it would be considered inappropriate not to
interview and prepare a witness for the rigors of trial if there were an opportunity to
do so”.41
From a procedural point of view, the confirmation of charges process has produced
mixed results and received much commentary. The Prosecutor has been heavily
39 See Infra Chapter 2, “Background and criticisms of the OTP”.
40 McMorrow, Judith ,”Creating Norms of Attorney Conduct in International Tribunals: A
Case Study of the ICTY”, 30 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 139 (2007),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol30/iss1/8 - Last accessed 05/09/2016.
41 Ibid, p.142.
8criticised for the lack of evidence presented by the Pre-Trial Chamber 42 which
declared that it “considers that the Prosecutor’s evidence, viewed as a whole,
although apparently insufficient, does not appear to be so lacking in relevance and
probative value that it leaves the Chamber with no choice but to decline to confirm
the charges under Article 61(7)(b) of the Statute. Rather than making a final
determination on the merits at this time, the Chamber considers it appropriate in this
case to adjourn the hearings.” 43 Therefore, the second sub-question is: does the
confirmation of charges stage need to be re-examined?
Thirdly, the Office has gone to some trouble to explain to its stakeholders, that it has
a strategy in place. The third sub-question asks: where does the Prosecutor herself
see the future of the OTP? The staff in the Office need to understand where the
strategic direction lies.  If this is clearly defined then it is easier to follow.  It is also a
necessary step in analysing the OTP as a whole because any recommendations
should preferably be in keeping with Prosecutors Bensouda’ s vision.
1.3 Justification for Research
At the turn of the century, the new Court was looming and international criminal law
had become more visible than at any time since the Second World War.44 The former
Yugoslavian and the Rwandan tribunals were having a big impact on the subject, and
academics and commentators discovered a rich source of new law on which to focus
their attention. There was a spike in publications, but these were largely theoretical,
as the Court had yet to actually prosecute any cases. It was not until the Lubanga
case that commentators really gained an insight to the workings of the OTP.45
As a long time servant of the Court, the author feels to a certain extent, a
responsibility to do all in his power, limited as it may be, to ensure that it is the best
42 The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, ICC-02/02/11-01/11.
43 The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, Decision adjourning the
hearing on the confirmation of charges pursuant to article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute, 03
June 2013, http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/2682d8/.
44 Anderson, Kenneth, “The Rise of International Criminal Law: Intended and Unintended
Consequences” - European Journal of International Law 20, no. 2 (April 2009): 331-58.
45 By this stage, “Archbold: International Criminal Court” had already been published and
up-dated, without the benefit of a single judgement being delivered.
9that it can be46. Therefore, the reason for choosing this topic is both practical and
personal. It is only by exploring the past behaviour in an honest way that real lessons
can be learnt, and for the Court to start to mature.
The Prosecutor of the Court frequently talks in terms of justice,47 when it could be
argued that the role of the OTP is merely to prosecute.48 Perhaps the matter is not as
straight forward in the case of the ICC because it does seem to have a role in
providing justice.49 It will also be considered throughout the following pages, how
success or failure should be measured. 50 For example, the failure to secure a
conviction at trial could be regarded as evidence that the process works and that an
innocent person is set free. The safeguards in place to protect the rights of the
accused, worked.
Expectations for the Court remain high and many still do not understand the
limitations of the Court’s mandate. The Prosecutor receives numerous requests to
open investigations where there is no power or jurisdiction to do so. According to
Human Rights Watch, the Court’s “... daunting mandate and world-wide reach have
made the flaws in its workings more visible. The governments on which the ICC
depends to carry out its mandate have been inconsistent in their support, particularly
when it comes to arrests ... [as of June 2012] [a]rrest warrants are pending for
suspects in the Libya, Sudan, Uganda, Cote d’Ivoire and D.R. Congo investigations.
46 The author is currently Head of the Information and Evidence Unit in the OTP, a position
he has held since 2006.
47 See for example: “Statement of ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda, on the conclusion of the
peace negotiations between the Government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia – People's Army”, September 2016, The Hague Justice Portal,
http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/index.php?id=13596 - Last accessed 05/09/2016.
48 Is it the Prosecutor’s role to bring justice to victims or merely prosecute those responsible
for committing crimes under her jurisdiction? Where the two converge, it is straight
forward.
49 The final paragraph of the Preamble of the Rome Statute specifically states that it is
“[r]esolved to guarantee lasting respect for and the enforcement of international justice” (italics
added).
50 It is clear for example, that the mission of the ICTY, because of the mechanism which
established it (i.e. Chapter VII of the UN Charter), is to ‘maintain or restore international
peace and security’ - From address to the General Assembly of the United Nations, 4th
November 1997.
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The Court and its member countries face major challenges in meeting the
expectations, for the court, in its second decade.”51
Finally, the culture of institutions is created right from the beginning. The Court
today is fourteen years old, it is young still, but no longer new and its culture is being
created. The possibility still exists to correct any bad habits that may have formed,
but soon this opportunity will expire and methodologies and systems will become
embedded making change difficult. It is therefore also opportune to visit the first
chapter of the OTP’s work and consider the foundation on which its future will be
built.52
1.4 Structure of the Thesis
As there are already a great many published works which describe how the Court
came into existence, it is not necessary to delve into this further. Any text book about
the Court will begin with a chapter setting out its origins via the Nuremberg trials
and the ad hoc53 tribunals of the early 1990s.54 This thesis will begin, in Chapter 2,
with a brief look at how the court came into existence and also will set out some of
the main criticisms levied at the Court and the Office of the Prosecutor.
The primary sources for Chapter 3, which looks at the culture of the Court, including
the conflict on the different legal traditions, are interviews conducted by the author
51 http://www.hrw.org/topic/international-justice/international-criminal-court - Last visited
24/12/2013.
52 Already the ICC’s Registry has embarked upon on a process of “ReVision” where they are
seeking to amend the structure of the organ. It has resulted in the first structured staff
redundancy programme. It is an attempt to realign the work practices from the theoretical
model to the reality.
53 The term ad hoc tribunals will be referred to repeatedly during this thesis. For the most
part, it refers to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Sometimes it is also extended to
include the Special Court of Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the Special Tribunal for the Lebanon
(STL).
54 Schabas, William, “The U.N. International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia,
Rwanda and Sierra Leone”, Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 7; Röling, B.V.A., “The
Law of War and International Jurisdiction since 1945”, Hague Academy of International
Law, Collected Courses, 1960-II, Leiden: A.W. Sijthof, 1961, p.356.
11
with two ICC officials 55 who were able to provide detailed knowledge and
perspective on how the Court evolved in the way it did and, for example, on the
balance between Civil and Common Law features in the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, as both interviewees were involved with the ICC going back as far as
1997, so even before the Court came into existence. Additionally, both officials still
currently work for the Court in senior positions. The author was satisfied that the use
of interviews would work well for Chapter 3 but not for additional parts of this
thesis, because on the topic of the Court’s history and culture they could speak freely
and objectively; however, the same interviewees would not be free or able to offer
any information on the cases before the Court. Both interviews were conducted at the
seat of the Court in The Hague, and while they followed a structure (i.e. questions
and answers), they were dynamic and the discussions were wide ranging.
Few lawyers actually practice International Criminal Law on a full time basis. Apart
from those hired directly by the Court, for most lawyers who appear before the ICC
on the defence side, it is not their full time job.56 International criminal law is a
relatively small aspect of public international law. However, in recent years between
the ICC and the ad hoc tribunals, there is an increasing body of law for practitioners
to study. Lawyers will come to the Court with their own experiences, learned from a
habit of practice in their national jurisdictions. A clear contrast is the difference
between an American lawyer (common law) and a German lawyer (civil law). Their
route to the profession is different and their experiences, coming as they do from
different legal traditions will vary. The difficulties are not confined to just the
advocates, but include judges elected to serve in the Court, who are drawn from all
over the world.57
55 The interview with Gilbert Bitti, currently a Senior Legal Adviser to the ICC Judges, took
place on 30 June 2015. Hans Bevers, Legal Adviser to the Prosecutor, was interviewed by the
author on 7 July 2015. Both meetings were held at ICC headquarters in The Hague.
56 For example, one defence attorney, Mr Kaufman, who represented Jean-Pierre Bemba and
Callixte Mbarushimana, is based in England and has regular domestic clients as well as his
international criminal practice. With a few notable exceptions (for example, Karim Khan),
lawyers practicing international criminal law, do not do so full time.
57 Article 36(8)(a)(i) of the Rome Statute requires that judges should be selected by the States
Parties, to take into account “the principal legal systems of the world”.
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In Chapter 4 the confirmation of charges stage of the judicial process is examined, a
topic which has been considered a great deal by commentators. The confirmation
process can be used to filter out the unmeritorious cases, or cases where the evidence
is too weak to justify a trial and thus protecting suspects from unnecessary and
potentially lengthy exposure to trial.58
Chapter 5 will consider what changes Fatou Bensouda has introduced since taking
over the position in 2012. It will also examine the strategic plan produced by the
OTP and add comment to the feasibility of the plan.
The final chapter will be the conclusion, which will offer concrete recommendations
for the success of the court in the medium to long term. This chapter will also make
some suggestions for future research and as a postscript highlight some recent
developments in the court, which can be seen in a positive light and thus establishing
a more solid foundation on which to grow.
Chapter 2 – Background and Criticisms of
the OTP
2.1 Introduction
This chapter will provide a background to the creation of the Court and also
highlight some of the work done in the first generation of its existence. It is not
necessary to describe how the Court came into being, as the journey is very well
documented elsewhere,59 however, what follows is necessary to provide the reader
with an understanding of the remaining, substantive, portion of the thesis, and to
inform the Research Question.
58 Nerlich, Volker, “The Confirmation of Charges Procedure at the International Criminal
Court. Advance or Failure?”, Journal of International Criminal Justice (2012) 10 (5): 1339-
1356, p.1354.
59 See for example: Schabas, W.A., “An introduction to the International Criminal Court”,
Third Edition, Cambridge University Press, 2007, at Chapter 1.
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It is also useful to identify some of the most common criticisms made about the
OTP, as these will be generally referred to throughout the thesis.60 Furthermore, it is
important to understand the commentary offered from a wide variety of observers, in
order to properly address the most pressing topics, facing the OTP and the wider
Court as a whole.
2.2 The Beginning of International Criminal Law61
According to one commentator, there was a long tradition during the 19th and early
20th century of not placing the political leadership of a defeated country on trial:
“The relevant negative practice was predicated on the assumption that wars were a
fact of life and that nothing could be gained by instituting criminal proceedings
against the responsible office holders after the end of hostilities”,62 believing that the
inter-relationship between many of Europe’s monarchs might have a bearing on this
‘liberalism’63. Nevertheless, as early as January 1942, representatives from a number
of Allied Countries met in London to consider how they might eventually punish the
Nazis for war crimes, followed throughout the war by similar meetings in Tehran64,
Yalta65 and Potsdam66. However, it was the London Charter67 (sometimes referred to
60 The examples provided are not an exhaustive list by any means.
61 Most of the academic literature points out that there were early examples of international
trials, but the first significant attempt did not come until the Paris Peace Conference in 1919
at the conclusion of which there was an attempt to prosecute the German Kaiser. Many
commentators make reference to the trial of Peter von Hagenbach as far back as 1474, as the
first international criminal trial (See for example: Glasius, Marlies, “The International
Criminal Court A Global Civil Society Achievement”, Routledge, 2006 at p. 5), dismissed by
the author as irrelevant to the ICC. Perhaps more relevant is the idea conceived by Gustave
Moynier, a founder of the International Committee of the Red Cross, following the Franco-
Prussian war, in 1872. The proposal suggested that an international tribunal be established
to punish those who violated international humanitarian law.
62 Tomuschat, Christian, “The Legacy of Nuremberg”, Journal of International Criminal
Justice 4 (2006), 830-844, p.831.
63 Kaiser Wilhelm II, Emperor of Germany was the eldest grandson of British Monarch,
Queen Victoria and a second cousin of Tsar Nicholas II of Russia, among others.
64 This was the first time that Stalin met with Churchill and Roosevelt met at took place in
November 1943 at a time when the war began to swing in favour of the Allies.
65 Took Place in February 1945, was also referred to as the Crimea Conference.  See: Berthon,
Simon; Potts, Joanna, “Warlords: An Extraordinary Re-creation of World War II Through the
Eyes and Minds of Hitler, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin”, Da Capo Press, 2007.
66 The conference at Potsdam, which is not far from Berlin, took place after the surrender of
Germany.  By this time Roosevelt had died and was replaced by Truman.  It was agreed
here that the Nazi leadership would be put on trial.
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as the Nuremberg Charter) which gave the tribunal, which was to follow, its legal
basis.68 Following the end of WWII, it was decided to hold the trials of the most
prominent Nazi leaders in the city of Nuremberg,69 once considered the ceremonial
birthplace of the Nazi party.70
Justice Jackson, who had been appointed by President Truman in May 1945 to act as
the US representative and Chief Counsel at Nuremberg,71 insisted that the Allies
must respect the Rule of Law,72 stating that “[t]he ultimate principle is that you must
put no man on trial under the form of judicial proceedings, if you are not willing to
see him free if found not guilty. If you are determined to execute a man in any case,
there is no occasion for a trial”.73 Indeed, three of those tried were acquitted and
others received prison sentences.74 Initially not all the powers were in favour of
holding the trials.75 These proceedings, at Nuremberg, were the first of their kind in
67 The Charter of the International Military Tribunal – Annex to the Agreement for the
prosecution and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis – 8th August
1945.
68 Although the Tribunal had a legal basis, one of the arguments put forward by critics of the
court was that the defendants could not be punished for crimes for which there was no
offence at the time of the act, nullum crimen sine lege, for ‘crimes against peace’, these days
called the crime of ‘aggression’.
69 The International Military Tribunal (“IMT”) gained more prominence over the Nuremberg
Military Tribunals (NMT), because the accused were some of the most high-ranking leaders
of the defeated regime, including Rudolf Hess, Herman Goring and Martin Bormann.
70 Whatever about the symbolic impact, the city had a large courthouse with a prison
attached, which remarkably remained intact despite much of the rest of the city being badly
damaged due to allied bombing.
71 Executive Order 9547 Providing for Representation of the United States in Preparing and
Prosecuting Charges of Atrocities and War Crimes Against the Leaders of the European
Axis Powers and Their Principal Agents and Accessories, May 2, 1945.
72 By some accounts, Churchill was in favour of summarily executing selected Nazi leaders
and allegedly made this proposal at Yalta, but he was overruled by Roosevelt.  See: Cobain,
Ian, “Britain favoured execution over Nuremberg trials for Nazi leaders”, The Guardian, 26
October 2012, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/26/britain-execution-
nuremberg-nazi-leaders - Last accessed 29/08/2016.
73 Robert H. Jackson, in an address to the American Society of International Law, cited by
Harris, Whitney, “Justice Jackson at Nuremberg”, International Lawyer, vol. 20, no. 3,
Summer 1986, p. 869.
74 Hjalmar Schacht, Franz von Papen and Hans Fritzsche were all found to be not guilty.
75 In fact it was reported that Churchill was initially in favour of executing the captured Nazi
leaders without even a trial. In an essay written about the Nuremberg Trials, Doug Linder
writes “Churchill reportedly told Stalin that he favoured execution of captured Nazi leaders. Stalin
answered, "In the Soviet Union, we never execute anyone without a trial." Churchill agreed saying,
"Of course, of course. We should give them a trial first." All three leaders issued a statement in
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history, where jurists from different nations came together to prosecute individuals
for their actions during the war.  Crimes against peace and war crimes were added to
by a new category of crime, crimes against humanity,76 which rejected the previous
defence of obeying superior orders, which was pleaded at Leipzig, following the end
of the First World War.77
When opening the trial, Justice Jackson declared: “That four great nations, flushed
with victory and stung with injury, would stay the hand of vengeance and voluntarily
submit their captive enemies to the judgement of the law is one of the most
significant tributes that power has ever paid to reason.”78
According to John Bolton79 “[w]henever the idea of a war crimes tribunal is raised,
Nuremberg is the model invariably cited. But an international criminal court [will
be] nothing like Nuremberg”.80 One of the most significant points about Nuremberg,
to the extent that it relates to the ICC, is that it took place. That, by itself, was a large
step forward from the aftermath of previous wars.81 Additionally, a precedent was
established that crimes committed in war would be punished.
“The most important point of Nuremberg was the conclusion that aggressive
war, which had been a national right throughout history, was henceforth going
to be punished as an international crime. That was a revolution in thinking.
Yalta in February, 1945 favouring some sort of judicial process for captured enemy leaders.
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/nuremberg/nurembergACCOUNT.html - Last
accessed 15/05/2016.
76 Set out in Section 6 of The Charter and Judgment of the Nürnberg Tribunal – “History and
Analysis: Memorandum submitted by the Secretary-General Formulation of the Nürnberg
Principles”, http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_5.pdf - Last accessed
07/08/2016.
77 For an interesting discussion on the debate between customary international law and the
ICC’s statute on this topic, see: Gaeta, Paola, “The Defence of Superior Orders: The Statute of
the International Criminal Court versus Customary International Law”, EJIL, 1999,
http://ejil.org/pdfs/10/1/571.pdf - Last accessed 08/08/2016.
78 Cited in Telford Taylor, “The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials”, New York, 1992, p.167.
79 Former US Ambassador to the United Nations 2005-2006 and a high profile critic of the
ICC.
80 Dempsey, Gary T., “Reasonable Doubt: The Case Against the Proposed International
Criminal Court”, from Driscoll, William, Zompetti, Joseph; and Zompetti, Suzette W.,
(Editors), “The International Criminal Court. Global Politics and the Quest for Justice”, The
International Debate Education Association, 2004.
81 Following the First World War there was no serious effort to prosecute those most
responsible for serious crimes committed during the conflict, although it is conceded that
the Leipzig trials at least set the foundation for the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials.
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We’ve always had wars, and many would say that warfare was inevitable and
immutable as part of some Divine eternal plan – “The big fish eat the little
fish”. Well Justice Jackson said, “No more”...the time had come when we must
hold accountable those leaders who hold the reins of power, so they will know
that they will be answerable for their evil deeds, and warfare is an evil deed.”82
While Nuremberg can be viewed as the beginning of modern international criminal
law, its importance to the ICC is more symbolic than practical.  The two courts, in
fact, were vastly different institutions. The ad hoc tribunals, established in the 1990’s
had a more direct impact and influence on the institution that was being negotiated in
Rome in 1998.
2.3 The Rome Conference
Despite some initial headway in the post war years, progress on the development of
an international criminal court was disrupted by the Cold War83 and, comparatively
little work was done between the end of the war and the early 1990s. However, once
the International Law Commission (ILC)84 finally finished its task of creating a draft
statute, it was submitted to the United Nations General Assembly in 1994.85 The
Assembly then created the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court which met twice the following year, 1995. The next
step was the creation of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
82 Ferencz, Benjamin B., “A World of Peace under the Rule of Law: The view from America”,
Washington University Global Studies Law Review, Symposium – Judgment at Nuremberg,
Vol. 6, No. 3, 2007, p.663-664.
83 The General Assembly suspended the mandate of the ILC in 1954.
84 The International Law Commission was established by the General Assembly, in 1947, to
undertake the mandate of the Assembly, under article 13(1)(a) of the Charter of the United
Nations to "initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of ... encouraging the
progressive development of international law and its codification". See http://legal.un.org/ilc/. -
Last accessed 03/03/2016. The Commission, according the Article 15 of its statute has two
main functions: 1) “the preparation of draft conventions on subjects which have not yet been
regulated by international law or in regard to which the law has not yet been sufficiently developed in
the practice of States”, and 2) “the preparation of draft conventions on subjects which have not yet
been regulated by international law or in regard to which the law has not yet been sufficiently
developed in the practice of States” See: United Nations, Statute of the International Law
Commission, 21 November 1947,
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/statute/statute_e.pdf - Last accessed
24/05/2014.
85 The report, which also contains commentaries on the draft articles, appears in “Yearbook
of the International Law Commission”, 1994, Vol. II, Part Two.
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International Criminal Court, whose function was to prepare a more diplomatically
acceptable text which could be presented to a diplomatic conference. This work was
completed in 1998.86 Finally, after almost fifty years the United Nations held a full
diplomatic conference87 in Rome.
The Conference was attended by 160 States, many with large delegations. The
Statute was adopted on July 17th 1998,88 after five intense weeks of negotiations
between the states with a great deal of involvement from civil society. Before the
Court could be formally established, there was a requirement for 60 States to ratify
the Statute. This happened on 11 April 2002 and the Treaty finally entered into force
on 1 July 2002. 89 In October 2016 the Court has ten cases under preliminary
examination90 and is currently conducting investigations in a further ten situations.91
2.4 Common Criticisms of the OTP
This section will set out the most frequent criticisms of the OTP and the ICC that the
author has encountered. Some have more merit than others and some are more
persistent than others. It is not proposed to go into each topic in much detail, merely
86 During the 6th committee of the 52nd session of the General Assembly in late 1997, the US
Ambassador to the United Nations, Bill Richardson declared that “As we approach the 21st
Century, individuals--of whatever rank in society—who participate in serious and widespread
violations of international humanitarian law must no longer act with impunity. The time has come to
create an international criminal court that is fair, efficient, and effective, and that serves as a
deterrent and a mechanism of accountability in the years to come. We therefore strongly support the
decision to hold a diplomatic conference to finish and adopt the statute of a Court in the summer of
next year.” Evidence that the United States, in theory, were in favor of a permanent
international criminal court. However, his support was not absolute and he did, in the same
speech, acknowledged that there was further work to be done and cautioned that important
details should be ironed out before the conference as they could prove to be barriers to the
success of the mission: “It is neither prudent nor wise to leave such supposed "details" unresolved,
as there may be surprising controversy and difference of opinion, and a total absence of shared
assumptions, about even very simple, albeit essential, procedures and rule”. Debate on the
Establishment of an International Criminal, New York, 23 October 1997,
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=ga52 - Last accessed 12/02/2014.
87 United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court.
88 The vote actually might have taken place in the early hours of the following day, the 18th
of July 1998.
89 http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=icchistory.
90 https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/preliminary-examinations.aspx - Last accessed 28/08/2016.
91 https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/situations.aspx - Last accessed 28/08/2016. Within some
situations, cases have been completed; nevertheless the general investigation remains open.
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to present the reader with a cursory look at the most common criticisms directed
towards the Court. That the challenges faced by the Court are immense is not really
in doubt; for example, one challenge experienced by the OTP is the sheer difficulty
in actually collecting evidence and it is therefore not to be unexpected that it has
received criticism in this area.  In addition this section will address inter alia: the
Court’s focus on Africa, the apparent desire for states to self-refer rather than have
the Prosecutor use her on power under article 15 of the statute, shortcoming in
preliminary examinations, the OTP’s reliance on NGO’s and other actors,
particularly at the early stages of an investigation, the lack of a formal code of
conduct for the OTP and finally the accusation of impartiality on behalf of the Office
of the Prosecutor. Not all of the following specific criticisms will be addressed
within this thesis beyond acknowledging that they exist, for the purposes of
economy.2.4.1 Evidence Collection
In many cases, ICC investigators have access to the Situation countries where
investigations are taking place. They may even have the assistance of the
governments of those countries. 92 In the Darfur Situation however, it was not
possible to visit the region and the Government of Sudan would not provide any
assistance; particularly after President Omar al-Bashir was accused by the ICC
Prosecutor of being responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity and war
crimes committed in Darfur since 2003.93 Because of these circumstances, the OTP
92 There is a long running debate about the ICC’s involvement in the African continent.
Currently all of the active situations are in Africa and there has been a lot of criticism,
including from some leading voices within the continent suggesting that external forces
were interfering in Africa’s problems. The debate centers around the conflict between peace
and justice. Thabo Mbeki believes that the priority is “to stop the killing of …Africans. But the
challenge that arises is when someone says that the issue of justice trumps the issues of peace”. See:
Thabo Mbeki on Al Jazeera, “Justice cannot trump peace”, November 26, 2013, Sierra
Express Media, http://www.sierraexpressmedia.com/archives/63396.
93 In his “Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, to the Security
Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005)”, Prosecutor Ocampo said that “[t]he initiation of the
investigation marks the start of a new phase in the proceeding that will require specific, full and
unfettered cooperation of the Government of Sudan and other parties in the conflict”. See:
https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/cc6D24F9-473F-4A4F-896B-
01A2B5A8A59A/0/ICC_Darfur_UNSC_Report_290605_en.pdf - Last accessed 15/08/2016.
However, by the time of the OTP’s 18th Report to the Security Council in 2013, the
Prosecutor reported that “The Government of the Sudan’s failure to cooperate with the ICC is but
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has had to rely on third parties, often Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), to
provide it with information and evidence, a practice for which they have been
criticised by the Judges.94
A further difficulty experienced by the OTP when collecting evidence is that
governments who support the Court and its work, can often not be seen to assist
investigations for political reasons. For instance, South Africa is a State Party and it
recently received criticism for failing to arrest President Omar al-Bashir when he
visited the country in 2015.95
The Office’s practices of collecting evidence are looked at in Chapter 4, specifically
in the context of the Confirmation of Charges hearings.2.4.2 Focus on Africa
One of the most persistent criticisms of the OTP is its apparent focus on the
continent of Africa. The African Union’s threat to withdraw from the ICC has made
such criticism an urgent issue.96 This is a problem which both the current and the
former Prosecutor have addressed on numerous occasions. Just prior to taking over
the leadership of the OTP, Fatou Bensouda stated “[w]ith due respect, what offends
me most when I hear criticisms about the so-called African bias is how quick we are
to focus on the words and propaganda of a few powerful, influential individuals and
one of the many incidents of the Sudan’s continuous failure and/or refusal to implement the Security
Council’s decisions. This has bolstered Mr Al-Bashir’s resolve to ignore the Security Council
prompting him to even publicly boast in a 13 October 2011 speech that the Sudan did not implement
Security Council resolutions.” See: “Eighteenth Report of the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court to the UN Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005”),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-18ReportUNSCDafurDecember2013.pdf - Last
accessed 15/08/2016
94 The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, Decision Adjourning the
Hearing on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute,
03 June 2013, para.29 - http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/2682d8/.
95 The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Order
requesting submissions from the Republic of South Africa for the purposes of proceedings
under article 87(7) of the Rome Statute, 04 September 2015 - http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/8a12a8/.
96 http://www.dandc.eu/en/article/criticism-international-criminal-court-being-too-focussed-
africa-misleading.
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to forget about the millions of anonymous people that suffer from these crimes …
because all the victims are African victims.”97
It was not until January 2016 that the ICC’s Prosecutor, under her proprio motu
powers, opened an investigation in a country outside Africa, Georgia.98 Furthermore,
the majority of cases under preliminary examination, by the OTP, are outside
Africa.99 One journalist has gone so far as to accuse the Court of being racist:
“Imagine if there were a criminal court in Britain which only ever tried black
people, which ignored crimes committed by whites and Asians and only took an
interest in crimes committed by blacks. We would consider that racist, right?
And yet there is an International Criminal Court which only ever tries black
people, African black people to be precise, and it is treated as perfectly normal.
In fact the court is lauded by many radical activists as a good and decent
institution, despite the fact that no non-black person has ever been brought
before it to answer for his crimes. It is remarkable that in an era when liberal
observers see racism everywhere, in every thoughtless aside or crude joke, they
fail to see it in an institution which focuses exclusively on the criminal antics of
dark-skinned people from the ‘Dark Continent’… Liberal sensitivity towards
issues of racism completely evaporates when it comes to the ICC, which they
will defend tooth and nail, despite the fact that it is quite clearly, by any
objective measurement, racist, in the sense that it treats one race of people
differently to all others.”100
Time and again, it is a position defended by the OTP. In a 2012 speech, Mrs
Bensouda declared: “Again and again we hear criticisms about our so-called focus
on Africa and about the court being an African court, having an African bias. Anti-
ICC elements have been working very hard to discredit the court and to lobby for
97 Smith, David, “New chief prosecutor defends international criminal court: Fatou
Bensouda, who takes over at ICC next month, rejects view that court is 'pro-western, anti-
African”, The Guardian, 23 May 2012,
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2012/may/23/chief-prosecutor-international-criminal-
court - Last accessed 12/15/2016.
98 See: https://www.icc-cpi.int/georgia
99 Of the nine situations under review, only two are in Africa; Guinea and Burundi.
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/Preliminary-Examinations.aspx - Last accessed 15/05/2016
100 O’Neill, Brendan, “The International Criminal Court is, by any objective measurement,
racist. So why do liberals love it?”, The Daily Telegraph, 15 March 2012.
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non-support and they are doing this, unfortunately, with complete disregard for legal
arguments.”101
Others analyzing this issue claim “[t]he critics of the ICC’s actions in Africa assert
claims based in morality, legality, and sociological legitimacy (understood as
perceptions of fairness). First, critics accuse the ICC of acting immorally by
discriminating against Africa and Africans in deciding which situations to investigate
and prosecute. Second, critics claim that the ICC has failed to respect the sovereignty
of African states.”102
The author recalls an informal conversation with Luis Moreno Ocampo103 where he
indicated that while the Court certainly seem to be working within Africa a lot, it
was only because that is where the crimes were being committed.  However, in the
1980’s, he said, the world’s attention was in South America and a hundred years ago
most of the conflicts took place in Europe.  The implication being that right now,
certain countries in Africa need the ICC, but that will not always be the case. The
author is not aware of any policy decision, for example, to either remain focused on
Africa, nor to move away from Africa.  He therefore does not believe there is an
African bias. The opening of the situation in Georgia in January 2016104 marks a
shift away from the African continent, but there has been no policy decision to so do.
The thesis will consider the OTP’s relationship with Africa in both Chapters 3 and 5
and will also make a specific recommendation on the topic in the final chapter.2.4.3 Shortcomings of Preliminary Examinations
With regard to situations under Preliminary Examination, the Office of the
Prosecutor received a fair share of criticism, expressed below. These comments
generally centre on a number of areas: a lack of reporting on the analysis conducted,
101 Supra note 97.
102 deGuzman, Margaret M., Associate Professor Temple University Beasley School of Law.
“Is the ICC Targeting Africa Inappropriately?” - http://iccforum.com/africa.
103 There is no reference for this conversation and it is quoted merely because it helped shape
the author’s view on the ICC’s relationship with Africa.
104 See generally: https://www.icc-cpi.int/georgia - Last accessed 10/09/2016.
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the length of time it takes and the apparent reluctance to close situations under
preliminary analysis.105
In a report about the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC, the FIDH106 considered the
issue of situations under preliminary examination. It believes that it could be
beneficial for the OTP to involve the Pre-Trial Chamber in respect of certain key
legal aspects of preliminary analysis. The report explains that “in practice, victims of
situations where the OTP appears to have been inactive for years have nowhere to
turn. In a court of law, it would be desirable for some debates to take place before a
judge”. 107 Indeed, there is a need to ensure that victims from situations under
preliminary examination can access justice within a reasonable time. However, this
may not be a view shared by the OTP and in any event, there is not a pre-trial judge
appointed to deal with situations under preliminary examination.2.4.4 Investigative Capacity and Reliance on External Actors
Luis Moreno Ocampo encouraged his staff to operate in small, lean teams, which would expand
and shrink with investigations.108 A new approach appears to have been adopted by the new
Prosecutor and this will be more specifically discussed in Chapter Five of this thesis.
Nevertheless, it is undisputed that a court based such a long way from the situations it is
investigating will need to rely upon the cooperation of others, particularly in the initial stages of
the investigation. However, it is a question of balance.
Again the FIDH has expressed “reservations about this ‘small investigation team’ policy on
several occasions. Another matter which has attracted criticism is the lack of sufficient
professional investigators with grounding in police services, forensic sciences, intelligence or
105 There are currently nine situations under preliminary examination, and the OTP has
closed only three: Honduras, Republic of Korea and Venezuela. See: https://www.icc-
cpi.int/pages/preliminary-examinations.aspx - Last accessed 05/08/2016.
106 Fédération Internationale des Droits de l’Homme.
107 FIDH, “The Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC- 9 Years On Analysis of the Prosecutorial
Strategy and Policies of the Office of the Prosecutor (2003-2011) Recommendations to the
Next ICC Prosecutor”, December 2011, https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/cpiproc579ang.pdf -
Last accessed 05/06/2016.
108 Prosecutor Ocampo developed something called the ‘court capacity model’ in order to
justify the number of situations and cases the Office could carry out based on its resources.
The idea was to make the best use of resources by moving staff from one case to another as
the needs dictated.  He (Ocampo) makes reference to the court capacity model at an
“Informal Meeting of Legal Advisors of Ministries of Foreign Affairs” held in New York on
24 October 2005. https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/9D70039E-4BEC-4F32-9D4A-
CEA8B6799E37/143836/LMO_20051024_English.pdf - Last accessed 28/08/2016.
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criminology. While ensuring multidisciplinary expertise within teams is laudable, FIDH stresses
that this must not be done at the expense of sufficient critical skills and experience in core
investigative roles”. 109 They recommend reinforcing the Office’s independent investigative
capacity 110 and, as will be demonstrated later, this is a course of action already begun started by
the Office of the Prosecutor.111 This will be considered in more detail in Chapter 5.2.4.5 Code of Conduct for the OTP
A code of conduct is generally regarded as a transparent method for a group with
some authority or power to demonstrate that they work following an accountable
standard.  In Ireland, for example the Bar operate a code of conduct for its
members112 and An Garda Síochána, the Irish Police force, also operate a code of
conduct, “which must be strictly adhered to.” 113 However, former Prosecutor
Moreno Ocampo always resisted such a code. The current Prosecutor, Mrs.
Bensouda, introduced a Code of Conduct for the Office of the Prosecutor in 2013.114
Such a Code could reassure commentators that the Office behaves in a transparent
manner and might even address certain long standing criticisms such as the
perception of one sided investigation.115
According to Milan Markovic, the Court has established a code of conduct for the
judiciary and the defence counsel, but as yet has failed to introduce one for the OTP.
“This is problematic because the ICC Statute imposes conflicting obligations on the
ICC Prosecutor, and the Prosecutor has resolved his conflicting obligations in the
Lubanga and Al-Bashir cases in ways that have undermined the ICC’s credibility”.116
109 https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/cpiproc579ang.pdf.
110 Ibid.
111 See: Chapter 5.
112 See: https://www.lawlibrary.ie/media/lawlibrary/media/Adopted-Code-of-Conduct-Bar-
of-Ireland-23-July-2014.pdf - Last accessed 15/07/2016.
113 See: http://www.garda.ie/Controller.aspx?Page=10125&Lang=1 - Last accessed
17/07/2016.
114 Entered into force 5 September 2013. Copy on file with the author, still considered an
ICC-OTP internal document.
115 http://www.dandc.eu/en/article/criticism-international-criminal-court-being-too-
focussed-africa-misleading.
116 Honourable Abraham L. Freedman Teaching Fellow, Temple University Beasley School
of Law; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center (2006); M.A., New York University (2003);
B.A., Columbia University (2001). In 2007, the author served as a law clerk to the
Honourable Philippe Kirsch in his capacity as a judge on the International Criminal Court’s
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The idea of a code of conduct requires a body in place to regulate or oversee
complaints grounded in the code.  This has the potential to add to the OTP’s
bureaucracy.  Additionally, the Chambers are at liberty to monitor the OTP’s
behaviour during investigations, which provides a certain level of accountability
already.  Nevertheless, it is an important step in demonstrating transparency and
accountability, and the author is of the view that a code of conduct should be viewed
positively.2.4.6 Impartiality of the OTP
Most of the critics agree on the necessity for the OTP to investigate all parties to a
conflict in order to ensure that the Office is perceived as impartial.117 Where one side
to a conflict appears not to be under investigation it raises questions as to why not. In
the Uganda Situation for example, when Ocampo held a joint press conference with
the Ugandan President, Yoweri Museveni, he was severely criticised and lasting
damage to the integrity of the Office took place.118 The topic of how the OTP intend
to conduct its investigations and prosecutors will be examined in broader detail in
Chapter 5.2.4.7 A Desire for States to Self-Refer
One of the three mechanisms for the Prosecutor to be seized of a case is for a State to
self-refer the situation to the Court.119 This mechanism was used for the first three
situations, namely Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African
Republic, to come before the Court. But, according to Human Rights Watch:
Appeals Chamber. Richard Greenstein, Jaya Ramji-Nogales, and Meg DeGuzman (see
below) provided valuable comments on this Article, as did Elena Baylis, Jean Galbraith,
Craig Martin, and David Zaring on an earlier draft.
117 See: Tiemessen, Alana, “The International Criminal Court and the politics of prosecutions,
The International Journal of Human Rights”, (2014) DOI: 10.1080/13642987.2014.901310;
As recently as April 2016 the prosecutor reaffirmed that she believes the ICC to be “fair,
independent and impartial”. Also see: http://www.jfjustice.net/letter-to-foreign-ministers-on-
support-for-the-icc-in-advance-of-extraordinary-au-summit/commentary/africa-and-the-icc-
legitimacy-impunity-selectivity-fairness-and-accountability - Last accessed 02/08/2016
118 Kersten, Mark, “Why the ICC Won’t prosecute Museveni”, Justice In Conflict, 19 March
2016, https://justiceinconflict.org/2015/03/19/why-the-icc-wont-prosecute-museveni/ - Last
accessed 01/08/2016.
119 Article 14(1) of the Rome Statute: “A State Party may refer to the Prosecutor a situation in
which one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court appear to have been committed
requesting the Prosecutor to investigate the situation for the purpose of determining whether one or
more specific persons should be charged with the commission of such crimes”.
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“Selecting situations that have been voluntarily referred may have
negative implications for perceptions of the prosecutor’s independence
and impartiality in affected communities. This likelihood is increased in
those country situations where the alleged ICC crimes have been
committed along ethnic or political lines and implicate actors in the
referring government (voluntary referral should not deflect attention
from alleged government crimes, for example). There is a substantial risk
that any collaboration between the referring government and the ICC in
these polarized country situations will be perceived negatively by those
affected by the crimes. The court must be sensitive to this reality and
should actively seek to address the negative misperceptions that may
follow a decision to open an investigation. Ultimately, the OTP should
ensure investigation of state actors in the context of voluntary referrals to
determine if there is sufficient evidence to do prosecute and the other
requirements are satisfied”.120
In the Kenya investigation, Ocampo encouraged the Kenyan Government to refer the
case itself,121 only using his Article 15 powers when they declined to do so. From the
Prosecutor’s perspective, a referral by the State itself removes some procedural
obligations imposed by Article 15; the need to “submit to the Pre-Trial Chamber a
request for authorization of an investigation, together with any supporting material
collected”.122 This obligation doesn’t exist either when the United Nations Security
Council refers a situation to the OTP.123
Although the author acknowledges that this is a criticism that has been raised.  It will
not be developed further within this thesis.
120 https://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/icc0708/5.htm.
121 See: ICC Prosecutor: “Kenya Can Be an Example to the World”, Press Release: ”… [s]hould
efforts to conduct national proceedings fail, the Government of Kenya committed to referring the
situation to the Court in accordance with Article 14 of the Rome Statute”, 18 September 2009,
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr452 - Last accessed 14/08/2016.
122 Article 15(3) of the Rome Statute.
123 So far, two situations have been referred by the Security Council: Darfur, which was
referred in March 2005 with an investigation opened in June 2005, and Libya which was
referred in February 2011. An investigation was opened in March of the same year.
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2.5 Success of the ICC
Every December, the representatives of the ICC’s States Parties –the stakeholders of
the Court - meet either in New York or The Hague to agree, among other things, the
budget for the following year. It is during this process that the officials from the
court are scrutinised over their previous activities and have to provide justifications
for future spending plans. 124 Like any country’s national budget, the States are
looking for value for their money, an idea that is abstract unless they can define
success. At first glance it is easy to say that the number of investigations,
prosecutions and convictions are solid success measurement criteria, because this is
something we can understand. A football team that wins the most matches is the
overall winner. Using this criterion however, the ICC is on uncertain ground.
Luis Moreno Ocampo often chose to measure success in a more abstract way.125
“Success”, he declared in answer to the direct question ‘how do you define the
success of the ICC?’, “will be 2 billion kids from all over the world that understand
and support the idea. Success was an Australian pilot who refused to drop a bomb
during the Iraq war because he realized that the real collateral damage would be
bigger than planned. He realized that if he executed the order received, he could be
prosecuted in accordance with the Rome Statute. He returned to his base without
dropping the bombs.”126 In the same forum he said that the “important aspect... is not
what happens in The Hague, but how the Court impacts on the world”127. Therefore,
the overall impact is more important than the outcome of the cases in court.
124 “The Assembly of States Parties decides on various items, such as the adoption of
normative texts and of the budget, (emphasis added) the election of the judges and of the
Prosecutor and the Deputy Prosecutor(s)” from https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/assembly/Pages/assembly.aspx.
125 By the end of his tenure Ocampo believed he had already contributed to ending
impunity. “What is happening in the world today is there is a rule, very clear. Political leaders
cannot gain or stay in power committing massive atrocities”, Interview with Luis Moreno-
Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, January 25, 2012 by Till
Papenfuss, http://theglobalobservatory.org/2012/01/interview-with-luis-moreno-ocampo-
chief-prosecutor-of-the-international-criminal-court/ - Last accessed 15/08/2015.
126 The Reckoning: Understanding the International Criminal Court – Luis Moreno-Ocampo
Responds to Questions from Work Shop Participants, Facing History and Ourselves,
https://www.facinghistory.org/reckoning/luis-moreno-ocampo-responds-questions-
workshop-participants - Last visited 17/07/2015.
127 Ibid.
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Although it is important to have the positive judicial results in order to shape the
global impact.
While reviewing the performance of the first Prosecutor and considering who should
replace him, one commentator said that “[t]o achieve the ICC's promise as a global
court, the parties to the Rome Statute must select a prosecutor who can meet the
court's most serious challenges: concluding trials; convincing governments to arrest
fugitives; conducting credible investigations in difficult places, such as Libya and
Sudan; and expanding the ICC's reach beyond Africa. This may be a lot to ask for,
but the future of the ICC depends on it.”128 This assessment moves away from
Ocampo’s abstract model, which lacked the ability to actually measure success, or
failure, to a more conventional system. A failure to secure convictions, as in the
cases within the Kenya Situation, will certainly have a negative impact on the
reputation of the Court.
2.6 Conclusion
The decision to remain outside the ICC by some large states, particularly the US,
could be seen as troubling, however over the longer term, it might be judged more
positively; that the Court was allowed to develop without their influence.129 Even the
jurisprudence of the Court might get a chance to develop in a truly mixed legal way,
whereas if the Court had US lawyers prosecuting many of the cases130 as with the
ICTY, the case law might develop in a more common law direction. This impact will
be discussed in the next Chapter and should not be underestimated.
Although widely seen as the successor of the ad hoc tribunals, the ICC must find its
own way. The author remains cautiously optimistic about the future: if the Court can
128 Kayne, David, “Who’s afraid of the International Criminal Court - Finding the Prosecutor
Who Can Set It Straight”, Foreign Affairs, May-June 2011,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2011-04-18/whos-afraid-international-criminal-court
- Last accessed 25/05/2015.
129 States can influence the work of the Court in many ways, the most obvious being the
allocation of funds, which the Assembly of States Parties do each year.
130 There are already a number of US citizens working in the OTP, within the Prosecution
Division and elsewhere. Currently two of the Senior Trial Attorneys are from the US.
Christine Chung, a former New York federal prosecutor was the first senior hire made by
Ocampo. Harvard Law professor Alex Whiting had several key positions within the OTP,
including Prosecution Coordinator, a member of the Executive Committee (ExCom).
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learn from the lessons of its early years, and assuming that it has not, as an
institution become culturally too embedded in its ways, and that it continues to get
the support required from the States Parties, then the Court will go on to create a
substantial body of law, enabling it to chart a more successful course.
Whilst the Prosecutor is independent and free from political interference, in reality it
would be entirely naive to believe that politics does not severely impact on the
Court’s work. In the first place, it is the State Parties who provide the Court with its
funding, an annual budget131 being approved each year at the Assembly of States
Parties.132 Court officials regularly meet with members of the Committee on Budget
and Finance (CBF) during the year. This Committee is made up of representatives
from the largest contributing States.133
Additionally, the United Nations plays a big role in the Court’s activities. In both
cases where the Security Council referred cases to the ICC, namely Libya134 and
Darfur,135 they were clear that the UN should not pay towards the investigations or
prosecutions, should any arise.136 It could be argued that by assigning work, but
131 The approved budget for 2013 was 115.12 million Euro, of which 28.27 million Euro was
assigned to the OTP. States are demanding when it comes to funding the Court’s operations,
and each cycle considerable resources are spent negotiating the budget for the following
year. The process begins in March and only concludes when the ASP meet and vote in either
November or December.
132 The Assembly is the management oversight and legislative body of the ICC. It has a
permanent Secretariat based within the Court’s headquarters, and a Bureau made up of a
president, two vice presidents and 18 representatives of the States Parties, elected on a
geographical distribution model. See: http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/assembly/Pages/assembly.aspx - Last accessed 15/03/2014.
133 According to the CICC, “The Committee on Budget and Finance, which is composed of 12
members, is responsible for the technical examination of any document submitted to the Assembly
that contains financial or budgetary implications or any other matter of financial, budgetary or
administrative nature, as may be entrusted to it by the Assembly of States Parties. The members of
the Committee are experts of recognized standing and experience in financial matters at the
international level from States Parties.” See: http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=budgetbackground.
134 Referred to the ICC by the UNSC on 26th February 2011.
135 Referred to the ICC by the UNSC on 31st March 2005.
136 United Nations Resolution 1593 (2005), Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan
to Prosecutor of International Criminal Court, 31 March 2005, which states: “7. Recognizes
that none of the expenses incurred in connection with the referral, including expenses related to
investigations or prosecutions in connection with that referral, shall be borne by the United Nations
and that such costs shall be borne by the parties to the Rome Statute and those States that wish to
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refusing to fund that work, the Security Council is affecting the Court’s ability to
properly conduct its activities generally. It is also not difficult to believe that the
decision by Russia and China to vote against the draft resolution on referring Syria
to the ICC137 was taken for purely political reasons. It should also be recalled that
many of the crimes within the mandate of the Court are committed in the context of
political rivalry. In the Kenya Situation, for example, the alleged crimes were
committed in the run up to the general election in 2008.138 Politics and the ICC
should be considered to walk hand in hand.139 Of course the Prosecutor does not
have a political mandate, however, her decisions certainly possess the potential to
have political ramifications. A decision to charge a nations prime minister or for
president with war crimes, for example, is likely to have a big political impact within
that country.
As we leave the introductory chapters and prepare to enter the substantive part of this
work, it is worth reflecting on the purpose of an international criminal tribunal and to
consider if the goal is ever achievable in a geo-political climate where those with the
most power often appear to disregard international law. For the author, the purpose
of the Court remains clear: it is to end impunity for the worst crimes imaginable,
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, words sometimes uttered without
the full impact of their meaning being understood. Where States are either
‘unwilling ‘or ‘unable’ to investigate or prosecute these crimes themselves, then the
Court must step in. It must not take sides or treat anyone unfairly. Because the idea
of the ICC was debated for so long, and then once created, generated a lot of
comment, the author sometimes has the impression from his discussions with those
outside the Court that it is a mere academic or theoretical model. Rather, it is a real
institution, with real cases and real victims. It is sometimes overlooked how difficult
contribute voluntarily”, http://www.un.org/press/en/2005/sc8351.doc.htm - Last accessed
02/02/2015.
137 See: http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47860#.U4dG0U38Lcc - Last
accessed 29/05/2014.
138 The same is true for Gabon which referred a situation to the OTP in September 2016.  The
Prosecutor will more than likely open a preliminary investigation in the near future.
139 See an interesting opinion in the New York Times: Mbeki, Thabo and Mamdani,
Mahmood, “Courts Can’t End Civil Wars”, New York Times, 5th Feb 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/06/opinion/courts-cant-end-civil-
wars.html?hp&rref=opinion&_r=1 - Last accessed 16 February 2014.
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it is to carry out the Court’s purpose in practice and it is inevitable that it will face
challenges.
Nevertheless, the creation of the ICC in 2002 could be seen as finally inserting the
‘missing link’140in the international criminal law chain.
Even within the family of international law generally, the absence of an international
criminal court was a glaring gap. However, the fact that a court now exists is far
from the end of the story. At the time of writing, the Court has been in existence for
14 years. Expectations, which were initially very high, are beginning to become
more realistic, and commentators, as we have seen above, now understand and
continue to explore and highlight some of the vulnerabilities of the Institution.
However, the idea of the Court, what it represents, especially to those who are
victims of the violence covered under the competency of the Court, is not entirely
rational. There is a great deal of misinformation about the powers and capacity of the
Court and this constituency continue to hold the ICC to an arguably impossibly high
standard.
The following chapter will examine the culture of the Court, how it developed and
the impact it will have on the Institution as it grows. A solid culture, understood by
its staff and the States that support the work of the Court is critical to its long term
success.
140 http://legal.un.org/icc/general/overview.htm - Last accessed 15/02/214.
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Chapter 3 - The Legal Culture of the ICC
3.1 Introduction
The identity of the Court is strongly influenced by its culture, both its operational
culture and its legal culture. Generally, culture is influenced by the governing
framework which creates the overall structure, however what really creates a culture
is the traditions, actions and beliefs of the members of the community. To a certain
extent a new organisation doesn’t really have its own culture; because a culture is
developed over time and through experience.
While this chapter focuses on the development of a new legal culture at the Court, it
will also look at how and by whom this culture was developed; the different legal
traditions, the Court actors and even factors such as the geographical and gender
balance.”
Although examining the culture of the court is not a legal topic, it is nevertheless an
important aspect of ensuring the long term success of the Court. This is because the
consequences of allowing a negative culture to develop could seriously damage the
courts reputation, the quality its investigations and prosecutions and ultimately its
existence. Conversely, the development of a positive culture, one which promotes
integrity, impartiality and hard work, for example, will go a long way towards
securing the success of the ICC.141 Because the organisation is impacted by so many
different cultural centres, it could be reasonably argued that where a clash of cultures
occurs, then it would have a negative impact. In order to address the primary
research question of this thesis, it is necessary to evaluate the cultural health of the
body. This chapter will examine the culture of the institution, including how the
current value structure was created and how it is developing. This topic is considered
to be an important building block towards creating the ICC of the future and
therefore, fits into the primary research question.
A strong organisational culture is vital for the long term health of an organisation
and its employees. The culture is the ‘secret sauce’ that makes a work place great
141 In recent year, the OTP has invested considerable effort in promoting and building the
cultural identity of the Office, and the author has been closely involved with this initiative.
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and without it, as one former Goldman Sachs executive said: “I look around today
and see virtually no trace of the culture that made me love working for this firm for
many years. I no longer have the pride, or the belief”.142 Creating the correct culture
is a difficult task, made even more so by the truly diverse staff employed by the
ICC.143 This chapter will focus more on the legal culture than the management
culture, but the two are closely related.
Lawyers from all around the world receive different legal education and professional
experience, which shapes how they view the law. In the international legal
environment this can present challenges. This was true for both the ad hoc tribunals
and the ICC, however it is not necessarily a barrier to its success, merely another
challenge to the first generation of lawyers and staff, who will help create a new
legal culture. According to Justice Jackson at Nuremberg, “members of the legal
profession acquire a rather emotional attachment to forms and customs to which they
are accustomed and frequently entertain a passionate conviction that no unfamiliar
procedure can be morally right.”144
Because international criminal tribunals have operated under a very distinctive blend
of common and civil law,145 and these two traditions indeed dominate the legal
foundation of the Court146 procedurally, lawyers from the different systems can
sometimes encounter difficulties in accepting certain principles not enshrined in their
own national jurisdiction for example the issue of witness preparation in advance of
142 Smith, Greg, “Why I Am Leaving Goldman Sachs”, The New York Times, 14 March 2012
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/14/opinion/why-i-am-leaving-goldman-
sachs.html?_r=4&pagewanted=all - Last accessed 05/05/2015.
143 In the author’s team at the Court, there are eighteen people from 16 different countries,
from Sierra Leone to Argentina.
144 Jackson, Robert H, “United States Representative to the International Conference on
Military Trials”, 29 December 1947, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/jack_preface.asp - Last
accessed 05/05/2014.
145 For a good explanation of the common and civil law traditions see “The Common Law
and Civil Law Traditions”, The Robinson Collection, School of Law, University of California
at Berkley,
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/library/robbins/CommonLawCivilLawTraditions.html - Last
visited 20/02/2015.
146 There is no evidence of an influence from the Soviet or Chinese legal systems, nor are any
of the religious based legal systems represented, e.g. Sharia. Similarly for traditional tribal
cultures practices.
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testimony, which is discussed in later chapters, is a polarising one.147 However, in
addition to the procedural challenges, the author has observed that there are also
engrained cultural practices which are challenging to incorporate in the courtroom.
This chapter will attempt to identify these challenges with the assistance of those
who have and still are practicing within the Court. Courts are hierarchical
institutions by nature, with the judge at the top. They often involve old fashioned
rituals and customs that reinforce these hierarchies. 148 However, whatever its
parentage, the ICC is a new system. It is a new tradition with a unique system of law
that will develop and settle. Over time it will gain characteristics of both civil law
and common law as the two dominant influences, which have shaped and influenced
the ICC’s legal framework, including its Rules of Evidence and Procedure. 149
Nevertheless, the Court is likely to be seen in its own right as a unique and
individual legal system, with a constituency of practitioners who dedicate their
careers to international criminal justice.
The Rome Statute is a result of tough negotiations, conducted before and during the
Rome Conference. Up until the time the Statute was drafted, the prosecution and
enforcement of the law were “carefully guarded sovereign prerogatives”. 150
According to Judge Silvia Fernández, (now President of the Court), who played a
147 Lawyers who practiced in the US are very comfortable with the idea of briefing their
witnesses in advance of them providing testimony, whereas in England the practice is not
permitted. While allowing ‘witness preparation’ in the DRC6 case, the Court refused it in
Ongwen (The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, Decision on Protocols to be Adopted at Trial, 22
July 2016, http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/311696/)  and Gbagbo (The Prosecutor v. Laurent
Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé, Decision on witness preparation and familiarization, 02
December 2015, http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/aa620a/).
148 The language used in courts in Ireland and England is unusually formal and seniority is
especially important: Seniors and Juniors. Although only a judge wears a robe in the US, in
Ireland and the UK, lawyers also wear robes and wigs.
149 See: https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/legal-texts/RulesProcedureEvidenceEng.pdf -
Last accessed 06/08/2016.
150 Lee, Roy S., “The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute, Issues,
Negotiations, Results”, Kluwer Law international, 2002, p.5. Further, in evidence of how
busy the Rome negotiations were, Lee describes how more than 200 written proposals were
officially submitted by delegates and at the height of its activity, roughly 80 interpreters
were hired to service meetings at the Conference.
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prominent part in the Rome Conference,151 it was easy to agree that a global court
should not be seen to favour a particular legal system and that compromises needed
to be found between the major legal systems. However, the theory was easier said
than done, as it “proved to be extremely difficult in practice.” 152 States had to
compromise sufficiently to ensure that the new Court could operate effectively.
Fernández quotes Professor James Crawford, Chairman of the ILC Working Group
for the ICC, when he said that the Commission “had also to contend with the
tendency of each duly socialized lawyer to prefer his own criminal justice system’s
values and institutions”.153 The fact that the “different legal traditions do not fit
together seamlessly, [leads] to myriad, heated disagreements over how to combine
them into a single, coherent, workable legal system”154.
It should be noted however, that because the US (common law) was not a party to
the Rome Statute,155 the American influence over the Court, in its formative years
was substantially diminished. The US had a big influence on the ad hoc tribunals,
not just in relation to the Rules of Procedure but also on the culture of the legal
proceedings.156 Watching from the public gallery one would be struck by the US and
British influence on the prosecution side. It could even be argued that the absence of
the US as a State Party of the ICC is a positive fact, especially given that the
151 United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, Rome, 15 June - 17 July 1998.
152 Fernández de Gurmendi, Silvia A., “International Criminal Law Procedures, The Process
of Negotiation Chapter in The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome
Statute”, Lee, Roy S., (Editor) Kluwer Law International 1999.
153 Ibid p.220. Crawford, James, “The ILC Adopts a Statute for an International Criminal
Court”, 89 A.J.I.L. pp.404, 408 (1995).
154 Van Sliedregt, Elies, “Introduction: Common Civility – International Criminal Law as
Cultural Hybrid”, Leiden Journal of International Law, Volume 24, Issue 2, pp. 389-391.
155 President Clinton did in fact sign the Rome Treaty in 2000, however it was never ratified
and while the US voted against the Treaty when it was put to a vote, their delegation at the
Conference played an active role in the negotiations.
156 See for example, the statement made by Judge Theodor Meron, President of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia before the U.S. Helsinki
Commission on 7 October 2003: http://www.icty.org/en/press/statement-judge-theodor-
meron-president-icty-commission-security-and-cooperation-europe - Last accessed
04/05/2015.
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majority of the cases before the Court are francophone,157 with dominant civil law
traditions. However, this is a difficult argument to justify because of the presence of
other common law states, like the United Kingdom.
3.2 Sources for this Chapter
The author had the opportunity to conduct a number of interviews for this chapter.
The interviewees were chosen because of their expertise and direct involvement in
the development of the Rome Statute and the creation of the actual court in The
Netherlands. The sources were able to provide the author with a great deal of
practical insight into the background of the court and its historical context.  These
first-hand accounts provided during a number of open conversations, is difficult to
find in other texts about the court.
One of the selected sources for the purpose of this chapter is a French Lawyer,
Gilbert Bitti, currently employed as the Senior Legal Adviser to the Pre-Trial
Chamber. Previously, he served as a Legal Adviser in both the Office of the
Prosecutor and in the Court’s Registry. Prior to joining the Court, he was the Legal
Adviser to the French Delegation at the Rome Conference and was responsible for
presenting and defending the French Government’s amendments to the Rome
Statute.158 The second important source for this chapter is Dr Hans Bevers, also a
lawyer, who worked for the Dutch Government in the Ministry of Justice. He is
currently the Legal Adviser to the ICC’s Prosecutor. His experience is of great
importance also because Dr Bevers worked, on the ICC’s Host Agreement with The
Netherlands. He also became a member of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom).159
157 Of the nine situations opened by the Court only two (Kenya and Uganda), of the States
concerned operate a common law legal system. Note of the nine situations, two are the
Central African Republic, which is therefore counted twice.
158 See also:
http://www.grotiuscentre.org/resources/1/ICL%20Summer%20School/Gilbert%20Bitti.pdf -
Last visited 07/07/2015. Bitti is one of a number of young lawyers who were involved in the
Rome Conference who came to work eventually in The Hague. Many others have since
moved on again and to a certain extent, this gives the few ‘relics from Rome’ still at the
Court, a certain comfortable sense of entitlement and practically, a second career publishing
and lecturing.
159 Between 1996 and 1998, six sessions of the United Nations Preparatory Committee were
in New York to work on a draft statute to establish a permanent international criminal court;
a first draft had been produced by the UN’s International Law Commission. A number of
NGOs were also actively present during these meetings. See UN General Assembly
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Moreover, he was involved in facilitating, on behalf of the Dutch Government, the
Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Scottish Government’s Temporary Court in
The Netherlands for the prosecution of the (PamAm) Lockerbie bomb case.160 He
therefore has vast experience in setting up international tribunals in The
Netherlands.161
3.3 Creation of the Court’s Culture
According to Powell and McLaughlin Mitchell “negotiators involved in the creation
of the ICC pushed for rules and procedures that mimicked those of their domestic
legal systems to help reduce uncertainty regarding the court’s future decision-making
processes”.162 The idea being that States need to be sure when they join a court like
the ICC, that it will be “fair and unbiased”,163 being able to recognize parts of their
own domestic law helps in providing this reassurance.
“The hybrid nature of the Court’s design enhanced the attractiveness of the
court to civil and common law states, making them significantly more likely to
sign and ratify the Rome Statute. Empirical models demonstrate that common
and civil law states were fervent supporters of the ICC in preliminary
negotiations and that they have shown higher levels of support for the Court
since the ICC’s inception in comparison to Islamic law or mixed law states.”164
The initial draft statute for an international criminal court was prepared by an
Australian, James Crawford SC, 165 a distinguished academic who served as the
ILC’s Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility from 1997 – 2001. Initially, it was
more similar to the ICTY’s Statute and many countries were unhappy with its
A/RES/50/46, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Sup. No.49 at 307,
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/50/a50r046.htm.
160 For details of the trial and its verdict see
http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/6/issue/2/lockerbie-trial-verdict - Last visited
10/07/2015.
161 These two remarkable personalities offer very different views on the Court. In keeping
with their personalities, Bitti was open and unguarded in this interview, freely offering his
opinion on all matters, which is in marked contrast to Bevers, who is measured and precise.
162 Powell, Emilia Justyna and McLaughlin Mitchell, Sara, “The Creation and Expansion of
the International Criminal Court: A Legal Explanation”, Paper prepared for the Midwest
Political Science Association Conference, Chicago, IL, April, 3-6, 2008.
163 Ibid p.2.
164 Ibid.
165 Crawford’s pedigree is impressive and he was appointed as a Judge in the International
Court of Justice in November 2014, for a nine year term.
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leaning towards the common law. 166 On the 12th August 1996, the French
Government’s delegation presented an alternative draft statute, which sought to
address French and other civil law countries sensitivities.167 In the end, the French
delegation compromised their primary objective, that of having a judge-led
investigation in favour of the more common law idea of a prosecutor. The main
reason for the creation of the Pre-Trial Division was that States “needed a
mechanism to counter-balance the power of an independent Prosecutor. Independent
in the sense that he or she could initiate investigations on his/her own initiative”.168A
prosecutor with a political agenda could open frivolous investigations and States felt
there ought to be safeguards put in place to prevent this from happening.169
The Court is an international organization, created by a founding treaty, the Rome
Statute.170 Therefore, it is a political organization,171 formed by representatives of the
governments of States Parties.172 It follows then that it is a compromise organization,
subject to the various non-legal influences of different countries and groups of
countries.173 In order to establish a proper consensus, it was necessary to create a
166 Bitti interview.
167 Bitti Interview.
168 Bergsmo, Morten and Pejić, Jelena,”Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court”, p.361 (Otto Triffterer, ed. 1999).
169 Fourmy, Olivier, “Powers of the Pre-Trial Chambers, in the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court: a commentary”, Vol. II 1210 (A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and
J.R.W.D. Jones eds., 2002).
170 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, 17 July 1998.
171 It can also be considered political by the nature of the terrible crimes it must investigate,
often committed by those holding political office. See further: Marston Danner, Allison,
“Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of Prosecutorial Discretion at the
International Criminal Court”, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 510, 510 (2003), in which it is stated that
the Court has jurisdiction over “crimes ... committed by governments themselves, or with their
tacit approval”; and also that the cases before the ICC are “infused with political implications”.
172 Actually, formed by representatives of governments of more than States Parties; for
example the United States of America were big contributors to the creation of the Court, but
didn’t eventually become a member. The US Ambassador-at-large, David Scheffer, who led
the US delegation at the Rome Conference, has visited the ICC on more than one occasion
and appears to be a supporter of the Court. See: Schabas, William A., “An Introduction to
the International Criminal Court”, 4th Edition, Cambridge University Press, 2011, p.28.
173 The author recalls regularly hearing former Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, telling
people that the Court was not influenced by politics and that he was above politics. If he did
believe this, it was possibly a bit naïve, as a great deal of effort goes into meetings with the
States parties every year. Each year the budget for the Court is approved at the Assembly,
wherein several weeks of negotiations take place. An example of a state flexing its authority
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legal framework that was a blend of the two different legal traditions. This is simply
how the ICC came to have its particular procedural model.174
As with many discussions on International Criminal Law, we can refer back to the
Nuremberg trials.175 Even then we see examples where one set of procedural rules,
when adopted into the legal framework of the IMT, were criticized by advocates
from the other legal traditions. For example “the evidence rules, which exhibited a
flexible approach to the handling of evidence that is typical of civil law systems,
were vehemently criticized by common law lawyers.”176
While the court is obliged to ensure that the “the principal legal systems of the
world”177 are represented in the constitution of the Chambers, there is no specific
obligation to actually have their legal systems represented in the Court’s rules,
regulations and procedures. Therefore, according to Bitti, the major ‘western’ legal
systems prevailed. However, the Statute does facilitate a wide approach when it
comes to the applicable law of the Court under Article 21(1) which points out that
“general principles of law derived by the court from national laws of legal systems of
the world including”178 to be used in certain circumstances. The ICC has been slow
over an international organization, is the US’ decision to withhold its funding contribution
from UNESCO because that organization allowed Palestine to become a member. See:
Statement by the Director-General of UNESCO on Withholding of Funds by the United
States, http://www.unesco.org/new/en/media-services/single-
view/news/statement_by_the_director_general_of_unesco_on_withholding_of_funds_by_th
e_united_states/#.VXHcP038IUA - Last visited 04/06/2015.
174 According to Lee – supra, note 150- the Court’s “justice system represents the successful
product of harmonization of the distinctive principles, rules and procedures derived from the world’s
major judicial systems”, p38.
175 The Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) that was adopted at the London
Conference on August 8, 1945, represented the finalization of the Allies’ decision to
prosecute principal German war criminals. The IMT was to prosecute crimes against peace,
war crimes and crimes against humanity. Proceedings against the major war criminals were
instituted in Berlin on October 18, 1945, with the Tribunal’s receipt of the indictments. The
defendants were 24 high-ranking representatives of the Nazi regime, along with seven
organizations. The trials themselves were held in the Jury Courtroom, also known as
“Courtroom 600,” at the Palace of Justice in Nuremberg,
http://www.nurembergacademy.org/the-nuremberg-legacy/the-nuremberg-trials-and-
courtroom-600/ - Last visited 04/04/2015.
176 See: Schoun, Christine, “International Criminal Procedure: A Clash of Legal Cultures”,
TMC Asser Press, 2010, p.5.
177 Rome Statute, Art. 36(8)(a)(i).
178 Rome Statute, Art. 21(1)(c).
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to embrace the ‘general principles’ concept and for now, firmly establishing that it is
lower down the hierarchical structure and should only be used to complete a lacuna
in the law of the Court. 179 The role of comparative criminal law is already
established in the ad hoc tribunals and was first used at the Court during the
Lubanga trial, where the Pre-Trial Chamber considered the different approaches to
the question on ‘witness familiarisation’.180 The ICC legislation is silent on the
matter and, within their judgment, the Court made pointed reference to the fact that
the OTP referred to two common law jurisdictions but failed to establish a link to
any jurisdiction from a civil law country:
“[T]he Trial Chamber does not consider that a general principle of law allowing
the substantive preparation of witness prior to testimony can be derived from
national legal systems worldwide ... Although this practice is accepted to an
extent in two legal systems, both of which are found upon common law
traditions, this does not provide a sufficient basis for any conclusion that a
general principle based on established practice of national legal systems exists.
The Trial Chamber notes that the prosecution’s submission with regard to
national jurisprudence did not include any citations from the Romano-Germanic
legal system”181.
Badar and Higgins identify a good example of where the Prosecutor’s argument in
the Lubanga trial, that the concept of witness proofing was commonly used in
national legal systems, was rejected by the Bench because the two jurisdictions
quoted were both common law jurisdictions. The Prosecutor failed to provide any
civil law examples. They note that an opportunity was lost by the Court, stating:
“further elucidation on what type of examination of national laws would have been
179 See: Elewa Badar, M. and Higgins, N., “General Principles of Law in the Early
Jurisprudence of the ICC”, Chapter 12, p.18; Mariniello, Triestino, “The International
Criminal Court in Search of its Purpose and Identity”, (ed), Routledge, 2015.
180 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the Practices of Witness
Familiarisation and Witness Proofing, 8 November 2006, paras 35-7 - http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/dd3a88/.
181 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision Regarding the Practice Used to Prepare
and Familiarise Witnesses for Giving Testimony at Trial, 30 November 2007, para 41 -
http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/ac1329/.
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appropriate was not forthcoming from the Chamber and thus it failed to seize an
opportunity to clarify the nature of Article 21(1)(c)”.182
Judge Goldstone refers to a situation which he encountered during the Tadić trial, at
the ICTY. However it involved not a clash of cultures between the civil and common
law, but between three different lawyers from a common law tradition. He explains:
“[T]hree of the prosecutors found themselves at odds with each other. One
practiced at the London Bar and he explained that, according to his professional
rules, it was considered unprofessional conduct to meet with witnesses prior to
their appearance on the witness stand—and, further, that he could be disbarred
for doing so. The second prosecutor came from the Edinburgh Bar. He relayed
that, according to Scottish rules, not only was such conduct regarded as
unprofessional, it was also considered criminal. The third counsel came from
the New York Bar and he explained that under the rules governing legal
practice in the United States, failure to prepare a witness would be regarded as
unprofessional, and is conduct for which he could be disbarred. (I might
mention that in my own country, South Africa, we would follow the approach
of the United States.)”183.
In his book on the ICC, Benjamin Schiff184 identifies the ‘Civil-Law and Common-
Law Heritage’ as a ‘conundrum’. While the role of the Prosecutor of the Court hails
from a common law model, in the Pre-trial Chambers the Judges are operating under
a civil law model, with the conundrum being that the “common-law orientated
Office of the Prosecutor is contending with the civil-law-orientated Pre-Trial
Chamber Judges to establish operational and legal precedents for the Court’s
operations”.185 Further stating that “[t]he structure of the situation, the orientation of
the personal involved, and in many areas in which precedents can be established only
by operating the machinery are causing clashes between judges and prosecution”.186
182 Ibid. p.19.
183 Goldstone, R., International Judges: “Is There a Global Ethic?”, Ethics & International
Affairs, http://projects.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/internationaljudges - Last accessed
25/08/2016.
184 Schiff, Benjamin N., “Building the International Criminal Court”, Cambridge University
Press, 2008.
185 Ibid, p.10.
186 Ibid.
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It is noteworthy though, that while the role of a prosecutor is generally understood to
come from the common law tradition, according to one source187 one of the main
responsibilities of the ICC’s Prosecutor, imposed by Article 54 “seems to require the
prosecutor to take a civil-law, investigative-judge approach, whereby the prosecutor
gives equal weight to incriminating and exonerating circumstances (though only a
mediocre prosecutor would not do the same in any adversarial system)”.188
3.4 Legal Traditions
As noted above, Article 21 of the Statute permits the Court to apply general
principles of law from national jurisdictions throughout the world, under certain
conditions. In this section the author will briefly set out the different legal systems
and articulate how they directly impact the ICC. Professor Schabas asserts that
“within the Statute can be found other provisions that …present a fascinating
experiment in comparative criminal law, drawing upon elements from the common
law, the Romano-Germanic 189 system, Sharia law and other regimes of penal
justice”190. However, the common law and civil law are by far the most dominant.
The common law191system is grounded in the liberal philosophy born in England,
whereby the state refrains from interfering in society in as much as it is possible.
This extends to the role of the judge in legal proceedings, where he or she acts as
more of an umpire between opposing parties. This is probably the most obvious
characteristic of the common law,192 the role the judge plays, or does not play in the
proceedings. It is often described as adversarial; arguments and counter arguments,
187 Alex Whiting, former Prosecution Coordinator within the OTP and now Professor of
Practice at Harvard Law School.
188 Whiting, Alex, “Dynamic Investigative Practice at the International Criminal Court, Law
and Contemporary Problems”, Vol. 76:163, at 165.
189 Professor Schabas prefers to use this term over Civil law. The author uses both
interchangeably.
190 Schabas, William, “An introduction to the International Criminal Court”, Third Edition,
Cambridge University Press, 2007.
191 Also often referred to as Anglo-American Law, after the two dominant influences.
192 In addition to the presence of a jury, although, not all criminal cases have a jury. In
Ireland and England serious crimes associated with the Northern Ireland ‘troubles’ sit with
three judges, rather than a jury.
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allegations and rebuttals. While a code does not exist to the same degree in the
common law system, it is indeed becoming more codified.193
In his interview, Bitti raised the point that there are more Roman-Germanic
jurisdictions in the world than states which operate a Common Law legal tradition.194
In the age of empire, England spread its legal traditions as it did its language and
other culture all over the world. He (Bitti) speculated that there are perhaps forty-five
countries in the world which could be said to operate a common law legal
tradition,195 less than half the amount of Roman-Germanic jurisdictions. Gilbert Bitti
has speculated that it is this imperialistic gene which has led the English to argue so
much for the inclusion of its system.196 In his interview, Bitti also recounts a story
about the negotiation process in which he repeatedly heard his common law
contemporaries talking about a word he did not understand: Subpoena – a word
familiar to common law lawyers as a document compelling someone’s attendance in
court. Bitti had no idea what this meant, despite being a practising lawyer and law
teacher. He grew annoyed at the arrogance of his colleagues that he should know and
he recalls it as a practicable example of some of the differences between the common
law and civil law camps.197
In the civil or Roman-Germanic legal systems, in direct contract to the common law
approach, the judge has a much more proactive role in the judicial process. Truth
plays a central role in the proceedings and it is firmly considered that justice cannot
be served without establishing that truth. The common law model could be said to be
more interested in the settlement of disputes. According to Bitti, the main difference
193 The European Union is responsible for harmonizing the laws of its Member States and as
a result the growing codification of laws in Ireland and England and Wales.
194 JuriGlobe, a research group formed by professors from the Faculty of Law of the
University of Ottawa state the number of UN member States who operate the Common
Law, as 23. It puts the number of States using the Civil Law at 75. See Alphabetical Index of
the 192 United Nations Member States and Corresponding Legal Systems.
http://www.juriglobe.ca/eng/syst-onu/index-alpha.php - Last accessed 15/06/2016.
195 JuriGlobe, a research group formed by professors from the Faculty of Law of the
University of Ottawa state the number of UN member States who operate the Common
Law, as 23. It puts the number of States using the Civil Law at 75. See Alphabetical Index of
the 192 United Nations Member States and Corresponding Legal Systems.
http://www.juriglobe.ca/eng/syst-onu/index-alpha.php - Last accessed 15/06/2016.
196 Bitti interview.
197 Bitti interview.
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between common law and civil law is the role played by the judge and the trust in his
or her office.198
While the dominant legal families are the civil and common law, in fact “[t]here are
three highly influential legal traditions in the contemporary world: civil law,
common law, and socialist law [199]... A legal tradition, as the term implies, is not a
set of rules of law about contracts, corporations, and crimes, although such rules will
almost always be in some sense a reflection of that tradition. Rather it is a set of
deeply rooted, historically conditioned attitudes about the nature of law, about the
role of law in the society and the polity, about the proper organization and operation
of a legal system and about the way law is or should be made, applied, studied,
perfected, and taught.”200
The Legal Information Institute of the Law School of Cornell University believes
that despite the great variety of legal systems in the world “it is important to begin
by emphasizing one great division: that into religious and secular legal systems.
Each side of this split holds quite different views as to law, in its source, scope,
sanctions, and function. The source of religious law is the deity, legislating through
the prophets. Secular law is made by human beings, and one of the most famous
examples being 'We, the people'.”201 The ICC’s Statute and its Preamble clearly
make of the respect of humanity a brand new post-biblical rule, universal and
permanent as its creation. This is a novel approach and serves to emphasise the
uniqueness of the ICC system of law and its legal culture.
198 The categorisation of legal families was the subject of a master’s thesis written in Bond
University that gives an interesting insight to common law and civil law families. See:
Landskron, R., “Common Law and Civil Law Legal Families: A Misleading Categorisation”,
16 February 2008,
http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1048&context=theses - Last
accessed 20/08/2016.
199 In fact, most of the socialist nations had operated a version of the civil law tradition prior
to the Soviet area, to which they all largely returned following the collapse of the Soviet
bloc.
200 Merryman J.H., “The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems of
Western Europe and Latin America”, 2 Ed., Stanford University Press, Stanford, California
(1985), 1, note 13.
201 Legal Information Institute, Cornell University Law School, Legal Systems,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/legal_systems - Last accessed 21/07/2015.
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The legal infrastructure of the Nuremberg’s International Military Tribunal reflected
the legal systems of the Second World War winning powers, namely the USA, the
UK, France, and the Soviet Union. The legal basis for the trials was known, as
previously mentioned as the London Charter, 202 and from this foundation all
subsequent international criminal tribunals were developed.203
The ad hoc tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia were created in the
early 1990s, at a time when the ILC had already made progress with drafting the
rules of procedure and evidence for the International Criminal Court. In terms of
case law, the ICTY has had a remarkable impact on the Court, with ICTY decisions
being quoted in every case to date.204 The trial chambers of the ad hoc tribunals were
able to rely on proposals from NGOs and different civil and common law
countries.205 This is because the Rules of Evidence and Procedure were generally
broad and the judges had “much room for interpretation and variation”.206Essentially
then, the chambers had plenty of discretion to develop their own rules, indicative of a
more common law type of environment.
Bitti is convinced that the ICTY is heavily influenced by the American system
because of the institution which created it, the UN Security Council. The Security
Council, in this matter, was entirely dominated by the US, supported by the UK. As
a consequence, the ICTY along with the ICTR have been clearly influenced by the
202 Its full name was The Charter of the International Military Tribunal – Annex to the
Agreement for the prosecution and punishment of the major war criminals of the European
Axis.
203 While the IMTs were created by a number of international partners, proceedings were
dominated by the Common Law’s United States, with support of the United Kingdom; and
while the Nuremberg trials offer interesting comparisons and lessons for the International
Criminal Court generally, in this case there is no real evidence to suggest that the earlier
Tribunal was hampered by the different judicial traditions.
204 For example, in The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba, (Decision on Sentence pursuant to
Article 76 of the Statute, 21 June 2016, http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f4c14e/, Fn 32 ICTY,
Popović et al. Appeal Judgment); The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Decision on
Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, 10 July 2012, http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/c79996/: Fn 52 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Appeal, Judgment, para. 58) and The
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga (Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, 7 March 2014,
http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f74b4f/: Fn 1826 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Trial Judgement, para.
616).
205 See: Alexander Knoops, Geert-Jan, “An Introduction to the Law of International Criminal
Tribunals: A Comparative Study”, Second Revised Edition, Brill Nijhoff, 2014. p.6.
206 Ibid.
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Anglo-Saxon common law system.207 The fact that the ICC’s Statute was debated
before the UN General Assembly, where the US influence is less dominant208 led to
a more broad inclusion of legal traditions.209
Set up in 2009, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) differed from the other ad
hoc tribunals in that it allowed for a trial in absentia and like the ICC, has the
possibility to include victims in the judicial process,210 both these key characteristics
are features of a civil law tradition. It is sometimes considered that the international
criminal courts are carbon copies of one another, and while they do have a great deal
of similarities, significant differences also exist. The ability to conduct a trial without
the presence of an accused is not a feature of most common law jurisdictions. While
international in nature, the STL, by virtue of its creation can only prosecute crimes
that exist under Lebanese law, a system of law inspired by the French civil law
system and criminal procedural model.211
It could be argued that the best way to understand and develop international law is to
study the mixed national traditions. It is possible that this is because a comparative
analysis “presupposes that international law fits into one of the traditional legal
families and can legitimately be analysed under the same rubric typically applied to
national legal systems.”212The European Union has brought together, under an EU
legal system, different common and civil law countries. In fact according to Tetley
“[i]n effect, the European Union is a mixed jurisdiction or is becoming a mixed
jurisdiction, there being a growing convergence within the Union between Europe’s
two major legal traditions, the civil law of the continental countries and the common
law of England, Wales and Ireland”.213 This should at least indicate that the two
different systems can become harmonised. EU law has been taught throughout the
207 The ICTY was created by Security Council Resolution 808(1993), 22 February 1993 -
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_808_1993_en.pdf.
208 In the General Assembly, the US is one of 193 countries, without a veto, where as in the
Security Council it is one of 15 and has a veto - http://www.un.org/en/members.
209 Bitti interview.
210 The role of victims during the trial phase has been one of the most scrutinized aspects of
the ICC project, and is discussed in every book ever written on the Court.
211 Schabas, Supra, note 172, p.15.
212 http://www.vanderbilt.edu/jotl/manage/wp-content/uploads/Picker_final_7.pdf.
213 Tetley, William, Q.C, “Mixed jurisdictions : common law vs civil law (codified and
uncodified)“ (Part I), Unif. L. Rev. 1999-3, 591 at 593.
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Continent in universities, for the past thirty years. An accepted part of the legal
curriculum now, it could provide a template for international criminal law to follow.
3.5 Re-characterisation of the Mode of Liability
It has been suggested that “lessons from earlier tribunals suggest that the mixture of
different legal traditions in the ICC will prove awkward for defence counsel, with all
that that implies for the accused, unless the defence counsel is accustomed to
practicing in such a mixed jurisdiction. Thus, the merger of the two traditions in the
ICC may have an impact on the justice afforded the accused”.214 One example of this
situation happened towards the very end of the Katanga215 case. In the Katanga case,
the Trial Chamber re-characterised the mode of liability at the end of the case: this is
something which would comply with the rules in civil law but nonetheless it
received much criticism. For example Kevin Heller is deeply critical of the
provision:
“An impartial judiciary concerned with maintaining the Rome Statute’s
distribution of authority between the judges, the OTP, the victims, and the
defence would invalidate Regulation 55. Unfortunately, with regard to the
Regulation, the judiciary is anything but impartial. After all, the judges
themselves wrote it. Regulation 55 thus represents the most indefensible form
of judicial lawmaking particularly aggressive and particularly self-interested all
at once”.216
In November 2012 while the Trial Chamber was deliberating the evidence, and even
after the accused had made his oral statement to the Court, it made the unusual
decision to amend the legal characterisation of the facts of the cases, as permitted
under Regulation 55. The Trial Chamber by way of explanation stated:
214 Picker, Colin B., “International Law’s Mixed Heritage: A Common/Civil Law
Jurisdiction”, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law [Vol. 41:1083],
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/jotl/manage/wp-content/uploads/Picker_final_7.pdf - Last
visited 22/05/2015.
215 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07.
216 Heller, Kevin Jon, “A Stick to Hit the Accused with: The Legal Re-characterization of the
Facts Under Regulation 55”; Carsten Stahn et al (eds), “The Law and Practice of the
International Criminal Court: A Critical Account of Challenges and Achievements”, 20
December 2013.
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“Upon examining the evidence, it appeared to the Majority of the Chamber
(“the Majority”), Judge Van den Wyngaert dissenting on this point, that
Germain Katanga’s mode of participation could be considered from a different
perspective from that underlying the Confirmation Decision and it was
therefore appropriate to implement regulation 55 of the Regulations of the
Court19 while ensuring that the Defence is able to exercise its rights
effectively, in accordance with regulation 55(2) and 55(3). Accordingly, the
Majority hereby informs the parties and participants that the legal
characterisation of facts relating to Germain Katanga’s mode of participation is
likely to be changed and that the accused’s responsibility must henceforth also
be considered having regard to another paragraph of article 25(3) of the
Statute.”217
The Prosecutor did not make a submission to have the characterisation of the facts
change, nor did the representatives of the victims; and obviously the defence team
did not make the request. It was a decision made by the Bench itself. It proved to be
a very controversial decision. 218 The decision was appealed and upheld by the
Appeals Chamber, however, they cautioned the Trial Chamber that “The Appeals
Chamber also emphasises that, considering the advanced stage of the proceedings,
the Trial Chamber will need to be particularly vigilant in ensuring Mr Katanga’s
right to be tried without undue delay”.219
It is worth remembering that this was only the second case before the Court, and Mr
Katanga’s co-accused, Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui was shortly found to be not guilty.
Had the Chamber not taken this decision, it is also possible that Katanga would also
have been found to be not guilty. This event will remain a controversial one.
The example described above, in the Katanga case, is very much an example of a
civil law influence on the ICC’s mechanism, where the focus is on the facts more
than on how the OTP characterise them in the indictment or even the charges
confirmed at the end of the confirmation of the charges hearing. In civil law
jurisdictions “the judges are considered to know the law and be the best able to
217 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Decision on the
implementation of regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court and severing the charges
against the accused persons, 21 November 2012 - http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f5cbd0/.
218 In fact it was a majority decision and Belgian Judge Van den Wyngaert dissented.
219 “Katanga case: Appeals Chamber confirms Trial Chamber II’s decision on potential
modification of the form of responsibility” - https://www.icc-
cpi.int/legalAidConsultations?name=pr892.
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characterize the facts presented during trial. The prosecution’s characterization in the
indictment is considered a mere recommendation or theory of the case. This is the
approach taken by the ICC”.220 While this statement could be true in a national
jurisdiction, it appears out of sorts in the international arena, and because of the
controversial nature of the provision, the proceedings were deemed to be unfair and
controversial by scholars.221. For the future, the Court should explain its decisions
more effectively or avoid such late decisions. It is likely that Regulation 55 will
receive closer attention in the future and may even eventually be amended.
One of the greatest challenges for this author and other commentators and scholars is
how to view the unique procedural law model of the ICC. Disputes arise between
common law and civil law lawyers over how to interpret certain provisions because
they are unable to reconcile a given provision with their own system. When one
examines the ICC’s procedures solely from the perspective of one of the legal
traditions, it creates difficulties.
3.6 Actors in the Court
As stated previously, in order for the Court to succeed in the future, it needs to have
a solid base. One of the central goals of this thesis is to examine how the Court can
work more efficiently. The Court is made up of and run by people from different
jurisdictions around the globe and they bring with them their own bias, rules cultures
and even religions. The final section of this chapter will look at the actors, whose
voices shape the rules, regulations and procedures.
220 International Justice Monitor, “A Closer Look at Regulation 55 at the ICC”,
http://www.ijmonitor.org/2013/05/a-closer-look-at-regulation-55-at-the-icc/ - Last visited
29/05/2015. One of the key principles of the Rome Statute is that of complementarity. See:
Preamble, para 10 and Articles 1, 17-20, Rome Statute.
221 See generally: Heller, Kevin Jon, “A Stick to Hit the Accused With: the Legal Re-
characterization of Facts Under Regulation 55”, 20 December 2013,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2370700 - Last visited 21/05/2015; Duffy,
Clair, “Fundamental Fair Trial Questions Remain Unanswered Ahead of Tomorrow’s
Judgment in the Katanga Case”, International justice Monitor, 06 March 2014 -
https://www.ijmonitor.org/2014/03/fundamental-fair-trial-questions-remain-unanswered-
ahead-of-tomorrows-judgment-in-the-katanga-case/.
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When Richard Goldstone 222 arrived in The Hague on August 15, 1994, as the
ICTY’s first Chief Prosecutor, there were “then serious questions raised as to
whether judges and prosecutors from different systems, including the common and
civil law jurisdictions, could work together and fashion a system of criminal justice
that would be considered fair by international standards.”223 According to Bitti, the
background of the actors is all important. He believes “it’s obvious: simply, the
structure of the trial and people in the Court room are not the same, so you cannot
have the same process. It’s a matter of legal culture and legal principles and actors of
the process”224.
The role played by the judges is probably the most challenging.225 Bitti says “in
France there is a lot of trust towards the judge and it is normal that you give to the
judge the power to drive the process. It would not come into your mind to give it to
the parties because you don’t trust them. You trust the judge as the representative of
the state”.226 This is the same principle in all civil law jurisdictions and is very
different to the role played by common law judges.
With the same facts, in the same courtroom, running simultaneously, it is very likely
that the conduct of the trial, even within the same legal framework, would be wholly
different. However, at least all the parties would have something in common and in
theory each trial might run smoothly. Imagine then mixing it up and inserting a judge
from a different background presiding over a case. This is likely to be the most
difficult scenario. Bitti dismisses the notion that eventually people will become
comfortable with the new international system, stating that “[p]eople will be
comfortable with the common law and people will be comfortable with the civil law.
222 An experienced South African Judge who served as Chief Prosecutor of the UNICTY
between August 1994 and September 1996.
223 Goldstone, R., Supra note 183.
224 Bitti Interview.
225 There are many different actors who can influence the trial: Judges and their Legal
Officers, Prosecution Lawyers, Prosecution Investigators, Registry support staff, language
and technical staff and Defence Counsel.
226 Bitti interview.
50
That will remain for a very long time ... before we could reach a kind of common
culture”.227
Hans Bevers takes a different view. He stated that “even in national courts judges
differ in their decisions and that is why there should be an appellate system in place,
as there is”.228 He is not convinced that the background of the individual makes that
much difference and that a competent lawyer can apply the rules of another
jurisdiction.
Attracting high quality candidates to work in this field can be challenging. While the
benefits are generally generous 229 for top lawyers there are limitations to the
financial compensation that many would find unacceptable. Nevertheless there is a
peak for early career lawyers where the experience gained and the financial rewards
are sufficient to keep them in this environment for a number of years.2303.6.1 Prosecutors
Of the current leadership within the Office of the Prosecutor’s Prosecution Division,
four officials have previously worked in the ICTY, while only a single one of the
eight Senior Trial Attorneys has no prior experience within international criminal
courts.231 Hans Bevers considers that the ICC has more in common with the other
international criminal law tribunals than it does with any national system and
therefore hiring lawyers with previous international experience is an advantage.
However, again he is at pains to point out that this is not necessarily the only
relevant factor, as you can have lawyers with a lot of international experience who
are not very good, and good lawyers from a domestic system who can easily adapt.
227 Ibid.
228 Bevers interview.
229 For example, tax free salaries, education grants, home leave.
230 Trial lawyers will generally be graded at P3 level. A Senior Trial Lawyer, who is
responsible for running a case is graded at the P5 level. See the Salary Scale for professional
staff members of the UN Common System,
http://www.un.org/Depts/OHRM/salaries_allowances/salaries/salaryscale/professional/base
01-2016.xls - Last accessed 20/08/2016.
231 At the ICC the Senior Trial Attorney, who is part of the Prosecution Division, acts as the
head of a Joint Team (JT) which consists of the investigative team (part of the Investigation
Division) and the prosecution team.
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Although in recent years we have witnessed the Sierra Leone Tribunal all but close
down, and the ICTY and ICTR have been down-sizing in a meaningful way over
recent years as well,232 the focus for career opportunities are therefore centred more
on the ICC for positions. It also means that there is currently a reasonably good
supply of lawyers who are capable of filling vacant positions. Many years of practice
in the international arena means that prosecutors have had time to become
accustomed to the new legal system. Indeed, some have practiced in The Hague
longer than they have in their national jurisdictions.3.6.2 Judges
In many ways it could be more challenging for judges to adapt to the new system
because for the most part, they are older, heading towards the end of their careers
and therefore could be more embedded in their national legal culture. Judges are
different from other actors because they are elected by the States Parties on a global
scale, from different geographic regions according to a built-in mechanism to ensure
diversity. However, they are nominated in the first instance by their national
governments and the actual selection can be a highly political process. To address
this matter, civil society in the form of the Coalition for the International Criminal
Court (CICC) has created a committee to “[urge] governments to put forward the
most highly qualified candidates in a fair, transparent and merit-based election
process.”233
The ICTY and ICTR differed slightly in the election process of their judicial
appointments in that the judges are elected, following nomination from their home
governments, by the UN Security Council and for a period of only four years.234
Within the ICC, once elected, judges serve for a non-renewable mandate of nine
232 The United Nations Security Council did create the Mechanism for International Criminal
Tribunals (MICT) in December 2010 to “carry out a number of essential functions of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY), after the completion of their respective mandates”. See:
http://www.unmict.org/en/abouthttp://www.unmict.org/en/about - Last accessed
10/03/2016.
233 https://ciccglobaljustice.wordpress.com/2014/04/29/wanted-highly-qualified-candidates-
to-become-icc-judges/ - Last visited 15/04/2015.
234 Although it can be renewed once for a further four year term.
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years.235 This longer term enables judges to become embedded within the institution
and allows them to gain experience. Some commentators have levied criticism at
some States whose diplomatic “representatives have apparently viewed success on
[the] nomination of judges to the tribunals and to the court as adding to states’
prestige – and thus elections have become exercises in campaigning and logrolling
rather than the determination of expertise”.2363.6.3 Defence Counsel
The ICC has set criteria for those wishing to appear before it:237 “These prerequisites
to practicing before the Court are designed to guarantee that every person in need of
legal representation implicated in ICC proceedings has available to him or her a pool
of highly competent counsel to ensure quality legal representation.”238
To qualify for admission to the list of counsel, lawyers must meet certain criteria,239
which provide a foundation for the harmonization of competence. The obligation to
be at least ten years qualified provides a safety net and ensures that inexperienced
counsel do not have the opportunity to take on a case for which they may be
unqualified. In order to further harmonise the defence counsel from different
jurisdictions, an idea was proposed to create an International Criminal Bar
Association.
3.7 International Criminal Court Bar Association
In March 2015 the ICC’s Registrar, Herman von Hebel held an event where he
brought together a panel of experts to consider the establishment of a Victims Office
and a Defence Office,240 as part of a re-structure of the ICC’s Registry. One of the
235 Article 36(9)(a) of the Rome Statute.
236 Schiff, supra, note 184, p.52.
237 To be admitted, candidates must satisfy the minimum quality assurance requirements set
out in Rule 22 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and Regulation 67 of the Regulations
of the Court.
238 Counsel authorised to act before the Court at https://www.icc-
cpi.int/about/registry/Pages/list-of-counsel.aspx.
239 Appointment and qualifications of Counsel for the Defence, Rule 22(1), Rules of
Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court ICC-ASP/13, 3-10 September
2002.
240 The Office of Public Counsel for Defence was “created in order to reinforce the equality of
arms and to enable a fair trial within the meaning of the Rome Statute.” See: “Delivering on the
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agenda items was the potential creation of an association or bar for counsel operating
or supporting the work of the Court. One of the outputs of the conference was the
establishment of an ad hoc committee to draft a constitution for an ICC Bar
Association for such counsel. Although there was already a list of counsel,241 the
recent proposals are a step further and are not without an element of controversy.242
Hans Bevers is very much in favour of the concept of an international criminal bar
and takes some credit, along with Béatrice Le Fraper du Hellen243 from the French
delegation at the Rome Conference, for its early development. Bevers helped to draft
Rules 20 to 22 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, which rooted the idea of a
bar association. Therefore, according to Bevers himself within his post as the Dutch
representative in PrepCom, he championed, or followed at least, and stimulated this
initiative.244
Around the time of the Rome Conference an organization was established called The
International Criminal Defence Attorney Association (ICDAA). They were present
at the Rome Conference. It was “[c]reated in 1997, [the] ICDAA initially focused on
vigorously supporting the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC)
and proposing specific measures in the ICC rules to reinforce defence rights and the
independent organization of lawyers practicing at the court. The Association led the
coalition of legal organizations, bars and lawyers that created the International
Criminal Bar (ICB), founded in Montreal in 2002 and now headquartered in The
Hague, Netherlands, near the ICC”.245
Bevers, who also played a part in the creation of this organization and sees merit in
it, believes though that it never became established as the sole representation of the
international defence attorneys, for the purposes of dealing with the Registry,
promise of a fair, effective and independent Court” - Legal Representation,
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=legalrep&idudctp=21&show=all - Last visited 15/05/2015.
241 The List of Counsel created and maintained by the Registrar in accordance with Rule
21(2) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
242 See: Jonathan Goldsmith’s comments in the Law Society Gazette, “International courts
and lawyers”, http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/analysis/comment-and-opinion/international-
courts-and-lawyers/5049285.article - Last visited 22/06/2015.
243 See: http://www.ambafrance-mt.org/Beatrice-le-Fraper-du-Hellen - Last visited 06/06/2015
244 Bevers interview.
245 http://www.aiad-icdaa.org/.
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possibly because the then Registrar preferred not to have a sole liaison point, but to
rather deal with many associations and organizations.246
The new proposal, which has recently come into being, could create a bar association
more akin to a national bar association with requirements for entry and even
disciplinary powers. It would differ from other international law associations like the
American Bar Association247 or the International Bar Association. However, an ICC
Bar Association would have a number of benefits which could assist lawyers practice
law before the ICC, and help lawyers to operate more effectively. However, it is
questionable if it can make a significant impact to the quality of the advocacy before
the Chambers, given that members are generally dispersed throughout the world and
spend comparatively little time in The Hague. A cynical view is that it would operate
more as a ‘workers union’, who cooperate to negotiate with the Registrar on the fees
they can charge.
The ICTY had already created an association, called ‘Association of Defence
Counsel Practising Before The International Criminal Tribunal For The Former
Yugoslavia (ADC- ICTY)’. 248 “The ADC-ICTY is an independent professional
association established under the laws of The Netherlands”249. It is not an organ of
the Tribunal itself, it is recognized as the Defence Counsel organization serving the
ICTY pursuant to Rule 44 of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence. However,
this was not the only body representing defence counsel. The ICTY also had an
association who operated at a policy and organizational level established by Misha
Wladimiroff, a member of the International Criminal Law Bureau. 250
“The Bureau is a group of highly qualified lawyers with unrivalled expertise in
international criminal law, international humanitarian law, human rights law
and criminal law. The Bureau’s lawyers provide clients with the skill and
246 Bevers interview.
247 The American Bar Association runs a special ICC project implementing longstanding
ABA policies on international criminal justice. See https://www.aba-icc.org/ - Last accessed
01/01/2015.
248 The Association of Defence Counsel Practising Before The International Criminal
Tribunal For The Former Yugoslavia, see: http://adc-icty.org/ - Last visited 07/07/2015.
249 Ibid.
250 http://www.internationallawbureau.com/index.php/members/mischa-wladimiroff/ - Last
visited 07/07/2015.
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experience needed to handle the most complex international criminal cases,
political situations and problems. The Bureau provides advice, consultancy and
training services to States, international organisations, international courts and
private clients”.251
Although this seems less like a bar association, there is no doubt that its members
understand international criminal law procedure and have a mission to train would-
be defence lawyers, which is an important goal. Despite the existence of these
organisations, there remains some scepticism as to their value.
Gilbert Bitti stated that the reason that a real international bar association didn’t exist
was because of the opposition of the Spanish speaking countries of South America.
They objected to this during PrepCom back in 1999/2000. He states: “The [South
American representatives] will say we have to be part of the bar to get cases and they
[the powerful common law countries and the French] will be the ones deciding if we
can get the cases or not.”252 He further indicated that a ‘soft association’, where it
was more of a social club would be acceptable, but as proper bar association, not.
The concept of an association responsible for the legal training and continuous
developing of its members is certainly an important way to harmonise the different
cultures and help foster an entirely new civilization. It is important too, to see what
jurisdictions have the largest representation on the ICC’s list of counsel. The chart
below gives a visual illustration. Despite the fact that most cases to date are based in
Africa, the greatest geographical representation of counsel is from Europe. Uganda
has been a situation country for more than a decade and only has four lawyers
admitted to the ICC’s list of counsel.253 The dominance of European defence lawyers
appearing before the Court is impacting its culture. Furthermore, on the prosecution
side, despite having an African Chief Prosecutor, only a single senior trial attorney
251 http://www.internationallawbureau.com/index.php/the-group/ - Last visited 07/07/2015.
252 Bitti interview.
253 See: https://justicehub.org/article/diversifying-list-counsel-icc - Last visited 20/07/2015.
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out of eight is from Africa254. Also there is only one woman leading a prosecution
team.
Figure 1. Geographical distribution of lawyers on the ICC’s list of Counsel255
3.8 Legal Education and Training
An obvious way to introduce a new culture is to begin early in the legal education of
students. Ideally, this could begin in high school, but international law features on
the curriculum of many of the leading universities. There is a lucrative business in
attracting students from all over the world to certain schools,256 but there is also a
danger that the ICC and other international courts will only choose their staff from
among the high ranking universities, resulting in a lack of diversity of cultures
within the corridors of the Court. Additionally, while the ICC does offer internships,
they are no longer funded as they once were.257 As with all unpaid internships, only a
254 See: Table 20: Major Programme II: Proposed staffing for 2016, https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP14/ICC-ASP-14-10-ENG.pdf. The table does not break down
geographical distribution, but the author has been able to verify this figure.
255 Source: https://justicehub.org/article/diversifying-list-counsel-icc - Used with permission.
256 For example, in recent years Leiden University has created a campus based in The Hague
and built up an excellent reputation for its international law courses.
257 The EU used to provide a generous stipend to interns from certain countries, however,
this funding ended in 2011.
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privileged few are in a position to move to The Hague for six months. There is a
danger therefore, that those entering the Court will fail to properly represent all of
the States who make up the Court. To counter this, the Assembly of States Parties
(ASP) need to set aside resources to fund interns and visiting professional from
underrepresented countries and there might even be an argument to specifically
identify candidates from Africa, as currently most of the Court’s Situations are based
in that Continent.
3.9 Gender Balance and Geographical Distribution
The Rome Statute, sets out the selection procedure of recruiting staff in the Court.258
The ICC should “pursue fair representation of women and men for all positions,
representation of the principle legal systems of the world for legal positions, and
equitable geographical representation for positions in the professional category.”259
In fact the Court has achieved a gender balance that is almost equal.260 Even at the
more senior levels of Director and Professional levels, the data provided in March
2013 showed that 182 male and 178 female staff members occupied these
positions.261
However, the data relating to the geographical distribution of staff needs some work
to ensure that staff from under-represented countries are given a better chance.262 A
gender and geographical distribution balance goes to the heart of what the drafters of
the Statute wanted to achieve and thus, points directly to the culture of the
organisation.
258 Arts. 44(2) and 36(8) of the Rome Statute. See also: Assembly resolution ICC-
ASP/1/Res.10.
259 Assembly of States Parties: “Report of the Bureau on equitable geographical
representation and gender balance in the recruitment of staff of the International Criminal
Court”, ICC-ASP/12/49, Twelfth session, The Hague, 20-28 November 2013,
https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP12/ICC-ASP-12-49-ENG.pdf - Last accessed
15/05/2016.
260 Statistics provided as of 31 March 2013, show that female staff comprise 49.4 percent of
the Court’s professional staff, while male staff comprise 50.6 percent, Ibid.
261 Ibid.
262 Ibid, para.10.
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3.10 Conclusion
While it may be understandable why the drafters of the Rome Treaty wanted to
include the different legal traditions, and also that because international criminal law
is a relatively new discipline still not practiced by many, differences are bound to
emerge. The tone for a mixed legal heritage was set down at Nuremberg and, for the
most part, all the international criminal tribunals based in The Hague have a very
similar flavour, allowing lawyers to move easily between them. While people, of
course, have a bias towards their own system, a hybrid culture has grown its own
roots and there is enough of each of the common law and civil law characteristics
that allows a growing number of states to trust the process.263 Bitti believes that
“people come with their own baggage, and this is not necessarily a bad thing”264, but,
he states, there will always be clashes.
In terms of gender balance, the Court is well composed. However, in order for the
geographical distribution of staff to be balanced the Court needs to ensure that it
makes a special effort to reach candidates from underrepresented regions. Vacancy
announcements could be advertised in local media outlets or even directly at
universities. Direct contact with embassies of underrepresented countries is also a
realistic option. Of course, to balance this proactive approach the Court needs to
enforce a programme of not hiring candidates from over represented countries or
regions. This naturally will present challenges to the hiring managers.
The ICC is creating new case law all of the time. Decisions are being made and
appealed on an almost weekly basis and there is now a substantial body of law laid
down. In addition, many lawyers and other staff have been working at the Court for a
long period of time and have become accustomed to its methods. In many cases,
having experience in other jurisdictions may lead to enhanced advocacy and the
quality of the cases being presented is improving all the time. However, what we
have seen in this chapter is that participants, defence counsel, judges and
prosecutors, are becoming accustomed to the new system. Many universities are now
263 Although there is no real sign of States like Israel, Russia, USA and China joining the ICC,
this is not necessarily as a consequence of the judicial process or courtroom activities, but
more for political reasons.
264 Bitti interview.
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offering courses in public international law, which includes a component of
international criminal law and also universities are training their students in moot
courts and tribunals.
In the final analysis, the ICC is distinct from the international tribunals that have
come before it and from the national courts of the States which form part of it. It may
have taken time for the actors involved to become accustomed to the new method,
but they have managed to do so. The Rome Treaty is a compromise instrument, both
politically and legally. According to President Fernández, quoting the PrepCom draft
statute: “the decision of the authors [of proposals] to move away from national
positions towards a single straight forward procedural approach, acceptable to
delegations representing different national legal systems”.265
The Trial Chamber’s decision to convict Mr. Katanga was initially appealed by the
Defence, however, the appeal was later withdrawn. 266 It has never been tested
whether or not the Trial Chamber’s late decision to change the characterisation of the
facts impinged on the accused’s right to a fair trial, and commentators will continue
to argue the merits and demerits of the provision.
Ultimately, “[n]o one State or group of States may claim total victory, or a monopoly
of the Statute, for each made concessions and compromises in order to make the
instrument generally acceptable”.267The Court’s culture will continue to evolve and
to settle. Procedures, Administrative Instructions (AI’s) and Internal Policies are
making working habits more standardised and staff know what is expected from
them. The move to a new permanent premises means that for the first time in many
years all of The Hague based staff are under one roof again and this has led to a more
familiar working relationship between the different Organs of the Court.
As more cases are brought to trial, it is hoped that the law will also settle and
participants will know what to expect from the proceedings. The Court’s staff are
drawn from all over the world; many come to The Hague for a definite period of
time and as a result there is a temporary feel to working at the ICC. Additionally, the
265 Supra, pp. 223, 224.
266 “Defence and Prosecution discontinue respective appeals against Judgment in Katanga
Case”, https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1021&ln=en.
267 Supra, note 150, p.36.
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longest fixed term contact of employment is for five years and many join the Court
on significantly shorter contracts than that. 268 In order to provide a more stable
environment, these contracts should be examined. Additionally, there is no
promotion structure in place. All positions are advertised and staff need to compete
with external candidates for ‘promotions’. Again, this is something for the Assembly
to look into. A stable environment is necessary for staff to perform well and
therefore this is related to the research question as a challenge to be addressed for
ensuring the long term success of the court.
268 General Temporary Assignments (GTA) along with Short Term Assignments (STA)
cannot be offered beyond the current budget term, meaning that they terminate at the end of
each year. It is not uncommon for staff to have four or six short term contracts. A colleague
of the author moved from the West Coast of the United States for a contract that began on
the 1st of December with no guarantee that he would have a new contract in January the
following year.
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Chapter 4: Confirmation of Charges and
Evidence
4.1 Introduction
This Chapter will address a large procedural issue which has received a lot of
attention from commentators. It is directly relevant to the research question because,
if the Prosecutor and the Judges are philosophically opposed on the issue of the
nature and extent of the evidence to be presented at the confirmation of charges
stage, then it could present serious credibility problems for the Court.
In particular the Gbagbo case raised serious concerns for the OTP, especially around
the topic of how much of the evidence should have been collected and how ‘trial
ready’ the Office should be at the time of the confirmation of charges. This chapter
will closely examine that particular case. The author strongly disagrees with the idea
that an investigation should be all but complete, believing it to be inefficient and
contrary to the spirit of the Statute. Furthermore, not being trial ready will not
necessarily adversely impact the interests of the accused, and turning the
confirmation of charges hearings into a mini-trial will not serve the general interests
of justice. How the Court deals with this issue in the next few cases will have a big
impact on the success of the Court in the future.
The idea of holding a hearing in order to confirm charges brought by a prosecutor
after an investigation in a criminal process, is not a concept familiar to many of us in
Europe. Although, those readers familiar with the common law culture practiced in
the US will, no doubt, be aware of the Grand Jury system269 which is, in essence, a
pre-trial hearing with the capacity to hear witnesses and review evidence before
deciding to send a case forward for trial before a criminal court.270
269 For a history of Grand Jury’s see: “Behind the Locked door of an American Grand Jury:
Its History, its Secrecy and its Process”, Kadish, Mark, Florida State University Law Review,
1996, http://www.law.fsu.edu/journals/lawreview/frames/241/kaditxt.html.
270 The Grand Jury is larger than a regular jury and it is used in some common law
jurisdictions but not in others.
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The drafters of the Rome Statute enshrined, in Article 61, the requirement for the
Pre-Trial Chamber to hold a hearing within a “reasonable time after the person's
surrender or voluntary appearance before the Court” in order to confirm the charges
which the Prosecutor initiated.
The hearing does have some characteristics of a trial: it is presided over by 3
judges,271 the prosecution presents some evidence to support the charges, and the
accused is present272 along with his or her counsel. The process allows parties to
issue opening and closing statements and for the examination of witnesses.
Following the hearing, the judges retire to issue their judgment.273 Although I will
delve deeper into the function of the confirmation of charges hearing later in this
chapter, it is not a trial. Nor is it even a mini-trial. Its function is to allow the judges
of a pre-trial chamber to evaluate whether the prosecution has enough evidence to
move ahead with a trial on the charges cited. The Prosecution need not present all of
its evidence at this stage but enough to satisfy the judges that there are “substantial
grounds to believe”274 that the accused committed the crimes alleged.
The confirmation of charges process is unique to the ICC and does not exist in the ad
hoc tribunals. 275 It was designed in order to allow the Prosecutor complete
271 These Judges, from Pre-Trial Chamber, will not be the same as those chosen for the actual
trial, should the charges be confirmed. The ICC is composed of three separate Chambers:
Pre-Trial, Trial and Appeals.
272 Article 61(2) of the Rome Statute allows for the possibility for the confirmation of charges
hearings to take place without the presence of the accused, for a number of stated reasons.
273 The options available to the judges are to dismiss all charges, some of the charges,
confirm some or all of the charges or postpone the issuing of a decision and instead, instruct
the prosecutor to provide more information by a certain date. See: Art. 61(7) of the Rome
Statute.
274 In the lead up to the signing of the Rome Statute the drafters had considered using the
phrase ‘prima facie’, however a number of States felt the expression was insufficiently clear
and that the ‘clearer expression’ reasonable grounds to believe should be adopted, which
ultimately is what happened. It should be noted however, that there was no difference in the
actual standard, merely the way of expressing the former was considered, by some at least,
to be less clear than the latter.
275 The essay of Tochilovsky represents a comparative analysis of charging at the ad hoc
tribunals – ICTY, ICTR and SCSL – and at ICC. The core difference, according to the author,
is the confirmation and amendment of charges at the ICC granted by Article 61 of the
Statute, which obliges the prosecutor to support each charge with sufficient evidence, and
allows the accused to present evidence at the hearing. Article 61 also gives the Pre-Trial or
Trial Chambers an ability to amend the indictment. In contrast, at the ICTR, if satisfied, the
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responsibility for when to initiate an investigation, while at the same time providing
a system of accountability down the line, to apply the brakes on a case where there is
insufficient evidence. The confirmation of charges step in the process, would also act
as a reassurance to those States that were sceptical of a prosecutor with too much
independence.276 During the hearing, the Prosecutor is required to “support each
charge with sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that the
person committed the crimes charged”.277 The test therefore, is for the Prosecutor to
establish that there are ‘substantial grounds to believe’ that the accused committed
the alleged crime.
This test has a higher threshold than the requirement of ‘reasonable grounds to
believe’ required when seeking a warrant for arrest or summons to appear.278 It is
lower, however, than the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ test 279 required to secure a
conviction. Mixed messages have come from the Pre-Trial Chambers, which will be
discussed below, and it remains unclear as to what level of evidence is required to be
presented at the confirmation of charges hearing in order for the Prosecutor to meet
the ‘substantial grounds to believe’ requirement.
4.2 Practical Purpose of the Confirmation of Charges Hearing
As mentioned already, the case of The Prosecutor vs. Laurent Gbagbo is of special
interest to the author because it was the first time that a Pre-Trial Chamber adjourned
the hearing using Art. 61 para.7(c)(i) of the Statute. Additionally, the dissenting
opinion raised doubts about the Majority’s understanding of the essence of the pre-
trial phase and the Judge’s roles. It is this Case, therefore, which demonstrates best
the challenges facing the OTP in order to be sure it has done enough to present a
Judge shall confirm the charge upon the review with supporting material. See: Tochilovsky,
V., “Charging in the ICC and Relevant Jurisprudence of the Ad Hoc Tribunals”, Chapter 23;
Doria, J., Gasser H.P., Bassiouni C.M. “The legal regime of the International Criminal Court:
essays in honour of Professor Igor Blishchenko: in memoriam Professor Igor Pavlovich
Blishchenko (1930-2000)”, pp.827-841. Leiden; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009,
p.840.
276 This is explained by Bitti in Chapter 3.
277 Article 61(5) of the Rome Statute.
278 Article 58 of the Rome Statute.
279 Article 66 of the Rome Statute.
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case to the required standard at the confirmation stage. It is thus, central to the
research question.
To better understand the rulings in the Gbagbo case, the author will look at the
decisions of the Pre-Trial Chambers and their rulings about the basic meaning of the
pre-trial phase at the ICC and the findings on ‘substantial grounds to believe’. An
important question that will be considered, is whether the rulings in the different
Gbagbo cases are really consistent with the former and later decisions and the
principles that are outlined for the pre-trial phase.
There are a number of important principles which the Court must consider at the pre-
trial phase: The rights of the defendant, should the case proceed to trial, ensuring that
the pre-trial stage is not conducted as the actual trial, the factual matter of the case,
and finally, judicial economy.
The first and maybe most important principle on which the pre-trial phase function is
based on, is to protect the rights of the defendant. That means in practical terms, that
no case should enter the trial phase without sufficient evidence to establish
substantial grounds to believe that the accused has committed the crimes he is
charged with.280 Therefore, it is up to Pre-Trial Chamber to ensure the defendant will
be protected against wrongful and wholly unfounded charges.281
4.3 Committal for Trial
A further purpose of the confirmation of charges hearing is to ensure that the
evidence presented is sufficient to justify committal for trial. 282 Furthermore, it
means that the evidence supporting the charges proves that the accusations of the
prosecution are going beyond mere theory or suspicion.283 That also might be the
280 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the confirmation
of charges, 30 September 2008, para. 63 - http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/67a9ec/; The
Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain, Case No. ICC-02/05-03/09, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges, 7 March 2011, para. 31 - http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/5ac9eb/.
281 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Ibid.
282 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the
confirmation of charges, 29 January 2007, para. 34 - http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b7ac4f/;
The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Decision Pursuant to Article
61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Bosco
Ntaganda, 9 June 2014, para. 9 - http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/5686c6/.
283 The Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain, supra, note 280.
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reason why Pre-Trial Chamber I highlighted its ‘gate-keeper’. 284 The evidence
should be assessed as a whole285 to determine whether the Prosecution built a solid
case.
Another important, and not well-known, function of the pre-trial phase is to actually
set the scope of the case that will go on trial. This means that charges that are not
approved by the Pre-Trial Chamber are not going to be heard before the Trial
Chamber. Therefore, the pre-trial phase sets the factual subject matter of cases
reaching the Trial Chamber.286 It also shows in what ways the Chamber is bound by
the charges presented by the Prosecutor, for they may not exceed these
accusations.287
It is important that the confirmation of charges hearing should not become a trial
before the trial or a mini-trial. The confirmation of charges hearing has a limited
scope and purpose,288 and the Pre-Trial Judges may not go beyond the accusations of
the prosecution, nor should they attempt to investigate on their own.289 They are of
course mindful of the rights of the defendant and the accessible evidence but the
Rome Statute does not give them the right to fully explore the evidence.290 This is
the duty of the Trial Chamber, otherwise it would be confusing to split the process of
the prosecution in a trial and a pre-trial phase. The Pre-Trial Chamber, therefore,
shall not evaluate whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a future conviction.291
284 The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, Decision adjourning the
hearing on the confirmation of charges pursuant to article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute, 3
June 2013 para. 18 - http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/2682d8/.
285 The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, Decision on the confirmation
of charges against Laurent Gbagbo, 12 June 2014, paras. 22, 23 - http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/5b41bc/.
286 The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11,
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome
Statute, 23 January 2012, para. 44 - http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/96c3c2/.
287 The Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain, supra note 280.
288 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, supra note 280.
289 The Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, Case No. ICC-02/05-02/09, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges, para. 40 – 08 February 2017, http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/cb3614/.
290 The Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, Ibid.
291 The Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, Ibid.
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Furthermore, the principle of judicial economy is connected to the other purpose of
the pre-trial phase: the Pre-Trial Judges are obliged to ensure that only those persons
against whom sufficient compelling charges are proven, will go on trial.292
Alex Whiting believes that the “pre-trial judges have gone too far in mandating that
the Prosecution reach this stage by the confirmation hearing, unless it can show
exceptional circumstances requiring additional investigation”.293 He stated that even
the ad hoc tribunals, often cited as the model to be followed by the Court, never
imposed such a strict regime on the OTP. He believes that while “it is essential that
the core elements of the charges remain fixed so that the defence has proper notice,
attempting to freeze in place the evidence at some point before the trial is
unworkable and will ultimately undermine the goal of the Court to uncover the
truth”.294
4.4 Substantial Grounds to Believe
The burden of proof required to be met is lower at the confirmation of charges stage
than at the trial stage. This section examines what is meant by ‘substantial grounds to
believe’.4.4.1 Definition
The Pre-Trial Chamber in the case of The Prosecutor vs. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo
in a decision from the 15th of June 2009, attempted to define the term
“substantial”. 295 They issued that according to the Oxford Dictionary, the term
“substantial” can be understood as “significant”, “solid”, “material”, “well built” and
“real”.296 So the proof that the prosecution has to bring must be solid, well-built and
real. Further, they stated concerning the threshold of proof, that in order to meet its
292 The Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain, supra note 280.
293 Whiting, Alex, “ICC Prosecutor Announces Important Changes in New Strategic Plan”,
Just Security, 24 October 2013, https://www.justsecurity.org/2215/icc-prosecutor-announces-
important-strategic-plan/ - Last visited 25/05/2015.
294 Ibid.
295 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision Pursuant to
Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo, 15 June 2009, para. 28 - http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/07965c/.
296 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Ibid.
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evidentiary burden the Prosecutor must offer concrete and tangible proof
demonstrating a clear line of reasoning underpinning its specific allegations.297
According to the Court, the Prosecutor is not required to tender more evidence than
is, in his or her view, necessary to convince the Pre-Trial Chamber that the charges
should be confirmed.298 This means that it is up to the Prosecutor to decide which
evidence would bring solid proof that the person accused committed the crime.
Furthermore, it is stated that the evidence must be assessed as a whole by the Pre-
Trial Chamber.299 On this basis, the Pre-Trial Chamber has to decide whether it is
satisfied that all allegations are sufficiently strong to go for trial.
To summarise the rulings and findings mentioned above, the Pre-Trial Chambers
said that, firstly, the evidence presented must be sufficient to justify committal for
trial.300 Secondly, the burden of proof lies somewhere in between the threshold for
the issuing a warrant of arrest and the proof ‘beyond reasonable doubt’.301 Thirdly,
that the proof needs to be ‘solid’, ‘well-built’ and ‘real’ in order to be substantial.3024.4.2 The Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana303
The burden of proof at the confirmation of charges stage was analysed in 2010 where
the OTP failed to convince the Pre-Trial Chamber that they had met the required
standard. On 28 September 2010, Pre-Trial Chamber I issued a warrant of arrest for
Mr. Callixte Mbarushimana,304 pursuant to the Prosecution’s request.305 The Warrant
of Arrest was unsealed on 11 October 2010, 306 and Mr Mbarushimana was arrested
later that day by the French authorities. It took more than three months to have him
297 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, supra note 282.
298 The Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain, supra note 280, para 40.
299 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, supra note 282.
300 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Ibid.
301 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, supra note 295.
302 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Ibid.
303 Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10.
304 A profile of Mr Mbarushimana can be found at: http://www.trial-
ch.org/en/resources/trial-watch/trial-
watch/profiles/profile/941/action/show/controller/Profile.html - Last accessed 03/03/2016.
305 The Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, Case No. ICC‐01/04‐01/10, Decision on the
Prosecutor's Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Callixte Mbarushimana, 28
September 2010 - http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/04d4fa/.
306 https://www.icc-cpi.int/drc/mbarushimana?ln=en.
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transferred to The Hague. He appeared before the Court for the first time on 28
January 2011.307 Mbarushimana’s arrest was the fourth by the ICC in the DRC
Situation.
The Prosecution held him allegedly criminally responsible under Article 25(3)(a) or,
in the alternative, under Article 25(3)(d), both of the Rome Statute, for eight counts
of war crimes and five counts of crimes against humanity committed by the Forces
Démocratiques pour la Liberation du Rwanda (hereinafter “FDLR”) in the North and
South Kivu Provinces of the DRC, between January 2009 and the date of the
Application for a Warrant of Arrest. 308 The Prosecution submitted that he first
became the de facto leader of the FDLR and he was later appointed FDLR First Vice
President ad interim in 2010.309 The confirmation of charges hearing was held from
the 16 to 21 September 2011.
The Pre-Trial Chamber found that an armed conflict not of an international nature
(NIAC) took place in the Kivu Provinces of the DRC between the DRC government
forces and the FDLR, and that there were substantial grounds to believe that the
FDLR, as an armed group, possessed the degree of organisation required under
Article 8(2)(f) of the Statute.310 Furthermore, after analysing the alleged crimes as
submitted by the Prosecution, the Pre-Trial Chamber was satisfied that there were
substantial grounds to believe that those crimes were committed by the FDLR, and
took place in the context of the above-mentioned NIAC.311
The main submission by the Prosecution entailed the existence of an order to create a
"humanitarian catastrophe" by directing attacks on the civilian population, emanating
from the leadership of the FDLR in early 2009. 312 Nevertheless, after a careful
examination of the Prosecution’s evidence, the majority of the Pre-Trial Chamber,
with the Presiding Judge dissenting, was not convinced, to the threshold of
307 Ibid.
308 The Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, Case No. ICC‐01/04‐01/10, Decision on the
confirmation of charges, 16 December 2011, para.13 - http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/63028f/.
309 Ibid para. 5.
310 Ibid paras. 106-107.
311 Ibid para. 241.
312 Ibid para. 245.
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substantial grounds to believe, that crimes against humanity, under Article 7 of the
Rome Statute were committed by the FDLR troops.313
After examining the evidence brought to its attention, the Majority was unable to be
satisfied to the threshold of substantial grounds to believe that the FDLR pursued the
policy of attacking the civilian population. Therefore, it concluded that there were
likewise not substantial grounds to believe that the FDLR leadership constituted “a
group of persons acting with a common purpose” within the meaning of Article
25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute.
Since the liability threshold under Article 25(3)(d) was not met for the armed group
as a whole, the Chamber was not bound to verify whether Mr. Mbarushimana
provided a significant contribution to the commission of the crimes mentioned
above. Nevertheless, the Judges further analysed each of the suspect's alleged
contributions, concluding that his role as a leader of the FDLR could not be qualified
as any contribution, even less a "significant" one, to crimes by the FDLR in
accordance with Article 25(3)(d) of the Statute.314
In light of the foregoing, the Majority, with Judge Sanji Mmasenono Monageng,
dissenting, declined to confirm the charges against Mr. Callixte Mbarushimana.315
The decision not to confirm the charges was undoubtedly a blow for the Office of the
Prosecutor and the Pre-Trial Chamber expressed some harsh criticism for both the
Prosecution and the Defence, for the way they conducted themselves in the lead up
and during the proceedings. The Pre-trial Chamber stated:
“[b]efore going into the merits of the case, the Chamber wishes to express its
dissatisfaction with both parties' conduct throughout the proceedings leading to
the confirmation of the charges.’316 ‘First, there were significant oversights and
mistakes regarding vital aspects of the case. Among these, the "errors, internal
inconsistencies, omissions and duplications" identified by the Prosecution in the
version of the DCC and LoE originally filed stand out as particularly
unfortunate.’ 317 ‘Such problems have not helped in streamlining the
proceedings: in most cases they triggered additional petitioning and litigation,
313 Ibid para. 264.
314 Ibid para. 303.
315 Ibid para. 340.
316 Ibid para. 35.
317 Ibid para. 36.
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such as when the Chamber was encumbered by the Prosecution with the
unnecessary burden of authorising redactions to a document which had already
been previously disclosed in an unredacted form.”318
The Pre-Trial Chamber levied further criticism at the Prosecutor which the Office
had not heard before. The Chamber highlighted “its concern at the technique
followed in several instances by some Prosecution investigators, which seems utterly
inappropriate when viewed in light of the objective, set out in article 54(l)(a) of the
Statute, to establish the truth by “investigating incriminating and exonerating
circumstances equally”.319
The Prosecution never publicly reacted to the criticism, except to the extent that once
the Appeal Decision was issued in May 2012, the OTP issued a statement saying it
“takes note of today’s decision by the Appeals Chamber. We are evaluating the
decision to see whether it is possible to present a new case against Mr Mbarushimana
presenting additional evidence, in accordance with the Judges’ ruling”.320 The case
was then quietly dropped.
Although there are other instances in which charges failed to be confirmed,321 for the
next part of this chapter it is proposed to consider only a single case: that against the
former Ivory Coast President, Laurent Gbagbo. The charges were eventually
confirmed against him, but it was less than a smooth journey. The reason that this
Case is so important is because the OTP was confident that it had understood the
requirements of the process sufficiently well, and believed that it had put forward
enough compelling evidence to meet the required burden of proof.
318 Ibid para. 36.
319 Ibid para. 51.
320 Press release Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana OTP Statement following the Appeals
Chamber decision, 30/05/2012, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otpstatement300512.
321 The Prosecutor v. Henry Kiprono Kosgey (ICC-01/09-01/11) and The Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss
Abu Garda (ICC-02/05-02/09).
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4.4.3 The Prosecutor vs. Laurent Gbagbo322
The Pre-trial Chamber, in line with Art. 61 para.7(c)(i) of the Statute,323 issued a
decision on 3rd Jun 2013 to adjourn the confirmation of charges. This Decision
allowed the Prosecution the possibility to present more evidence on the Case and to
conduct further investigations.324 Firstly, the author will present the reader with the
decisions and dissenting opinions, and then he will compare them to the findings
before and after the judgements in this Case.4.4.4 First Confirmation of Charges Hearing
In the majority judgement 325 it is pointed out at first that “the Chamber will
determine whether it is thoroughly satisfied that the (Prosecutor’s) allegations are
sufficient strong to commit to trial.”326 This is basically the applied standard used by
the Pre-Trial Chambers before. It is describing the main three tasks of the Pre-Trial
judges which it to ensure that only cases go on trial “for which the prosecutor has
presented sufficiently compelling evidence going beyond mere theory or
suspicion”,327 in order to protect the alleged person against wrongful prosecution328
and to ensure judicial economy by selecting the cases that go on trial.329 The judges,
furthermore, started to emphasise, for the first time, the “gatekeeper function of the
Pre-Trial Chamber”.330
The Pre-Trial Chamber changed its approach to the evidence as a whole in this
Decision, by stating that “[e]ven though article 61(5) of the statute only requires the
Prosecutor to support each charge with sufficient evidence at the confirmation
hearing, the Chamber ‘must assume that the Prosecutor has presented her strongest
322 Supra note 284; supra note 285; The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11,
Decision on the Defence request for leave to appeal the «Decision on the Confirmation of
Charges against Laurent Gbagbo», 11 September 2014, http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/17d7c7/.
323 Supra note 284.
324 Article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute.
325 Supra note 284.
326 Supra note 284, para. 17.
327 Supra note 284, para. 18.
328 Ibid.
329 Ibid.
330 Ibid.
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possible case based on a largely completed investigation”331.By this, the Pre-Trial
Chamber is referring to an Appeals Chamber decision where it was stated that
ideally, the investigations of the prosecution shall be largely completed at the stage
of the confirmation of charges hearing332. Furthermore, it is its opinion that: “This
approach ensures continuity in the presentation of the case and safeguards the rights
of the Defence, which should not be presented with a wholly different evidentiary
case at trial.”333
Unfortunately, in the same decision the Appeals Chamber acknowledges that it is the
Prosecutor’s decision how she investigates each claim and that there is no
requirement in the Statute which suggests otherwise.334 Neither do the Majority
acknowledge that the Prosecution decides which evidence it will introduce, in which
phase of the proceedings. The result should be that the Prosecutor has the choice
whether she will introduce new evidence at trial. This would be just normal strategic
planning in a case.4.4.5 The dissenting opinion of Judge Fernández de Gurmendi
Judge Fernández de Gurmendi issued a strong dissenting opinion. The author
believes that the Minority opinion felt that the Majority judgement was introducing a
completely new standard of proof. Fernández de Gurmendi stated that the Majority’s
decision “is based on an expansive interpretation of the applicable evidentiary
standard at the confirmation of charges stage that exceeds what is required and
indeed allowed by the Statute”335. The Majority itself specifically acknowledges that
it departed from the existing approach336 and by doing that, they refer to two Appeals
331 Supra note 284, para. 25.
332 ICC-01/04-01/10-514 para. 44.
333 Supra note 284, para. 25.
334 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment on the
Prosecutor's appeal against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled "Decision
Establishing General Principles Governing Applications to Restrict Disclosure pursuant to
Rule 81 (2) and (4) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence", 13 October 2006, para 54: ”The
Appeals Chamber notes that, ideally, it would be desirable for the investigation to be complete by the
time of the confirmation hearing - a matter that the Prosecutor acknowledges. However, for the
reasons stated above, this is not a requirement of the Statute.” - http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/7813d4/.
335 Supra note 284, Anx., paras. 3, 4.
336 Supra note 284, para. 37.
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Chamber decisions337 to modify their findings. The effect of deviation of the findings
“makes it necessary for the Prosecutor to: (i) “present all her evidence”; (ii) “largely
complete her investigation”338; and (iii) “present[] her strongest possible case.”339
Though it is stated in the Appeals Chamber Judgment that these findings above are
not a legal requirement of the Statute itself, 340 which means the Prosecutor can
decide whether she presents her strongest case possible. 341 Judge Fernández de
Gurmendi first of all, questions the Chamber’s approach. She states that “the Pre-
Trial Chamber is not an investigative chamber and does not have the mandate to
direct the investigations of the Prosecutor.”342 Further she is of the opinion that
“such an approach undermines both the flexibility in the assessment of evidence that
needs to prevail through all phases of the proceedings, as well as the possibility for
the Prosecutor to rely solely on documentary and summary evidence.”343
The Pre-Trial Chamber also made specific reference to hearsay evidence and the
reliance on external reports, noting that it would prefer first hand witness statements
rather than NGO reports in order to support the allegations made by the
Prosecutor.344 Nevertheless, Article 61(5) of the Statute allows the Prosecutor to rely
exclusively on documentary and summary evidence.
Judge Fernández stated that the “Pre-trial Chambers exceed their mandate by
entering into a premature in-depth analysis of the guilt of the suspect, as was
previously held.”345 In addition, she stated that “the approach of my colleagues may
end up reintroducing through the back door the “mini-trial” or ‘trial before the trial’
that the drafters and other Chambers of this Court wished so much to avoid."346
337 The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed
Hussein Ali and in the case of The Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana.
338 Supra note 284, Anx., para. 7 ; Decision, paras. 25 and 37.
339 Supra note 284, Anx., paras. 7 ; 13 ; Decision, paras. 25 and 37.
340 Supra note 284, Anx., paras. 7 ; 17 ; Decision, paras. 25 and 37.
341 Supra note 284, Anx., para. 17.
342 Supra note 284, Anx., para. 51.
343 Supra note 284, Anx., para. 23.
344 Supra note 284, paras. 28 ; 29 ; 30 ; 32.
345 Supra note 284, Anx., para. 25.
346 Supra note 284, Anx., para. 28.
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Furthermore, the Chambers should not seek to determine whether the evidence is
sufficient to sustain a future conviction347, this is simply not their responsibility.
“I believe that Pre-Trial Chambers need to exercise this gatekeeping function
with utmost prudence, taking into account the limited purpose of the
confirmation hearing. An expansive interpretation of their role is not only
unsupported by law. It affects the entire architecture of the procedural system of
the Court and may, as a consequence, encroach upon the functions of trial
Judges, generate duplications, and end up frustrating the judicial efficiency that
Pre-Trial Chambers are called to ensure”.348
The decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber to adjourn the hearing rather than failing to
confirm the charges altogether, is a rather logical approach because without the
knowledge of the newly applied standard, the Prosecutor had no chance to meet the
higher requirement.4.4.6 Second Confirmation of Charges on the Prosecutor vs. Laurent Gbagbo
The Pre-Trial Chamber reconvened, and on 12 June 2014 confirmed the charges
against Mr. Gbagbo and committed him for trial. However, it was again a majority
judgement. The Pre-trial Chamber asserted that the Prosecutor must “offer concrete
and tangible proof demonstrating a clear line of reasoning underpinning [her]
specific allegations.”349 Further, all available evidence is assessed as a whole as
required also by the limited scope and purpose of the confirmation of charges
proceedings.350
The dissenting opinion was from Judge van den Wyngaert. She acknowledged that
there was a “considerable quantitative increase in [the] evidence.”351 However, she
pointed outs that “despite the request for more and better information as to the
number of victims in relation to the alleged incidents, the previously identified
347 Supra note 284, Anx., para. 25.
348 Supra note 284, Anx., para. 26.
349 Supra note 285, para. 19; Supra note 280, para. 69; Supra note 282, para. 39.
350 Supra note 285, paras. 22, 23.
351 Supra note 285, Anx para. 2.
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problem regarding reliance upon anonymous hearsay remains.”352 In her opinion, she
goes to some length to explain her rationale. She states that:
“charges should only be confirmed if the evidence has a realistic chance of
supporting a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. I am, of course, aware that
the applicable standard for confirmation is considerably lower than at trial. At
the confirmation stage the Prosecutor may even be given the benefit of the
doubt when there are questions about the credibility of certain witnesses or the
probative value of particular documents. However, there must be at least
enough of an evidentiary basis to sustain a possible conviction on the
assumption that these questions are resolved in favour of the Prosecutor at trial.
If it is clear that, even if the available evidence is taken at its highest, there is a
substantial doubt that this will be enough to support a conviction, there is no
point in confirming the charges.”353
The Appeals Chamber in the Prosecutor vs. Callixte Mbarushimana354 pointed out
that “the confirmation of charges hearing exists to separate those cases and charges
which should go to trial from those which should not, a fact supported by the
drafting history". The decision continues to state:
“It serves to ensure the efficiency of judicial proceedings and to protect the
rights of persons by ensuring that cases and charges go to trial only when
justified by sufficient evidence. It is by its nature an evidentiary hearing, with
the Pre-Trial Chamber required to evaluate whether the evidence is sufficient to
establish substantial grounds to believe the person committed each of the
crimes charged. In order to make this determination as to the sufficiency of the
evidence, the Pre-Trial Chamber must necessarily draw conclusions from the
evidence where there are ambiguities, contradictions, inconsistencies or doubts
as to credibility arising from the evidence. By nature an evidentiary hearing.”355
The Chamber must necessarily draw conclusions from the evidence where there are
ambiguities, contradictions, inconsistencies or doubts as its credibility. 356 The
352 Ibid.
353 Ibid, para. 4.
354 The Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, Case No. ICC‐01/04‐01/10, Judgment on the
appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 16 December 2011
entitled "Decision on the confirmation of charges", 30 May 2012 - http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/6ead30/.
355 Ibid, para. 39.
356 Ibid, para. 39.
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decision says that the confirmation of charges hearing is not an end in itself but:
“serves the purpose of filtering out those cases and charges for which the evidence is
insufficient to justify a trial.” 357 Additionally, and importantly, the decision
continues to state that:
“This limited purpose of the confirmation of charges proceedings is reflected in
the fact that the Prosecutor must only produce sufficient evidence to establish
substantial grounds to believe the Person committed the crimes charged. The
Pre-Trial Chamber need not be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, and the
Prosecutor need not submit more evidence than is necessary to meet the
threshold of substantial grounds to believe. This limited purpose is also
reflected in the fact that the Prosecutor may rely on documentary and summary
evidence and need not call the witnesses who will testify at trial. As the
Appeals Chamber has stated, the use of such summaries, even where the
identities of witnesses are unknown to the defence and their underlying
statements are not fully disclosed, is not necessarily prejudicial to or
inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial.”358
This Appeals Chamber decision in the Mbarushimana was delivered on 30 May
2012, more than a year before the decision to adjourn the confirmation of charges
hearing in the Gbabgo Case, on 03/06/2013. It is interesting that the Pre-trial
Chamber in the latter case decided to depart from the earlier Appeals Chamber
decision and indicates that lower chambers are not obliged to follow the doctrine of
stare decisis.
4.5 Academic commentary
The topic of confirmation of charges at the International Criminal Court is a widely
discussed topic among academics and commentators. Most of the sources, being
detailed descriptions of Articles 15, 57 and 61 of the Rome Statute, only have
sketchy attempts to critically assess the confirmation process of the Court. However,
the Washington College of Law drafted two reports on this topic: one in 2008 and
another more recently, in 2015.
The first report describes the process of the confirmation of charges, and gives
comments and recommendations on the current – back in 2008 – confirmed charges
357 Ibid, para. 47.
358 Ibid, para. 47.
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in the case against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and in the joint case against Germain
Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui. The report reveals a number of complications
in the confirmation stage, mainly delays and absence of full disclosure. As a result of
this analysis, several recommendations have been made concerning the procedures
during confirmation process and its conclusions, as well as decisions of the Pre-Trial
Chambers.359
The recent report by the Washington College of Law is dedicated to propose
fundamental restructuring of the confirmation process. The authors reason the need
for changes in the system with a ‘disconnect between the drafters’ and the Court’s
intentions regarding the confirmation process and the way that process has played
out in practice360." The report mentions the initiatives to improve the confirmation
process undertaken by the Judges of the Court and by a group of outside experts, but
discards these ideas as "insufficient to render the overall scheme consistent with the
goals of the drafters and the Court itself”361. As a result of critical assessment of the
confirmation of charges, a series of amendments to the ICC’s Rules of Procedure and
Evidence and the Regulations of the Court have been made.362
The low level of inclusion of gender based crimes during the confirmation of
charges, is raised by the report of the Executive Director of the Women’s Initiatives
for Gender Justice, Brigid Inder.363 She emphasises the pioneering role of the ICC in
charging gender-based crimes in the case of Katanga and Ngudjolo. Nevertheless,
she remains concerned that the impunity for these crimes continues, and criticizes
the Court for not bringing charges of rape and other gender-based crimes against
359 “The confirmation of charges process at the International Criminal Court”, Washington
College of Law, War Crimes Research Office, International Criminal Court Legal Analysis
and Education Project. Washington, DC: American University, Washington College of Law,
2008. pp. 7-12, 67-72.
360 “The confirmation of charges process at the International Criminal Court: A Critical
Assessment and Recommendations for Change”, Washington College of Law. War Crimes
Research Office. International Criminal Court Legal Analysis and Education Project.
Washington, DC: American University, Washington College of Law, 2015. pp. 2-3.
361 Ibid.
362 Ibid.
363 Inder is also Special Advisor on Gender to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal
Court.
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anyone else in the Democratic Republic of Congo.364 Inder specifically raises the
case of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo in CAR, who faced charges of rape, but,
according to The Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice, was not charged with the
full range of sexual violence crimes. While the Pre-Trial Chamber explains its
reasoning that the ‘essence’ of the charges of torture and outrages upon personal
dignity are fully subsumed by the charge of rape, the author argues that the Pre-Trial
Chamber’s decision to only confirm charges of rape does not sufficiently address the
extent of the harm suffered by those raped and those forced to watch family
members being raped.365
Fabricio Guariglia366 says that one of the contemporary challenges the ICC has to
face is the authorisation of Pre-Trial Chamber. Guariglia notes this issue in the
context of the Cote d'Ivoire Situation about the appropriateness of a Pre-Trial
Chamber to make “autonomous findings pertaining to incidents and crimes not
included in the Prosecutor's request”367 and concludes that it is the task of the Court
to deal with the uncertainty and ambiguity of these situations. 368 The recent
confirmation of charges hearing in the Mali369 Situation did not address the topic, but
it is likely that future Pre-Trial Chambers will take the opportunity to address some
of these challenges.
The late Judge Kaul also made observations on the perspectives and development of
the Court, and he was critical of some of the proceedings. For example he believed
they are not ‘expeditious’ enough, which causes many complications and delays. He
offered a solution, where the Office of the Prosecutor works ‘full power ab initio’ to
364 Inder, B., “Making a statement: a review of charges and prosecutions for gender-based
crimes before the International Criminal Court”, Second edition.
http://www.iccwomen.org/publications/articles/docs/MaS22-10web.pdf [Retrieved
29/07/2016] p. 19.
365 Ibid p. 27.
366 Guariglia is Director of Prosecutions at the OTP.
367 Guariglia,F., “Propio Motu Powers of the Prosecutor”; Zidar, Andraž, “Contemporary
challenges for the International Criminal Court” pp.93-102, London: British Institute of
International and Comparative Law, 2014, p.100.
368 Ibid p.102.
369 See: https://www.icc-cpi.int/mali - Last accessed 28/08/2016.
79
achieve an unquestionable state of evidence.370 Perhaps this point emphasises the
difference between Chambers and the OTP, as the Prosecutor would certainly argue
that she does in fact work at achieving the best possible evidence she can obtain.
The aspect of fairness and expeditiousness at ICC has been touched upon in a book
chapter of “The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court” by Judge
Trendafilova, who analyses the concept of in absentia proceedings in the history of
the Rome Statute and the provision of Article 61(2)(b) of the Statute, in a scrupulous
manner. She believes while a confirmation hearing in absentia “could provoke
concern with respect to the person’s rights under the Statute, and, in particular the
right to be informed of the allegations against him/her”,371 she highlights that it is an
option “to advance the pre-trial proceeding by virtue of [a] confirmation hearing in
absentia”, 372 which would, in her view, contribute to fair and expeditious
proceedings. Judge Trendafilova also believes that the right to be present is not
absolute: “Where fair trial standards are employed by the defendant to disrupt
proceedings, the trial in absentia is an acceptable alternative to the usual procedure.
[…] Proceedings in absentia are a contingency available to any judicial system in
the event of the accused’s non-appearance. The failure to appear and defend in
person should not render the court impotent.”373
The material published by Human Rights Watch has summarised the experience of
the Pre-Trial Chambers at the Court, emphasizing its unique role. The article does
not provide the detailed description of the confirmation process, but marks it and
370 Kaul H, “The ICC of the future”; Andersen E., Crane D. M., “Proceedings of the Sixth
International Humanitarian Law Dialogs”, American Society of International Law Studies in
Transnational Legal Policy, No. 45, August 26 - 28, 2012,
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/stdtlp45&id=113, pp.110-111 – Last
accessed.
371 Trendafilova, E, “Fairness and expeditiousness in the International Criminal Court’s pre-
trial proceedings”; Stahn, G. Sluiter C., “The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal
Court”, pp.447-45, Leiden ; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009, p.445.
372 Ibid.
373 Ibid.
80
makes an overview of the cases which showed the necessity of the Pre-Trial
Chambers.374
Understanding the place of the International Criminal Court among other
international criminal courts and tribunals gives an opportunity for multilateral
cooperation and exchange of experience. The essay of Tochilovsky represents a
comparative analysis of charging at the ad hoc tribunals – ICTY, ICTR and SCSL –
and at ICC. The core difference, according to the author, is the confirmation and
amendment of charges at the ICC granted by the Article 61 of the Statute, which
obliges the Prosecutor to support each charge with sufficient evidence and allows the
accused to present evidence at the hearing. Article 61 also gives the Pre-Trial or
Trial Chambers an ability to amend the indictment. In contrast, at the ICTR, if
satisfied, the Judge shall confirm the charge upon a review with supporting material.
Tochilovsky makes the conclusion that the Trial Chamber has discretion to allow the
amendment of the charge and to grant additional time for the defence to prepare.375
The report “Defining the Case Against an Accused Before the International Criminal
Court: Whose Responsibility Is It?” (2009) by the War Crimes Research Office at
the Washington College of Law, focuses on the Court’s charges in the Lubanga and
Bemba cases and, after thorough analysis, makes the following observations:
Firstly, the Rome Statute grants the Prosecutor “exclusive authority”376 to frame the
charges against the accused, while the Pre-Trial Chamber of the Court is not
authorized “to become actively involved in the prosecution of the case”.377 Secondly,
in both cases of Lubanga and Bemba, the Pre-Trial Chambers have made decisions
that have exceeded their authority: amended the charges, declined to confirm the
charges and decided add new charges in the midst of the on-going trial. This,
according to the report, was not in the interest of efficiency or protecting the rights of
374 “Courting history: the landmark International Criminal Court's first years”, Human
Rights Watch, Landmark International Criminal Court's first years. New York, NY: Human
Rights Watch, 2008, pp.14-27.
375 Supra note 275.
376 “Defining the case against an accused before the International Criminal Court: whose
responsibility is it?”, War Crimes Research Office, International Criminal Court Legal
Analysis and Education Project; Washington, DC: War Crimes Research Office, American
University Washington College of Law, 2009, p.42.
377 Ibid.
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the defendant, which “calls into question the very purpose of having confirmation of
charges process”. 378 Finally, the report discusses in detail Trial Chamber I’s
interpretation of Regulation 55 of the Regulations the Court in the Lubanga Case,
which inevitably conflicts with a number of provisions of the Statute. Applying
Regulation 55 to justify modifying the charges, “appears inconsistent with the Rome
Statute”.379
The 2011 report “Expediting proceedings at the International Criminal Court” takes
a closer look at the length of the confirmation process, and, as of the writing of this
report, the ICC had concluded confirmation proceedings in five cases. In each case,
the process had taken from 8 to 14 months.380 The second issue the authors address
in the report is the length of time between the transfer of the case to the Trial
Chamber and the commencement of the trial proceedings, which took between 13
and 22 months.
The report proposes a solution to expedite the confirmation process, which requires
the Prosecution to rely on fewer witnesses, as, according to the Article 61(5) of the
Statute, the Prosecutor “need not call the witnesses expected to testify at the trial.”381
The report also suggests shortening the sixty-day period given to the Pre-Trial
Chamber to issue its decision, as “it seems appropriate at this stage to prioritize
prompt delivery of the confirmation decision over detailed and lengthy discussions
of the law and facts”382 or, instead, require the decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber to
be delivered “within 60 days of the last day of the actual confirmation hearing.”383
The article by Dr. Triestino Mariniello, “Questioning the Standard of Proof. The
Purpose of the ICC Confirmation of Charges Procedure” is closely related to the
researched topic and it represents an evaluation of the judicial debate, which arose in
the pre-trial proceedings in the Gbagbo case. As mentioned already, in their 3 June
378 Ibid p.47.
379 Ibid p.8.
380 SáCout, S., Cleary, K., “Expediting proceedings at the International Criminal Court”, War
Crimes Research Office, International Criminal Court Legal Analysis and Education Project;
Washington, DC: War Crimes Research Office, American University Washington College of
Law, 2011, p.19.
381 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
382 Supra note 379, p.23.
383 Ibid p.25.
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2013 decision (the “Gbagbo Adjournment Decision”), the majority of Pre-Trial
Chamber I, for the first time since the establishment of the Court, requested the
Prosecutor to present the case based on a “largely completed investigation”384. After
a close examination of the Article 61 of the Statute, Mariniello argues that the
Gbagbo Adjournment Decision approach, if put into practice, would bring several
undesirable complications. Firstly, it would result in a vast amount of evidence being
submitted to the Pre-Trial Chamber and probably delay the confirmation process.
Secondly, it might lead to a “distortion of the confirmation of charges hearing,
contrary to the purpose of Article 61 of the Statute”,385 which aim is to prevent the
transformation of the confirmation hearing into a mini-trial before the trial itself.
Finally, the need for the Prosecutor to provide a more detailed investigation during
the confirmation of charges, could, according to Mariniello, potentially “disrupt
proceedings by blurring the boundaries between pre-trial and trial stages”386, which
“would ultimately be detrimental to the rights of the accused, both in terms of the
right to a speedy trial and the presumption of innocence.”387
4.6 Conclusion
The author believes that an obligation to have the case all but completed by the time
of the Confirmation of Charges hearing, is inconsistent with the very notion of a
Confirmation of Charges stage. The varying levels of proof required at the different
stages are a key to the amount of effort that should be placed in the process. The
OTP must cross each hurdle as they approach it. The same resources cannot expect
to be allocated to the Confirmation of Charges hearing and the actual trial; the first is
completed in a matter of weeks, the latter often takes several years.
The author supports Mariniello’s view and believes that the OTP should, where
possible, argue this approach before the court in the future. The Prosecutor engages
in regular future planning and will no doubt take a strategic view on this
384 Supra note 284, para. 25.
385 Mariniello, T., “Questioning the Standard of Proof. The Purpose of the ICC Confirmation
of Charges Procedure”, Journal of International Criminal Justice (2015) 13 (3): 579-599, p.593.
386 Ibid p.598.
387 Ibid p.579.
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issue. However, by failing to address the issue at the next available opportunity, i.e.
at the next confirmation hearing, there is a danger that a precedent will be set. It is
therefore critical that the OTP seek to place the different stages in their correct
context to avoid blurring the lines between the trial and confirmation stages.
The following chapter will examine the OTP’s current strategic vision.
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Chapter 5 – The Future Strategic Direction of
the OTP
5.1 Introduction
This chapter will focus however, on the greatest strategic changes being embarked
upon by the Prosecutor and her team, and their possible long term benefit for the
wider Institution. It will look at some of the issues mentioned in previous chapters,
specifically the criticisms highlighted in chapter Two.
In order to predict how the Court will function in the future, it is proper to view
inside the OTP to understand what is required to create a solid foundation for the
next stage of its work to be completed. As will be discussed shortly, the management
of the Office went to great lengths to consider its future strategy and explain it to its
stakeholders.
The early years of the ICC have been marred by some difficult events in the
courtroom. The Office of the Prosecutor was forced to evaluate its strategy after
witnessing some flaws in its cases.388 However, while lessons learned exercises
began as early as the end of the Lubanga case, it was only with the change of
leadership that the Office really began to consider a shift in strategy.389 Nevertheless,
because of the lifecycle of a case or situation any shift in strategy can take a long
time to bear fruit.
This chapter will examine some of the biggest challenges faced by the Office in its
early years and take a close look at the solutions being developed to address these
388 For example, after receiving criticism from the Trial Chamber in the Lubanga trial over its
use of material collected under Art 54(3)(e) of the Statute, the Prosecutor at the time made a
policy decision to inform his staff not to accept evidence which had a ‘condition of receipt’
attached to it.
389 Ocampo’s strategy was to conduct intensive investigations and seek arrest warrants based
on the minimum amount of evidence. He would then instruct investigators to continue to
investigate and gather evidence in order to have enough to confirm the charges. Bensouda
favoured an approach of wider and if necessary longer, investigations where the majority of
the evidence could already be collected by the time of the confirmation of charges hearing.
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challenges. It will also make a judgement on the effectiveness of these solutions and
consider some new methods being pioneered by the Prosecutor Bensouda.
While considering the topics of strategy and strategic planning, the author has in
mind the policies and plans that guide the Office in fulfilling its mandate.  Yet it is
important to be aware that investigations and trials are dynamic. No two cases are
the same and it is necessary to react differently to different circumstances.  Within
the authors own team, the Information and Evidence Unit, the phrase ‘strategic in
the long term, tactics in the short term’ is often used.  For example, it may be a
strategy to use more forensic evidence and rely less on witness testimony; however,
where no forensic evidence exists within a given investigation, this may not be
possible.
5.2 New Prosecutor, New Strategy
The 2013 Strategic Plan issued by the OTP in April 2013, provided the first formal
indication that the Office was considering a change in its strategic approach. In
reality, in the opinion of this writer, there was not much of a strategy in place at all
during the infancy of the Office. A framework had been created, based to a very
large degree on the model of the ad hoc tribunals and the early days were about
attracting qualified staff. It has been suggested that:
“[d]uring its initial years, the OTP tested different approaches by relying on the
diverse experience of staff members who came from different professional
backgrounds. That experience applied within the very specific context and
mandate of the OTP, resulted in the development of the OTP Operations
Manual which, inter alia, defines the investigative standards of the Office. Since
then the Office has continued to review and improve its practices and standards
based on its experiences. As part of its strategy to enhance prosecutorial results,
the OTP is, amongst other things, analysing the Court’s decisions in relation to
its investigative practices to determine whether further changes to its
investigative strategies and standards, are required”.390
The author can testify because of his direct involvement in the Institution that the
initial stages of the OTP were challenging times, and the leadership of the Office
390 International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Strategic Plan 2013 – 2015, 03 April
2013. Copy on file with the author.
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relied on the diverse experience of the initial recruitment 391 in order to build a
functioning organisation.392 It appeared at times that the Office may have lacked a
defined strategy. This cannot be uncommon in a new institution, and while it took
some time to complete, new procedures and regulations were developed through trial
and error. Each organisational unit developed its procedures and eventually an
operations manual was drafted which attempted to bring together these procedures.
The Operational Manual has undergone a redraft and it is a living document, which
can be amended. It is not, however, a public document,393 which means it will not be
possible to extensively review it in this work.
According to one commentator close to the Prosecutor,394 “the ICC has no uniform
investigative approach across cases.”395 This is not necessarily the result of poor
structures or planning, but more because “each investigation is … shaped by the
constraints and opportunities peculiar to the situation … Thus, ICC investigations
are generally reactive, highly dynamic and unpredictable. Over time, evidence can
become available or can disappear depending on many factors, including political
circumstances and issues of security.”396 This situation will always remain the case,
particularly when the OTP only manages to open an investigation years after the
391 For example, Andrew Caley and Ekkehard Whitopf were both recruited from the ICTY
where they served as trial attorneys and Christine Chung was recruited from the US, where
she was a Federal Prosecutor, all as Senior Trial Attorneys. Caley and Whitopf were said to
have had a difficult relationship with the then Prosecutor.
392 According to one source, “the role of ICC Prosecutor was always going to be extraordinarily
difficult, under competing pressures from supporters and powerful detractors like the United States.
Moreno Ocampo’s greatest asset was an exemplary cadre of professional staff for whom working at
the ICC was more than a career—it was a vocation. ‘I loved this job’, an early recruit to the OTP told
us. ‘It was my life’. The Prosecutor had the opportunity to draw upon the accumulated expertise of
existing international tribunals and some of the world’s finest lawyers and investigators”. See Flint,
Julie and de Waal, Alex, “Case Closed: A Prosecutor Without Borders”, World Affairs
Journal, Spring 2009, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/case-closed-prosecutor-
without-borders - Last accessed 20/03/2016.
393 The author in his professional capacity has a copy and has contributed to a number of
sections of the Manual.
394 Professor of Practice at Harvard Law School. He held several senior positions within the
OTP between 2010 and 2013, including Investigation Coordinator and later Prosecution
Coordinator.
395 Whiting, Alex, “Dynamic Investigative Practice at the International Criminal Court, Law
and Contemporary Problems”, Vol. 76:163.
396 Ibid.
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event, for example, in Georgia.397 Nevertheless, decisions issued in some cases must
have caused the OTP leadership to consider its methods398 and judicial decisions
have likely impacted on the strategy being deployed by the OTP in recently years.
5.3 OTP Strategic Plan 2012-2015
This plan was first made public in October 2013 399 and Dov Jacobs 400 was
particularly cynical as to its reason for being. He claimed that it was essentially a
public relations exercise designed to gain additional resources from the Assembly of
States Parties, who agree on the Court’s budget at the end of each year. He states:
“This is made very clear in the Plan, which claims: there are no defensible
alternatives to the increase in resources In this sense, one can certainly not expect a
large amount of self-reflection on past errors and anything more than a cursory
attempt at self-criticism. But even with that in mind, as PR exercises go, this one
seems to me to be particularly empty.”401
Jacobs does not seem convinced that the OTP was being sufficiently introspective
and facing up to past mistakes, commenting that “[s]ome acknowledgment that
something needs to change at the OTP simply because things were not being done
correctly before would have therefore been welcome, rather than the Strategic Plan
blaming it on changing circumstances, the judges or lack of money.”402
The 2012-2015 Strategic Plan, which could be called the ‘post-Ocampo’ approach or
the ‘Bensouda approach’ highlights three new areas of change. Additionally, and
397 See: https://www.icc-cpi.int/georgia - Last accessed 15/08/2016.
398 For example, following the Lubanga debacle over the use of Article 54(3)(e) material, the
Prosecutor made a policy decision to permit the collection of evidence to which conditions
of use were attached only in exceptional circumstances, a decision that stands to this day.
399 The OTP Strategic Plan for 2012-2015, in addition to the previous one (2009-2012) seems to
have been published quite late. One would expect the strategic plan for 2012 to be issued in
2011, rather than in 2013.
400 Jacobs is a registered defence counsel at the ICC and also and Associate Professor at
Leiden University.
401 Jacobs, Dov, “Some Thoughts on the ICC OTP Strategic Plan: Trying to Build the Future
on the Failures of the Past”, 08 November 2013 -
https://www.justsecurity.org/2960/thoughts-icc-otp-strategic-plan-build-future-failures/ -
Last accessed 15/03/2015.
402 Ibid.
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while not being expressed in a strategic plan, lessons seem to have been learned from
the early cases and failures.
There appear, therefore, to be three main thematic shifts in the OTPs strategy:
1. Move away from narrow focused investigations.
2. Complete investigations at the time of the confirmation of charges.
3. Greater emphasis on forensic evidence while limiting the witness testimony
evidence.
5.4 Move Away from Narrow Focused Investigations
One of the persistent allegations levied at the former Prosecutor was that he just
sought to “secure quick convictions, rather than striving to capture a representative
range of crimes committed during a given conflict.”403 The policy of conducting
narrow, focused investigations, which was a hallmark of Ocampo’s tenure, while
causing ‘frustration … for investigators”,404 was justified on the basis that the Office
could not investigate indefinitely405 and it was a deliberate strategy based on an
analysis of the ICTY experience in the Milošević Case,406 where it took the Tribunal
six years to prepare indictments against Serbia’s former President.407 However, the
accused died four years into the trial and before the judgment could be rendered.408
To contrast this scenario, Prosecutor Ocampo’s method was to conduct
investigations in a short period of time, a few months, involving as few witnesses as
possible. 409 In 2006 Ocampo stated that his approach to meet the challenges
presented to his office was to “reduce the length and scope of the investigation.”410
According to Le Fraper du Hellen “In Uganda, it was a matter of drawing the
balance between covering the widest range of victimisation, which is one of the main
403 Glassborow, Katy, “ICC Investigative Strategy Under Fire”, 27/10/2008, Institute of War &
Peace Reporting, https://iwpr.net/global-voices/icc-investigative-strategy-under-fire
404 According to former member of the OTP’s Executive Committee (ExComm), Beatrice Le
Fraper du Hellen quoted in IWPR interview, Ibid.
405 Ibid.
406 ICTY, The Prosecutor v Slobodan Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54.
407 Ibid.
408 See: http://icty.org/cases/party/738/4 - Last accessed 01/01/2015.
409 Le Fraper du Hellen quoted in IWPR interview, supra note 402.
410 See: “Second public hearing of the Office of the Prosecutor NGOs and Other Experts”, 26
September 2006, https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP_PH2_HGNGO.pdf.
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guiding principles of prosecutorial strategy, and conducting a focused investigation
in a short time to have charges ready against those we considered most
responsible,” 411 This was the persistent strategy deployed by the OTP for the
duration of the Ocampo years.412 When she became Chief Prosecutor, Bensouda413
announced her intention to move away from this strategy reasonably quickly,
without specifically criticising the previous regime, stating 414 “[w]hile the past
strategy has achieved a number of positive results, the Office also has to evaluate
whether it is adapted to future challenges”.415 The OTP then presented a change in
policy direction. It wanted to move away from the focused and narrow investigations
where assumptions were made relatively quickly and a case hypotheses created at an
early stage, towards a more contemplative scenario, where a great volume of
evidence was collected and the Office might work on several case scenarios.
“Due to the higher evidentiary standards and the expectation to be trial-ready
earlier, the notion of focused investigations is replaced by the principle of in-
depth, open ended investigations while maintaining focus. The Office will
expand and diversify its collection of evidence so as to meet the higher
evidentiary threshold. It will apply multiple case hypotheses throughout the
investigation which will further strengthen decision-making in relation to actual
prosecutions.”416
411 Ibid.
412 An ex-Senior Investigator, Martin Witteveen may have revealed why Ocampo decided
upon the strategy of short investigations. While describing how the investigation team had
been working for a year and a half on a number of different crimes, and one day were told
without explanation to only focus on the crimes relating to child soldiers, dismissing 18
months worth of work, he says “he thought that this might have happened because the
investigation had already taken a long time, and prosecutors wanted something to present at court as
soon as possible”; simply that the investigative process was taking too long and it needed
some focus. See: IWPR article, supra, note 402.
413 Remember she had served as Moreno Ocampo’s Deputy Prosecutor for eight years prior
to her election.
414 Bensouda was part of this regime for almost its entire term. Although it is now widely
understood that Ocampo was not a consensus leader.
415 OTP Strategic Plan, 2012-2015, Executive Summary, 11 October 2013. Copy on file with
the author.
416 Ibid at 4.a, p.6.
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Although it is not clear what the words ‘while maintaining focus’ mean,417 it is a
clear statement that the intense investigation deadlines418 previously set by Ocampo
were to be exchanged for longer investigations where more evidence would be
gathered and reviewed before a decision was taken as to what charges should be
brought. The new strategy also seems to reflect the personality of the second
Prosecutor. In contrast to Ocampo, Bensouda appears to be more open, perhaps a
little less decisive and aggressive in her approach.419
While the Prosecutor has never really commented on the extent to which her office
evaluated the performance of the Office of the Prosecutor in the first years420 she
made it clear in a speech in Dublin in December of 2013, approximately 18 months
after she assumed office and shortly after the publication of her first strategic plan,
that “on the basis of my Office’s early experience and the lessons we have learned
from an evaluation of our early practices, my Office has revised its prosecutorial
strategy and policies, where necessary, to meet today’s challenges.”421 Since she
made this comment, the Office has opened a new investigation into crimes
417 Often these documents are drafted by a committee and undergo several revisions. The
meaning may have been lost through a re-draft. Whatever the explanation, it does not add
much and even complicates the point a little.
418 Moreno Ocampo was obsessed by the idea of ‘focused’ investigations: “So all I’m talking
about is the focus idea. And I love that. Because, yes, Lubanga is a small case; I love it. It’s a focused
case on the evidence we have and we move with that. That’s perfect”; from an exit interview
conducted by ICC Forum, see: http://iccforum.com/forum/ask-former-prosecutor - Last
visited 12/03/2015. In fact it was a standing joke within the Office, captured on an internal
staff video, in which the Prosecutor himself makes reference to in this interview. Although
not for public distribution, the author has a copy on file.
419 According to the New York Times “When Ms. Bensouda becomes the world’s most visible
prosecutor for a single nine-year term, she may bring a change of style with her soft-spoken, low-key
manner — a sharp contrast to her more publicity-conscious boss, who succeeded in quickly thrusting
the new institution into the limelight after it opened its doors in 2002”. See:
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/13/world/europe/fatou-bensouda-becomes-lead-
prosecutor-at-international-criminal-court.html?_r=0 - Last visited 02/06/2016.
420 It should be remembered too, that Bensouda was the second highest ranking officer
within the OTP for nearly the entire duration of the term of office of Ocampo and therefore a
member of ExComm. She was familiar and one assumes, agreed with the original strategies
adopted by the Office.
421 Bensouda, Fatou, Lecture, “The International Criminal Court – Current Challenges and
Future Prospects”, Co-hosted by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and
University College, Cork, 16 December 2013.
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committed in Georgia, 422 which will likely present an example of ‘today’s
challenges.’423
In this speech she told her audience: “We have moved to the concept of in-depth,
open-ended investigations, while still maintaining a clear investigative focus”. 424
However here she clarifies, its ‘clear investigative focus’. It remains a little uncertain
and it still does not explain what exactly she means. However, she goes on the point
out that “[w]e will test our case hypotheses throughout investigations in order to
strengthen decision-making in relation to prosecutions.”425 This is a big shift because
previously, the case hypothesis was developed very early on in the investigation
phase and rarely changed as the investigation progressed. Nevertheless, it is still
apparent that investigations cannot just go on indefinitely, and further it is unrealistic
to consider that all crimes will be punished.426
In early 2016 the Prosecutor issued a draft policy on ‘case selection’ in order to give
commentators the opportunity to provide the Office with feedback on how to choose
its cases going forward.427 This was a progressive move and demonstrated her desire
to engage with civil society, something Ocampo did not really engage in, particularly
later on in his tenure.
422 The application to open an investigation in Georgia was approved by the Pre-Trial
Chamber on 27 January 2016 and will initially focus on alleged crimes against humanity and
war crimes committed in the context of an international armed conflict between 1 July and
10 October 2008. The Prosecutor is seeking to investigate in and around South Ossetia. See:
https://www.icc-cpi.int/georgia - Last visited 02/06/2016.
423 To date all the cases before the Court have involved nations in Africa. The Georgia
Situation is likely to consider some of the actions of Russian nationals, and it is not
unreasonable to believe that Russia will not actively assist the OTP.
424 Ibid.
425 Ibid.
426 The role of state cooperation is also crucial to comprehensive investigation and
prosecution of crimes. South Africa, for example, allowing the Sudanese President, under
indictment by the Court, to travel into its territory in June 2015 without arresting him,
highlighted some of the challenges faced by the Court in relation to state cooperation.
427 See: “ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda, issues Draft Policy Paper on Case Selection and
Prioritisation for comment” - https://www.icc-cpi.int/legalAidConsultations?name=pr1238.
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5.5 Completing Investigations at the Time of the Confirmation of
Charges
The second major policy shift announced by Prosecutor Bensouda, is her Office’s
intention to be all but done with the investigations by the time of the confirmation of
charges hearings. Again, this is to be considered a big change. It is also a change the
author considers to be an error, or at least that it is being done for the wrong reasons.
This is discussed in greater detail in the chapter on Confirmation of Charges.428
Bensouda has said that “[i]n response to the expectations of the Judges and the
standards we are setting for ourselves, we are endeavouring whenever circumstances
permit, to be trial-ready by the time we bring cases before the Chambers. We are
also seeking to bolster our collection of evidence from varied sources and to use
enhanced state of the art methods of investigation.”429 Although not obliged to do so,
the Prosecutor will now aim to have the investigation all but complete at an earlier
stage in the process. The impact of this policy will certainly add pressure to the
investigation team and one has the impression that Ocampo would not have accepted
this pressure from the Judges.430
This topic centres on the principle of the right of the accused to receive a fair trial.431
In order to be fair, the Defence argue that they need to have all evidence disclosed at
the earliest possible moment, in order for them to have sufficient time to defend
against the allegations.432 The question therefore is, should the Prosecution have
collected all its evidence and all but completed its investigation by the time of the
confirmation of charges hearing?
According to a former staff member of the OTP, Montserrat Carboni, 433 in an
interview with IWPR,434“the OTP had a tendency to gather just enough evidence to
428 See: Chapter 4.
429 Ibid.
430 Moreno Ocampo was convinced in the idea of collecting only sufficient evidence to
proceed to next stage of the process. The idea of having the investigation largely completed
by the time of the confirmation of charges hearing was against his ideology.
431 See: Article 67 of the Rome Statute.
432 Usually a status conference with the parties before a judge will set out a timetable for the
disclosure of evidence.
433 Now a permanent representative to the ICC for the International Federation for Human
Rights.
94
secure an arrest warrant. This would then be built on to confirm the charges, and
then worked on again in order to clear the next hurdle in the case.”435 The logic for
the course of action was clear: different levels of burden of proof were required at
the different stages in the judicial process.436 The Prosecutor could therefore submit
an application for an arrest warrant with a relatively small amount of evidence, and
then go on to collect more in the event that she was successful, before going a step
further following the confirmation of the charges against the accused. The new
strategy seems to say that all, or at least the majority, of the evidence should be
collected already at the second stage.
The debate about when the OTP should complete its investigative activity is more to
do with a belief that the OTP is not presenting a strong enough case at the
confirmation of charges hearings. According to Whiting “…some judges insisting
that the prosecution complete its investigation appears to be a concern that the
prosecution is not bringing strong enough cases, or that it is bringing cases with
undeveloped evidence, with the hope of conducting substantial investigation as
proceedings unfold.”437 In fact there is no provision within either the Rome Statute
or the Rules of Procedure and Evidence to compel the prosecution to complete its
investigation prior to the pre-trial conformation of charges hearing.
As discussed in Chapter 4, the Appeals Chamber in the Mbarushimana438case, said
that “the investigation should largely be completed at the stage of the confirmation
of charges hearing. Most of the evidence should therefore be available, and it is up to
the Prosecutor to submit this evidence to the Pre-Trial Chamber.” 439 However,
434 Institute for War and Peace Reporting.
435 See “ICC Unveil New Investigation Strategy” - https://iwpr.net/global-voices/icc-unveil-
new-investigation-strategy - Last visited 09/08/2015.
436 ‘Reasonable grounds to believe’, is the standard for the issuance of an arrest warrant;
‘substantial grounds to believe’ is the standard required for the confirmation of charges and
‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ is what is required for a conviction.
437 Whiting, Alex, “Dynamic Investigative Practice at the International Criminal Court, Law
and Contemporary Problems”, Vol. 76:163,
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4374&context=lcp - Last
accessed 15/08/2015.
438 The Prosecutor v Callixte Mbarushimana, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10.
439 Ibid, Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I
of 16 December 2011 entitled "Decision on the confirmation of charges", 30 May 2012 -
http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/6ead30/, para. 44.
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‘largely completed’ is not the same thing as ‘completed’, and even with a thorough
examination of the Rules and the Statute, no evidence can be found by the author
that such a requirement exists.
The Appeals Chamber in the Lubanga Case was clear in its vision, stating “ideally, it
would be desirable for the investigation to be complete by the time of the
confirmation hearing".440Albeit in a dissenting opinion, and referring to the Majority
decision, Judge Fernández said that “[r]egardless of the desirability of the ideal that
investigations be largely completed before confirmation of charges, I find it
problematic that a policy objective has been turned by the Majority into a legal
requirement, something that cannot be done without amendments to the legal
framework.”441
Some believe that the “pre-trial judges have gone too far in mandating that the
Prosecution reach this stage by the confirmation hearing, unless it can show
exceptional circumstances requiring additional investigation”.442 It could be argued
that even the ad hoc tribunals, who are often cited as the model to be followed by the
OTP, never imposed such a rigid regime on the prosecution. Whiting asserts that
while “it is essential that the core elements of the charges remain fixed so that the
defence has proper notice, attempting to freeze in place the evidence at some point
before the trial is unworkable and will ultimately undermine the goal of the Court to
uncover the truth.”443
440 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment on the
Prosecutor's appeal against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled "Decision
Establishing General Principles Governing Applications to Restrict Disclosure pursuant to
Rule 81 (2) and (4) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence", 13 October 2006, para. 54 -
http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7813d4/.
441 The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, Decision adjourning the
hearing on the confirmation of charges pursuant to article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute, 3
June 2013, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi, para. 15 -
http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/2682d8/.
442 Whiting, Alex, “ICC Prosecutor Announces Important Changes in New Strategic Plan”,
Just Security, 24/10/2013, https://www.justsecurity.org/2215/icc-prosecutor-announces-
important-strategic-plan/ - Last visited 25/05/2015.
443 Ibid.
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5.6 Greater Emphasis on Forensic Evidence While Limiting the
Witness Testimony Evidence
The Court has built an entire administrative and procedural framework around the
management of witnesses. For example, within the OTP there is Unit called the
Protection Strategies Unit (PSU) which seeks to ensure the safety and wellbeing of
prosecution witnesses, in addition to a larger unit in the Registry called the Victim
and Witness Section (VWS).444 Nevertheless, the Court has experienced difficulties
with witnesses in several cases, but especially in the Kenya Situation. “Prosecution
witnesses in this [Kenya] case have been under siege. The Office of the Prosecutor
has identified a network of individuals who have been working together to sabotage
the Prosecution's case against Messrs. Ruto and Sang, by using bribes and/or threats
to either dissuade witnesses from testifying in this case or influence Prosecution
witnesses to recant their testimony.”445
Citing “[a]n unprecedented campaign on social media to expose the identity of
protected witnesses in the Kenya cases” and a “[c]oncerted and wide-ranging efforts
to harass, intimidate and threaten individuals who would wish to be witnesses”446 the
Prosecutor was clearly concerned for the safety of her witnesses.
The ICC was established with special consideration of the victims of the crimes it is
investigating. 447 The Prosecutor, therefore, has two reasons to want to limit the
exposure of victim witness to its judicial activity. The management of witnesses in a
444 The Victims and Witnesses Section (VWS) has a statutory mandate to provide protection,
support and other appropriate assistance to witnesses and victims who appear before the
Court. The Rules of Procedure and Evidence further stipulate that the Victims and Witnesses
Section shall provide witnesses, victims who appear before the Court and others who are at
risk on account of testimony with adequate protective and security measures and formulate
long-and short-term plans for their protection; recommend to the organs of the Court the
adoption of protection measures and assist witnesses when they are called to testify before
the Court.
445 “Statement of the Office of the Prosecutor regarding the reported abduction and murder
of Mr. Meshak Yebei”, 19/01/2015 - https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-stat-
09-01-2015.
446 “Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, on the
status of the Government of Kenya’s cooperation with the Prosecution's investigations in the
Kenyatta case”, 05/12/2014 - https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=stmt-05-12-2014
447 See for example: Rome Statute, Article 68(3) “...the court shall permit their [victims] views and
concerns to be presented and considered at stages of the proceedings determined to be appropriate by
the Court...”.
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Case which might never go to trial, or in the best case scenario, take many years is a
logistical burden for the Court. In addition, the experience of witnesses taking the
stand has been problematic for the Prosecution “it will also continue its strategy of
prioritising the collection of evidence other than witness testimony, for example
forensic and documentary evidence, voice and cyber communication, in order to
minimise personal risk as well as the risk of further traumatisation for the
witnesses”.448 Nevertheless, creating this environment and infrastructure will take
time and it is a longer term strategy, to be implemented on newer situations rather
than existing cases.
The Prosecutor has said that the issue of witness interference and intimidation is a
“significant challenge facing [the OTP] and the court proceedings”.449 The Court
currently has Article 70450 cases, concerning offences against the administration of
justice, going on in two separate situations, Kenya 451 and the Central African
Republic.452 It seems logical that reducing reliance on witnesses would remove these
problems. Additionally, the pervasive use of social media and mobile technologies in
society, including conflict zones, presents opportunities to the OTP to gather and use
computer generated evidence. In part to combat the specific challenges posed by the
use of witness testimony, the OTP have advanced a great deal in recent times to
create a capacity to collect and use electronic, forensic and open source, (or new
448 OTP Draft Strategic Plan 2013-2015, copy on file with author.
449 Bensouda, Fatou, “The International Criminal Court – Current Challenges and Future
Prospects”, a lecture hosted by the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs and University
College Cork in the Royal Irish Academy, Dublin, 16 December 2013.
450 Article 70 of the Rome Statute relates to offences against the administration of justice,
subsections states corruptly influencing a witness, obstructing or interfering with the
attendance or testimony of a witness, retaliating against a witness for giving testimony or
destroying, tampering with or interfering with the collection of evidence.
451 On 02 October 2013 an arrest warrant was unsealed against Walter Osapiri Barasa for
several offences against the administration of justice consisting in corruptly or attempting to
corruptly influencing ICC witnesses. See: https://www.icc-cpi.int/kenya/barasa.
452 On 11 November 2014, Pre-Trial Chamber II partially confirmed the charges against Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aimé Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidèle
Babala Wandu, and Narcisse Arido, and committed the five suspects to trial for offences
against the administration of justice allegedly committed in connection with the case of the
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo. See The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba et al, Case No.
ICC-01/05/01/13, Decision pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute , 11
November 2014 - http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/a44d44/.
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media), evidence. As with much of the new plans, only time will tell whether this
strategy is successful.
5.7 Draft OTP Strategic Plan 2016-2018
On the 8th July 2015 the Prosecutor published a draft version of her latest strategic
plan and invited interested “external partners, including States, intergovernmental
and non-governmental organisations, academia and affected communities” 453 for
their comments. The Prosecutor stated that “even as we see the positive impact of
our 2012-2015 Strategic Plan, we continue our efforts to consolidate the high
performance of the Office and to address challenges”454While the latest plan builds
on the previous one, there are some new developments, namely:
1. The impact of the in-depth investigations on the ability to react to other
priorities
2. Creation of a Basic Size model (The Basic Size Model of the Office of the
Prosecutor has two fundamental objectives:  First, is to ensure that the Office
has the requisite resources to fully meet its mandate under the Rome Statute;
and, secondly, to offer States Parties a reasonable stable basis for budgetary
planning)455
3. Creation of a coordinated investigative and prosecutorial strategy to close the
impunity gap.
The 2016-2018 Strategic Plan begins with some statistical data which shows that in
the previous reporting period, the OTP has seen an improvement in its success rate
of confirmation of charges decisions. It then goes on to say that “[i]t is anticipated
that the new strategy will yield similarly positive effects on conviction rates for cases
over the next few years”456. Their data is somewhat selective, as it only focuses on
confirmation of charges, not including the results of fully completed trials,
453 “ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda issues draft OTP Strategic Plan 2016-2018, for
comment”, Press release ICC-OTP-20150708-PR1129, 08/07/20415, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1129&ln=en.
454 Ibid.
455 OTP Internal Document, Basic Size of the OTP, 7 August 2015. Copy on file with the
author.
456 OTP Strategic Plan 2016-2018, p5, 06/07/2015.
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outstanding arrest warrants or any other metrics that could demonstrate the
productivity or efficiency of the Office. An informed observer might not therefore
share the same optimistic view of the results achieved by the OTP, and might even
consider them unrealistic.
5.8 Impact of In-depth Investigations on the Ability to React to Other
Priorities
The current draft plan sets out clearly that the balance between quality and quantity
has been considered carefully:
“The positive results achieved by the Office in the past three years have come at
a cost. The speed at which the Office has been able to respond to situations
calling for its intervention has been affected by its need to prioritise quality
over quantity of work. Some necessary investigations have had to be postponed.
This has impacted on the Office’s ability to react to ongoing crimes; negatively
influenced the perception of the Office; and forced the Office to overstretch its
resources creating undue, prolonged pressure on its staff”.457
Ever since its creation, the OTP has had to make choices and resources have always
been limited. However, the OTP is now taking great care to set out what it can and
cannot do with its available resources. It is therefore important for the OTP to be true
to itself and not be swayed by criticism. Now is the moment for Bensouda to deflect
criticism and continue in accordance with her strategy. The criticism will likely
never disappear.
“We solved the big issues; in other aspects people will always have their
opinions. Do they know the facts? Not always. Human Rights Watch
questioned how many cases we are doing, without mentioning the policy we
adopted in 2003. It’s my fault? No. But it’s okay. People make comments. I
think it’s showing the interest in the Court. I’m not trying to please people. I’m
trying to respect the law. And on this, no one can say I’m doing illegal things.
That’s why I’m proud. I managed to open seven situations, fully respecting my
mandate. No one can challenge that my cases are not grave enough, or my cases
are including the most serious crimes. We had to challenge, to discuss, to
appeal, but we are winning our cases. So, I’m doing what I have to do, and
respect for people who have different views is part of my duty.”458
457 Ibid, p.7.
458 Ibid.
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The OTP receives a vast amount of communications requesting the Prosecutor to act,
and while many of those who communicate with the Office will likely not read the
draft Strategic Plan, it is an effort to manage the expectations of the most influential
actors, namely the State Parties and the NGO’s with a specific interest in the Court’s
activities.
5.9 Creation of a Basic Size model
The OTP created an additional document in mid-2015 called the ‘Basic Size of the
OTP 2016-2018’. Its primary purpose was to forecast the basic required size of the
Office for the coming period in order to “create financial predictability for States and
a level of stability within the Office”459.Again, it is a way of justifying its resources
to the States. This is a new approach by the OTP and it was probably requested by
the Committee on Budget and Finance (CBF).
The idea is to create a vision longer than the usual annual budget cycle, and build the
foundation for an increase in budget over the planned period. The Office highlights
that it is “proposing a phasing in of the required resources to achieve the forecasted
basic size over a period of three years.”460
The Office had to deal with calls for a zero growth budget between 2009 and 2011
because “some ICC member countries ... raised concerns about the potential [of]
spiralling costs and inefficiency in many aspects of the Court’s work”461 . This
pressure, placed on the Prosecutor to choose where to allocate her resources was
considered by some to be a ‘capacity crisis’ which “threatens not only the ICC’s
effectiveness, but also its legitimacy”.462
The concept has two main objectives:
459 OTP Strategic Plan 2016-2018, supra note 455, p.7.
460 Ibid.
461 Evenson, Elizabeth and O’Donohue, Jonathan, “The International Criminal Court at Risk”
- http://www.opendemocracy.net.
462 Ibid.
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1. Ensure “the OTP has sufficient resources to fulfil its mandate under the
Rome Statute, based on past experience and a reasonable forecasting of what
lies ahead”463
2. Offer “States Parties a reasonably stable basis for budgetary planning.”464
The OTP plans to phase-in the model over a number of years. The Office makes an
effort to justify its proposals, and the document is based on the underlying
considerations. Additionally, the financial implications are also clearly laid out: the
OTP’s annual budget rising from 42.2 million Euro in 2015 to 60.6 million Euro by
2018.465
5.10 Creation of a Coordinated Investigative and Prosecutorial
Strategy to Close the Impunity Gap
The final important goal of the latest Strategic Plan certainly sounds ambitious.
Expectation management is discussed below in this chapter, and such headings do
not serve to help observers understand the limitations of the Court. This is the ninth
strategic goal of the OTP: Develop with partners a coordinated investigative and
prosecutorial strategy to close the impunity gap.466
The idea appears to be that crime is often not committed in isolation. In much the
same way as ‘organised’ criminals often carry out multiple crimes, those who
commit crimes under the Rome system might also be committing other offences, for
463 OTP basic size 2016-2018, International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, 14 July
2015, Executive Summary.
464 Ibid.
465 Ibid, p.7. The basis for the projections are: from experience gained that teams start off
small but grow and develop over the duration of the case, again based on actual experience,
the workload undertaken by the OTP and the final consideration being the reasonable
projection of future activity based on its current assessment of the workload.
In terms of expectation management this document is very important. Figures are justified
and costed and it will in due course, receive the scrutiny of the CBF and ASP. In many ways
it is sound management by the current regime and firmly places responsibility back in the
hands of the Court’s funders. What better excuse than to say that resources were requested
but, for whatever reason, were denied. Looking to the future of the OTP, detailed
engagements with the states, like this will help to build and keep trust between the two
partners.
466 OTP Strategic Plan, Supra note 455, p.31.
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example “transnational, financial [and] terrorism”.467 This goal seeks to enhance
cooperation with other law enforcement actors in what one commentator calls
‘complementarity 2.0’. 468 The Office, by virtue of its mandate, can only ever
address a “handful of cases”469 and therefore to successfully plug the impunity gap,
other global, regional and national organisations need to play a role. To achieve this
end, the OTP “invites relevant jurisdictions and organisations to take the lead on
addressing these other crimes”. 470 The Office might be able to share certain
information and evidence with its partners. Thus, analysing the relationship between
crimes generally, the OTP is seeking to assist in addressing certain associated
criminal activity outside of its mandate.
The OTP set out how this collaboration might take place. For instance, it could build
relationships with first responders, create knowledge centres, assist with the creation
of open source data-bases and generally collaborate, much in the same way as state
agencies might do in a domestic level.471
5.11 Expectation Management
Before we move on to the next section, on the budget of the ICC, it may well be
worth considering the sentiment expressed by Justice Jackson at the beginning of the
Nuremberg trials. A court like the ICC came to give hope to many that the end of
impunity is in sight and in many ways promoters of the new court could be accused
of getting swept along in the euphoria of the new institution:
“May I add that your personal encouragement and support have been a source
of strength and inspiration to every member of my staff, as well as to me, as we
go forward with a task so immense that it can never be done completely or
perfectly, but which we hope to do acceptably”.472
467 Ibid, para. 92, p.31.
468 See Whiting, Alex, Justsecurity.org article, supra note 293.
469 OTP Strategic Plan, supra note 455, para. 96, p31.
470 Ibid, para. 94, p31.
471 For instance, when the famous gangster Al Capone was arrested in Chicago 1931, it was
for, among other things, income tax charges.
472 Justice Robert H Jackson, “Justice Jackson’s report to the President on Atrocities and War
Crimes”, June 7 1945 - http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imt_jack01.asp - Last visited
27/07/2015.
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The management of expectations was never included in any strategy and, to a certain
extent, the Court is now paying the price for this. Three years after the installation of
Prosecutor Bensouda, there have been no new Situations.473 Describing the Situation
in the Ivory Coast, one commentator notes that the “victims’ high expectations for
impartial justice before the ICC—fuelled by the fear, especially among the victims
of crimes by the Ouattara-allied forces, that they would never get it at home—have
given way to frustration regarding a lack of progress in prosecuting all sides”.474High
expectations were created when Bensouda assumed control and now the reality is
beginning to set in. Ensuring that people understand the limitations of the Office
should be a key feature of any future strategy. Not merely pandering to those who
fund the Court, but explaining to those who the Court was set up to serve.
5.12 Is the Cost of International Justice Too High?
Before we leave this chapter, it can be noted that there is a growing chorus of voices
who believe that the idea of an international criminal court is out of time. This is not
necessarily without merit. In the summer of 2016 the British people voted to leave
the European Union, largely on the basis that it was too expensive and ineffective in
protecting their borders. This event led to serious conversations about the future of
the Union. Therefore, we must give due regard to those who have concerns about the
cost of the ICC.
The effectiveness of the ICC has been the subject of close scrutiny ever since its
creation in 2002. In the following years, the Court faced continuing criticism,
particularly directed at where trials have gone on for too long and in some cases, the
Court’s most high profile suspects continue to evade capture475. It has been described
as “inefficient, expensive and perhaps useless.”476 Moreover, it has been suggested
that the credibility of the Court may suffer, as a “high-profile suspect like al-Bashir
473 A second situation was opened in the Central African Republic, but this has not received
much attention as it was already listed as a ’Situation’.
474 Evenson, Elizabeth, “ICC success depends on its impact locally”,
www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/elizabeth-evenson/icc-sucess-depends-on-its-
impact-locally.
475 For example, Joseph Kony in Uganda and Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir.
476 Dicker, R., Evenson, E., “ICC Suspects Can Hide — and That Is the Problem”, JURIST -
Hotline, 24 January 2012 - http://jurist.org/hotline/2013/01/dicker-evenson-icc-suspects.php -
Last accessed 03/08/2016.
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who continues to function in a senior position, ostentatiously conducting official
visits to other capitals and hosting high-level visitors, flouts the warrant”.477 Such
assertions are frustrating for the Court’s officials, as it is well known to those
commentators that the Court lacks the capacity to ensue the capture of some of those
seeking to evade the Court’s jurisdiction.
These accusations against the effectiveness and efficiency of the Court, gain traction
and raise questions about the Court’s financial independence and bias. For example,
D. Hoile, Director of the Africa Research Centre and author of “Justice Denied: The
Reality of the International Criminal Court” expresses “deep concerns not just about
the ICC’s acute financial dependence upon western European funding corrupting the
court’s legal independence but also on the all too obvious inefficiencies in how that
money is used.”478
Another commentator reflects upon the economical and ideological dimensions of
the Court’s practice. In a study entitled “Commodifying Global Justice, Economies
of Accountability at the International Criminal Court” she urges actors of
international criminal law to become the “stakeholders of ‘global justice’”479 and
highlights some of the market-based terms being used by the Prosecutor: “return on
our investment is effective deterrence and saving millions of victims’ lives”.480
The article “The Failings of Ad hoc International Tribunals” considers the
experience of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and
highlights its drawbacks in order to learn from them in the future. The author
emphasises the role of the ICTY in creating a “new culture of human rights and
human responsibility, in which there can be no impunity” 481 for genocide, war
crimes and crimes against humanity. However, Zacklin believes that the ICTY, as
well as the ICTR, has encountered a number of problems that have “seriously
477 Ibid.
478 Hoile, D., “Justice Denied: The Reality of the International Criminal Court”, The Africa
Research Centre, p.19.
479 Kendall, S., “Commodifying Global Justice. Economies of Accountability at the
International Criminal Court”, Journal of International Criminal Justice (2015) 13 (1): 113-
134, Oxford University Press, p.117.
480 Ibid.
481 Zacklin, R., “The Failings of Ad hoc International Tribunals”, Journal of International
Criminal Justice (2004) 2 (2): 541-545, p. 541.
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undermined confidence in the Tribunals and raised questions as to whether they can
effectively promote respect for international justice and the rule of law”. 482 He
characterises the issues as: the decentralisation of power and accountability, heavy
bureaucratic structures, problems with outreach and reception by the victims. Zacklin
concludes the article with his opinion on the Tribunals as “too costly, too inefficient
and too ineffective.”483
British journalist Helena Cobban not only argues about the ineffectiveness of the
international criminal tribunals, she believes they are actually a bad influence on the
situation in the countries where the atrocities occur. She asserts that the idealists who
created the international tribunals and the International Criminal Court hoped that
these bodies would help check the power of governments and improve the well-
being of people who suffered under the atrocities of violent conflict. However, she
says, if you ask the people living in the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda, they are
unlikely to say that the Tribunals have brought about any sort of reconciliation.
Moreover, she argues that the work of the Tribunals has been too expensive,484
reflecting a now all too common theme.
Another critical approach towards the ICC is formulated by McCargo, 485 who
researches transitional justice, and comes to the conclusion that this model does not
work. The reason for such a conclusion is the political bias of the transitional justice
industry. The author turns to the study “International Justice in Rwanda and the
Balkans: Virtual Trials and the Struggle for State Cooperation” by Peskin, who
believes that the “tribunal’s ability to deliver justice hinges on how politically skilled
its leadership is.”486 Hence, “since all supranational transitional-justice arrangements
are essentially political, they lack the legitimacy to effect real change.”487 McCargo
482 Ibid p.542.
483 Ibid. p.545.
484 Cobban, H., “Think Again: International Courts”, 20 October 2009 -
http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/20/think-again-international-courts/ - Last accessed
10/08/2016.
485 McCargo, D., “Transitional Justice and Its Discontents”, Journal of Democracy, April
2015, Volume 26, Number 2, pp. 5-20.
486 Peskin ,V., “International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans: Virtual Trials
and the Struggle for State Cooperation”, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008,
236–237.
487 Supra note 484, p.9.
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believes that the international community should find a way to reach the goals of
accounting for the past and preventing future mass violence, seeking for more
“creative” decisions.488
One creative solution is to prosecute more international crimes domestically, or by
supporting countries with universal jurisdiction to prosecute these crimes.
5.13 Conclusion
According to Alison Cole,489 “[i]t is clearly an understatement to conclude that the
ICC has a busy year ahead. It will be a year caught up in transition as the results of
the past 10 years finally come to judgement, in the midst of an acknowledgment by
OTP that new methods are needed. Yet the results of new approaches adopted now
may not come fully to fruition for several years. The challenge will be to navigate
the time until then, with technical skill, transparency, and accountability.”490
There can be no doubt that the ICC has come a long way in its first fourteen years,
especially considering its many challenges. Remember the onslaught from the
United States administration of George W. Bush, which campaigned for the ICC to
“wither and collapse”, according to the former United States Ambassador to the
United Nations, John Bolton.491 It was natural, therefore for the Court to go through
a growing stage and make mistakes from which, it is hoped, were learned.
Today it may still be too soon to judge however, it is important to look at what the
OTP says about its own future, to try and appreciate if there is an understanding of
what did and did not work in the past. As is frequently pointed out in these pages, the
Court is new and many of those in leadership positions at the OTP gained much of
their experience within the Court itself and sometimes this can lead to a blinkered
view of the risks and opportunities. It is also important to analyse the excuses
488 Ibid p.18.
489 Cole is a frequent commentator on the OTP. She was previously a Special Assistant to
Luis Moreno Ocampo, an OTP Investigator, held roles in other international tribunals and
for the Open Society Justice Initiative.
490 Cole, Alison, “Upcoming Challenges for the ICC”, Commentary, International Justice
Monitor, 05 March 2014 - https://www.ijmonitor.org/2014/03/upcoming-challenges-for-the-
icc/.
491 Kaufman, Paula, R., “Bolton is on Duty as America’s Sentry”, Insight on the News, 22 July
2002, at 3639, available at 2002 ML 8338907.
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offered, as Dov Jacobs says: it can’t all be about the Judges or the lack of resources.
The ICC’s Registry recently underwent a painful ‘reVision’ process where they
looked at its entire structure, and abolished more than a hundred staff positions.
At the time of writing, the Court is under scrutiny as never before. Many of the
Court’s greatest supporters are questioning its legitimacy and if in the next few years
the OTP opens Situations or Cases which implicate ‘first world’ nations, then this
scrutiny will only increase.492
The ICC Prosecutor’s Office clearly believes that it needs greater resources to carry
out its work and is astute enough to know that this will involve a campaign to
convince its paymasters to fund it.
The combination of the strategic plan, the forecasted basic size and corresponding
proposed budget, the performance indicators and the risk management plan offers
State Parties and other stakeholders a comprehensive and integrated picture of the
way forward for the Office in the next strategic period, allowing them to evaluate
how their investment in the OTP as a leading international institution in the fight
against impunity is returned.493
Although, the author is of the view that there is not yet sufficient evidence that
‘universal jurisdiction’ trials, as a substitute for the ICC, would work. Furthermore,
the principle of complementarity means that the ICC should always be a court of last
resort. Therefore, if a State is willing and able to prosecute a case itself, it should be
free to do so.
While it is difficult to calculate if the Court represents ‘value for money’ the
representatives of Assembly of States Parties (ASP) charged with approving the
Court’s budget every year, spend considerable effort scrutinizing the accounts. A
sub-group of the ASP, called the Committee on Budget and Finance (CBF), is active
492 For example, the scrutiny in which William Schabas found himself placed under when he
accepted, in 2014, the position as Head of a UN Committee investigating the role of Israel in
the 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict shows that high profile roles in these very politicized situations
will lead to serious infringements in the privacy of individuals concerned. There is no
reason to believe that the same will not apply to the ICC Prosecutor, who held important
positions in the Gambian administration, prior to joining the ICC and ICTR.
493 OTP Strategic Plan 2016-2018, pp.7-8, supra note 455.
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at different times during the year looking to ensure that Court is well managed. For
example, any new permanent positions as well as post reclassifications must first
meet the approval of the CBF and then of the Assembly.
Having considered specifically the legal culture of the Court, the challenges
surrounding the confirmation of charges hearings and the future strategic direction of
the Office of the Prosecutor relating to the research question of this thesis, the
following chapter will offer the author’s overall conclusions including relevant
recommendations.
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Chapter 6 – Conclusion
6.1 Introduction
The goal of this thesis was to identify where the Court needs to establish a firm
framework in order to build on its success and learn from its mistakes. Because
much has been written about the Court, the author focused on specific areas that
were not widely commented upon, in an effort to address the Research Question
‘What are some of the biggest challenges remaining to ensure the long term success
of the International Criminal Court?’
From the research conducted for this thesis, the author concludes that the culture of
both the Court and the OTP is developing in a multi-cultural, public organisation,
way. Despite the strong focus on Africa in terms of the caseload, the Court seems to
be more strongly influenced by a western culture, if not at an executive level, then
certainly at a managerial level. In terms of the legal culture, this is also developing
all the time and there is now a substantial body of law created by judicial decisions.
As time goes by, the case law from the ad hoc tribunals will become less important
and the ICC will create a substantial body of settled law. There is a sufficient mix of
lawyers from different jurisdictions for now, but it appears that there are more and
more Common Law attorneys joining the OTP, although this might just be
coincidence and it could rebalance again over time.
With regard to the OTP strategic plan and style, it will not really be possible to
properly evaluate its success in the short term. However, it appears confident enough
to request more resources from the States Parties and it is investing heavily in
developing its electronic and forensic evidence gathering capacity, in line with its
strategic goals494 (no. 4).
The third element to the research question is related to the confirmation of charges
stage. The OTP needs to be relatively certain  that the merits of the Cases
approaching the confirmation of charges stage, are matching the expectations of the
494 OTP’s Strategic Goal Nr. 4 states: “further adopt the Office’s investigative and prosecutorial
capabilities and network to the scientific and technological environment in which it operates”, OTP
Strategic Plan 2016-2018.  Copy on file with the author.
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Pre-Trial Chamber. The aspiration to have the investigation completed by this time
can be a goal, but cannot become a rule. There will undoubtedly be times in the
future where, for strategic reasons, the OTP will move to secure the arrest of a
suspect and it simply will not be practical to have the investigation stage completed.
It should also be noted that even at a late stage, new evidence might come to light,
which the Prosecutor is obliged to examine, which could lead to long delays.
The challenges for the Court and the OTP are, of course, not confined to just these
topics. As stated by Ferencz:
“Nuremberg was little more than a beginning. Its progress was paralyzed by
cold war antagonisms. Clear laws, courts and a system of effective enforcement
are vital prerequisites for every orderly society. The matrix for a rational world
system has countless parts that are gradually and painfully being pressed into
place. The ICC is part of this evolutionary process. It is a new institution
created to bring a greater sense of justice to innocent victims of massive crimes
who seek to live in peace and human dignity. That’s what the ICC is all
about.”495
This thesis was born from the simple view that the OTP made some mistakes in the
early years, and that as it matures, it will learn from these mistakes and put in place a
solid infrastructure. Tested through experience and properly funded, it will
eventually produce an institution which will live up to the high expectations attached
to an international court tasked with prosecuting the most heinous of crimes.
“In writing the history of the ICC one has to carefully distinguish between its
operations and ideas. The legal bedrock of the court is its concept of individual
responsibility for war crimes. This was first pioneered in the Nuremberg Trials
1945 and thus makes the court itself a distinctly modern and post-WWII
phenomena. The idea of an international criminal law regime, however, goes
back centuries.”496
495 Benjamin B. Ferencz, a life long advocate of a permanent, international criminal court, at
the swearing in ceremony of Luis Moreno Ocampo as the ICC’s Prosecutor, The Hague, June
16th 2002.
496 Neureiter, Katharina, “When it all Began – Tracing the Birth of the ICC”, 10th January
2013, Justice in Conflict, http://justiceinconflict.org/2013/01/10/where-it-all-began-tracing-
the-birth-of-the-icc/ - Last visited 02/04/2014.
111
6.2 Key Conclusions and Recommendations
In order for the ICC to achieve its full potential and emerge as a successful
institution capable of investigating and prosecuting crimes under its jurisdiction the
author proposes the following recommendations:
1. The Prosecutor should pro-actively re-affirm why the Office is active in Africa.
The power and limitations of the Court remain misunderstood and despite much
valid criticism and commentary, there is a misperception about what the court can
and cannot do.  As the organ responsible for initiating preliminary examinations and
later full investigations, the Office of the Prosecutor has a role to play in ‘managing
expectations’.  The Prosecutor, for example, needs to raise her voice in addressing
persistent questions about the Court’s involvement in Africa. This issue was, at least
partially, laid to rest when the Court’s Pre-Trial Chamber granted the Prosecutor
permission to open an investigation in the Georgia Situation on 27th January 2016.497
In any case it needs to be highlighted.
2. The Court should develop a strategy for developing the local implementation of
International Criminal Law. The cost running the court is rising every year and there
is a concern that the cost of administrating international criminal law through a
single institution based in The Netherlands is no longer the most efficient model.
The Court has yet to support the use of international criminal law trials in national
jurisdictions, for example by sharing evidence.  While to be fair, to date this
probably has not been a practicable solution, the OTP should begin exploring the
opportunities to engage in positive complementarity with state parties.
3. The Court must move towards ensuring it creates a geographically diverse and
gender balanced work-force. The ICC follows the United Nations Common System
for its administrative framework.  This means, for example, that the staff grades and
job specifications are similar to those employed by the UN.  However, it is not
obliged to follow this system.  To date the administrative culture of the organisation
has evolved without much planning.  An organisation with staff drawn from so many
different countries, with differing cultural centres needs to pay a great deal of
attention to the well being of its staff.  Looking to the future the Court should
497 https://www.icc-cpi.int/georgia?ln=en.
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develop new policies on its treatment and development of staff to ensure they are
capable of meeting the challenges of the institution in the 21st century.  Future
recruits must be drawn from different regions of the world and the over
representation of certain jurisdictions must be realigned.
4. All organs of the Court should promote legal training of International Criminal
Law. The legal culture of the Court is also developing and therefore adequate support
infrastructures are required to ensure that lawyers from all over the world appreciate
the different nuances of the law.  Defence counsel need a solid and funded
association of members who can receive training and mentoring on this new area of
law.  Judges must be selected apolitically based solely on their abilities, with due
regard for gender and geographical distribution requirements.
5. The OTP must focus on building trust in its operations, through transparency and
predictability. According to the OTP’s 2013 – 2015 strategic plan:
“During its initial years, the OTP tested different approaches by relying on the
diverse experience of staff members who came from different professional
backgrounds. That experience applied within the very specific context and
mandate of the OTP resulted in the development of the OTP Operations Manual
which, inter alia, defines the investigative standards of the office. Since then the
Office has continued, formally and informally, to review and improve its
practices and standards based on its experiences. As part of its strategy to
enhance prosecutorial results, the OTP is, amongst other things, analysing the
Court’s decisions in relation to its investigative practices to determine whether
further changes to its investigative strategies, practices and standards, are
required.”498
Bensouda has made it clear that “one of the main goals of [her] tenure as Prosecutor
is to strengthen trust and respect for the Office and its crucial mandate by ensuring
further transparency and predictability in our operations. This goal is clearly
498 Office of the Prosecutor Strategic Plan 2013 – 2015, 08 March 2013, Strategic Goal 2.2:
“Further improve quality and efficiency of investigations”, p.7 - Draft copy on file with author.
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reflected in our strategic plans, and demonstrated in how we fulfil our
responsibilities under the Rome Statute.”499
Reviewing the performance of first Prosecutor and considering who should replace
him, one commentator said that “[t]o achieve the ICC's promise as a global court, the
parties to the Rome Statute must select a prosecutor who can meet the court's most
serious challenges: concluding trials; convincing governments to arrest fugitives;
conducting credible investigations in difficult places, such as Libya and Sudan; and
expanding the ICC's reach beyond Africa. This may be a lot to ask for, but the future
of the ICC depends on it.”500 This assessment moves away from Ocampo’s abstract
model to a more conventional system.
6. The Court must continue to target states who remain, for whatever reason,
outside the Rome treaty, to join the Court and to actively promote its mandate.  A
failure to secure convictions will certainly have an impact on the reputation of the
Court going forward. While the OTP and Fatou Bensouda retain a lot of good will
and the ad hoc tribunals took time to get established, there is a limit on the amount
time available to set the Court on its permanent course.
Speaking before the creation of the ICC, in 1997, the then UN Secretary General,
Kofi Annan said “[t]he establishment of an International Criminal Court will ensure
that humanity's response will be swift and will be just.” 501 While the sentiment
expressed is understandable, the reality has shown us that implementing international
criminal law is a challenge. This thesis has described some of those challenges but,
as ever, it is more complicated in practice than in theory.
It has been argued that the rationale for creating an international criminal tribunal
which is “meant to exert a potent moral authority that will deter current and future
499 See: “ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda, issues Draft Policy Paper on Case Selection and
Prioritisation for comment” - https://www.icc-cpi.int/legalAidConsultations?name=pr1238.
500 Kayne, David, “Who’s afraid of the International Criminal Court - Finding the Prosecutor
Who Can Set It Straight”, Foreign Affairs, May/ June 2011,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/Articles/2011-04-18/whos-afraid-international-criminal-
court - Last accessed 25/05/2015.
501 See: http://www.ngos.net/un/icc.html. - Last accessed 28/08/2016
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leaders from engaging in terrible criminal acts”, 502 was that this could not be
achieved by national courts. However, a significant problem is that many of the more
powerful nations are absent and probably unlikely to ever feel the wrath of the Court.
There are also States within the Rome system, such as the United Kingdom and
France, which probably believe that they, as mature democracies, would not face the
impact of charges brought by the Prosecutor because they largely fund the Court, and
have sufficient trust in their national systems that should an allegation ever be made
against someone in their jurisdiction, that they would have the ability to prosecute
those responsible. There are also those within the system, who believe they have
been treated unfairly, and they will surely loudly claim that the Court is not fit for its
purpose, further damaging its reputation.
7. The Court should strive to create a culture of introspection and learn from its
mistakes. Although widely seen as the successor of the ad hoc tribunals, the ICC
must find its own way. The author remains cautiously optimistic about the future. If
the Court can learn from the lessons of its early years, for example in the Lubanga
case, and assuming that it has not as an institution become too embedded in its ways,
and that it continues to get the support required from the States Parties, then the
Court will go on to create a substantial body of law, enabling it to chart a more
successful course.
International criminal law, therefore, is really a child of the 20th century. That is to
say, it was born and grew up in that period. Lessons were learnt and the political and
legal debate eventually shaped the final product. Now, in a new century, it will
mature and develop. At least that is the hope. Nothing is guaranteed and the success
of the ICC 503 over the next decade will have a critical impact on the future
502 McCargo, D., “Transitional Justice and Its Discontents, Journal of Democracy”, April
2015, Volume 26, Number 2.
503 Defining success in the case of the ICC is complicated. According to the Court, the
”primary mission of the International Criminal Court is to help put an end to impunity for the
perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole, and
thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes.”, “Understanding the International Criminal
Court”, p.1, http://www.iccc-pi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/UICCEng.pdf - Last accessed
25/05/2014. This is in keeping with a sentiment often expressed by Luis Moreno Ocampo,
who claimed his goal was no cases before the Court because there was no one to punish, that
is to say global peace. This utopian view would certainly be welcomed over a position that
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development of international criminal law. According to Luis Moreno Ocampo, the
number of cases that reach the Court should not be a measure of its efficiency. On
the contrary, the absence of trials before this Court, as a consequence of the regular
functioning of national institutions, would be a major success.504
An option that could be explored by the Court is to develop the capacity of national
courts to prosecute international crimes. This is not a new proposal, however, to date
it is one that has not been considered by the Court. In the book The International
Criminal Court in Search of its Purpose and Identity, the author focuses on the
challenges faced by the Court in building capacity on a national level. The lack of
resources and skills in addition to the complicated nature of the criminal procedure
itself, certainly presents hurdles to the national prosecuting bodies. 505 Bekou
recommends advancing the positive complementarity of the Court to provide the
basics for building the national capacity. To enable national investigations and
prosecutions, it is necessary to provide the assistance from the ICC and build the
bridge between the Court and the operational realities in the State Parties.506 To
combat the funding issue she suggests linking the capacity building to the
development aid goals and increase accessibility of grants to fit this purpose.507
Although this is a realistic option, it is not likely to happen in the short term. There
are many difficulties that would need to be addressed, not least the issue of witness
protection.
6.3 Future Research
During the course of this research project a number of issues came to the interest of
the author who was unable to explore the topic in further detail which however,
there were no cases before the ICC because of a lack of referrals or an inability to bring
suspects to face trial. While hard to define what success is, failure is easier to measure.
504 Statement by Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, June 16, 2003, Ceremony for the Solemn
Undertaking of the Chief Prosecutor. See http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/20BB4494-
70F9-4698-8E30-907F631453ED/281984/complementarity.pdf - Last visited 02/04/2015.
505 Bekou O., “Building National Capacity of the ICC”; Mariniello T., “The International
Criminal Court in Search of its Purpose and Identity”, pp. 134-146, Routledge Oxon 2015,
p.134.
506 Ibid p.145.
507 Ibid p.144.
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merit further analysis, and it is hoped that others will find it sufficiently interesting to
carry on the work.
In many ways the possibilities for further research for the Court are endless. Scholars
could focus on any part of the Court, or the Statute, or Rules and they would have
new and fertile opportunities to contribute new thought. Topically right now is the
threat posed from ISIS and there are a few scholars who are considering if the Court
could have a role to play in this field. Also interesting is the debate around the crime
of aggression, which was included as a theoretical possibility at the Uganda
conference in 2011.
A reoccurring theme throughout this thesis is the part played by the culture of the
organisation and the legal culture of the individuals who make up the Court. This is a
fascinating topic.
The lack of geographical diversity in certain parts of the Court is surely shaping how
it develops. The data is not easy to locate, but it is available. Even under Bensouda,
who is said to encourage the hiring of non-western female staff, the trend is towards
appointing western (WEOG) candidates, making both gender balance and
geographical distribution -both requirements of the Rome Statute-508 , to remain
distorted.
Art. 70 investigations are now part of the landscape of the Court and while there is
not yet much case material available to the public, other cases will come on stream
and this would be a good area for a researcher to pick as a topic now, because we are
likely to see much more development in this area in the next few years. Picking a
topic early will allow someone to start understanding their area and develop with it.
This is certainly a growth area.
In one study conducted on 2003, a Senior Trial Lawyer of the ICTY stated “at the
ICTY the police, rather than the lawyers, were given responsibility over
investigations and strategy. This was, I believe, somewhat problematic and has been
corrected to some degree in recent years. The nature of the investigations and
508 Articles 44(2) and 36(8) of the Rome Statute and Assembly of State Parties Resolution
ICC-ASP/1/Res.10.
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prosecutions at the ICC will require legal direction and coordination from the
beginning. The investigators should report to the lawyers who will be presenting the
cases at trial and confirmation.”509 However, the OTP waited nearly twelve years
before following this lead and placing their Senior Trial Attorneys at the top of the
hierarchal structure.510 If someone could gain access to the OTP, it would certainly
be worthwhile examining its ‘learning culture’, understanding what it says and what
it does.
As one commentator puts it, “[t]he Court is a work-in-progress, an amalgam of
normative commitments, legal understandings, political interests, diplomatic
bargains, and organization dynamics. It embodies idealistic conceptions of experts
from the end of World War II onwards, shaped by diplomatic bargains and pushed
by non-governmental organisations”511.
As previously mentioned, it is often interesting to draw comparisons between the
Nuremberg tribunal and the ICC. In the present context of looking to the future, it is
noteworthy that even though the world has changed a lot in the years since the
Second World War, the way international criminal law proceedings are conducted
has not changed much. Investigators gather evidence in much the same way and
prosecutors conduct the trials in a very similar fashion. Even the law itself did not
develop much since, until the early 1990’s, although it did develop quickly as a
result of the ICTY, ICTR and the other ad hoc tribunals.
It has been noted in the IMT trial that proceedings were, for the most part, document
driven512. That is to say that the use of witness testimony was not so significant.
Although this differs when it comes to the NMT trials in which witness testimony
played a much greater role. The OTP are likely to exploit social media and forensic
509 Schrag, M., “Expert consultation process on general issues relevant to the ICC Office of
the Prosecutor: Lessons Learned from ICTY Experience: Notes for the ICC Prosecutor”, 20
March 2003 - https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/library/organs/otp/Schrag.pdf.
510 At the ICC, for the first 12 years, each Situation had a Joint Team organizational structure
made up of an Investigation Team Leader, a Jurisdiction, Cooperation and Complementarity
Adviser and a Senior Trial Lawyer who each had joint authority, which was designed to
shift naturally as the case progressed. It was a model that generally was regarded as
problematic.
511 Schiff, supra note 184.
512 See: Persico, J. E., “Nuremberg: Infamy on trial” 92 (200).
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intelligence gathering capabilities, however it is unlikely that ICC trials will be able
to significantly move away from a heavily witness dominated proceeding.
6.4 The Kenya Situation
It is not possible to write a thesis on the ICC at this moment without at least
mentioning the Kenya Situation, which regrettably could not be examined in depth in
this thesis. 513 The Case presented several significant challenges for the OTP and
although it is still too early to fully understand what went wrong in this situation, of
the six suspects514 at the beginning of the process, not a single trial was finished. In
the Kenyatta case, summonses to appear were issued on March 2011 and the
confirmation of charges hearing opened on 21 September 2011. Charges were then
confirmed against Mr Muthaura and Mr Kenyatta but not for Mr Ali515, and the Case
against him dropped. Citing a lack of evidence, the charges against Muthaura were
dropped on 11 March 2013. The same outcome occurred for Kenyatta the following
year when on 5 December 2014, the charges against him were finally dropped. On
13 March 2015, proceedings formally ended516.
It was a hugely embarrassing defeat for the Prosecutor. In the other Case in the
Kenya Situation, the Ruto and Sang Case, the OTP fared a little better, but only in as
much as the proceedings continued for longer. Summonses to appear were issued on
March 2011 517 and the confirmation of charges hearing began on April 2011.
Charges were not confirmed for Kosgey, but were for Ruto and Sang 518 .
Consequently, the trial began on 10 September 2013 and ran until 5 April 2016. The
513 The Kenya Situation will be a very interesting topic for researchers. It is regrettable that
the Ruto and Sang Case collapsed when it did, because the author had already completed
his research. In any event the topic may not be quite ready to write about, as the OTP have
not really discussed the case much yet.
514 The Kenyan press dubbed them the ‘Ocampo six’
515 The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein
Ali, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article
61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute”, 23 January 2012 - http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/4972c0/.
516 https://www.icc-cpi.int/kenya/kenyatta.
517 None of the six accused was ever in the custody of the ICC, all appeared voluntarily when
required to do so.
518 The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11,
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome
Statute, 23 January 2012, para. 44 - http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/96c3c2/.
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Case finally ended when the Trial Chamber accepted a ‘no case to answer’ motion
issued by the Defence.
There might be a single positive aspect emerging from the Kenyan Situation,
according to Mark Kersten: “[t]he only silver lining, and an important one to
recognize, is that the institution’s investigators and prosecutors seem to be learning
from this failure and are committed to building much stronger and resilient cases in
the future.”519 The Kenya situation as a whole has been challenging for the OTP.  In
due course the Office will certainly review the different stages of the proceedings
and will need to reflect on what went wrong in the cases.  In the short term it is a set-
back in terms of the future success of the Court, however with honest introspection
and remedial action the institution may emerge a stronger organisation. This case
will certainly generate much comment and would be an interesting topic for further
research.
6.5 Resources: An On-going Challenge
One of the challenges that many organisations face, is the capacity to raise the
resources required to carry out their mission. In this regard the ICC is no different
from the situation faced by many publicly funded institutions in the national
jurisdictions of the States who fund the Court. While the funding of the Court’s
activities comes from its States Parties, in fact many countries pay nothing at all and
others very little. The majority of the funding comes from some of the wealthier
countries. However, the global financial crisis meant that even these wealthy
countries did not have budget surpluses and were forced to review their spending
commitments, “[d]espite improvements in Office resources over the past two years,
resources are still insufficiently aligned with the demands placed upon the Office for
intervention.”520
519 Kersten, M., “A Missed Trial or a Mistrial? The End of the ICC Cases against Ruto
and Sang”, Justice in Conflict, 07 April 2016, https://justiceinconflict.org/2016/04/07/a-
missed-trial-or-a-mistrial-the-end-of-the-icc-cases-against-ruto-and-sang/ - Last accessed
02/05/2016.
520 OTP Strategic Plan 2016-2018, supra note 455, para. 3, p.6.
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6.6 Final Observations
The Court, including the OTP, has developed well in its first generation.  Setbacks
are only to be expected in a new organisation, nevertheless good progress has been
made. With strong leadership, which pays attention to the cultural diversity of the
institution and which adheres to its strategic roadmap, then this author is confident
that the future success of the Court is secured. As the case law becomes settled the
OTP and other participants will have greater certainty over legal and procedural
matters and thus, become more effective at carrying out their mandate.
While the author is optimistic for the future of the Court, success is by no means
guaranteed. Despite many positive developments in 2016, there were also less
positive instances, for example the collapse of the Kenya situation. By demonstrating
objective analysis of breaches of International Criminal Law and by choosing its
cases transparently, the OTP will build trust in its work.  The Court must continue to
develop its staff to ensure the quality of its investigation and prosecutions are
conducted professionally.  Finally, if the Court continues to engage with civil society
and promotes its work, and even admitting its mistakes, then over the long term
history will judge it a success.
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